IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0810-19
THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.
RICARDO MATA, Appellee
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HIDALGO COUNTY
WALKER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MCCLURE, J., joined.
CONCURRING OPINION
Depending on the circumstances, the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona may be set
aside if the warnings themselves could create a threat to public safety. Giving warnings when a
kidnapping is involved will not necessarily create such a threat. But in Appellee’s case, if he was
properly warned and thereafter decided to remain silent, the police would have been in an untenable
situation where they would not know where the kidnapping victim was located and her safety could
be put at risk. For that reason, and not because it was a kidnapping of a child generally, the Quarles
public safety exception to the rule of Miranda applies, and Appellee’s un-Mirandized answers to 2
“aggressive interrogation” were admissible into evidence. I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals, but I respectfully do not agree with the Court’s reasoning and
cannot join its opinion.
I — The Quarles Public Safety Exception Is Not Categorical
The court of appeals decided the Quarles public safety exception did not apply because the
situation did not involve a missing gun. The Court today decides the exception does apply because
public safety—insofar as the kidnapping victim was a member of the public—was involved. From
my own reading of Quarles, the public safety exception is not categorical and does not turn on
whether there is a missing gun, whether there is a kidnapping, or whether public safety can be
generally pointed to. Instead, the exception applies when the Miranda warnings themselves can
cause more harm than good: when the warnings themselves implicate public safety.
A look at the facts involved in Quarles is necessary to understanding how the public safety
exception works, and, knowing how it works, it is clear to me that the situation in Appellee’s case
fails to meet that standard. In Quarles:
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol in Queens, N.Y., when a young woman approached their car. She told them that she had just been raped by a black male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the name “Big Ben” printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just entered an A & P supermarket located nearby and that the man was carrying a gun.
The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted [Quarles], who matched the description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter. Apparently upon seeing the officer, [Quarles] turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a drawn gun. When [Quarles] turned the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight of him for several seconds, and upon regaining sight of [Quarles], ordered him to stop and put his hands over his head. 3
Although more than three other officers had arrived on the scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the first to reach [Quarles]. He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. [Quarles] nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, “the gun is over there.” Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded .38–caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed [Quarles] under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651–52 (1984).
The police in Quarles were told that the suspect was armed, but when they apprehended him
he had no gun yet he had an empty shoulder holster. Any reasonable police officer could deduce that
the suspect must have gotten rid of the gun somewhere in the supermarket. Though the suspect could
not do anything himself with the now-missing gun, someone else in the supermarket could. If anyone
else found the gun before the police did, that person could present a clear and present danger to the
police, the other people inside the supermarket, and the people outside the supermarket should the
person leave with the gun. Plainly, time was of the essence.
In holding that there should be a public safety exception to Miranda, the Supreme Court
explained that:
if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles’ position might well be deterred from responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft’s question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. The plain import is that the Quarles public safety exception is intended 4
to prevent the Miranda warnings themselves from endangering the public. This could happen, as the
Supreme Court explained, where, after being informed of his rights, the suspect chooses to insist on
his right to remain silent and not answer any questions, but answers are necessary to prevent an
immediate danger to the public. Id. In Quarles, this was simple enough—there was a loaded weapon
somewhere in the supermarket, and “[s]o long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the
supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the
public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon
it.” Id.
Although Quarles involved a gun that, if not found, could be used to cause harm to the public
and Appellee’s case involves a kidnapped person that herself did not pose a harm to the public, if
the police could not find her in time the potential harm could have fallen on her. If Appellee had
been given Miranda warnings and he thereafter chose to remain silent in the face of the roadside
interrogation, his silence could have created an imminent danger to the safety of the kidnapping
victim, herself a member of the public, because her location was unknown and therefore her rescue
was not at all assured.
To be sure, she was actually located at an address that the police had identified during their
investigation, though they did not know it at the time. The police knew two locations where
Appellee’s phone, from which he had been making his ransom calls as “El Guero,” had pinged
from.1 One location was Appellee’s residence in Palmview; the other location, also in Palmview, was
where the victim was eventually found.2 As a result of their investigation, the police had probable
1 Rep. R. vol. 2, State’s Ex. 1. 2 Id. 5
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0810-19
THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.
RICARDO MATA, Appellee
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HIDALGO COUNTY
WALKER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MCCLURE, J., joined.
CONCURRING OPINION
Depending on the circumstances, the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona may be set
aside if the warnings themselves could create a threat to public safety. Giving warnings when a
kidnapping is involved will not necessarily create such a threat. But in Appellee’s case, if he was
properly warned and thereafter decided to remain silent, the police would have been in an untenable
situation where they would not know where the kidnapping victim was located and her safety could
be put at risk. For that reason, and not because it was a kidnapping of a child generally, the Quarles
public safety exception to the rule of Miranda applies, and Appellee’s un-Mirandized answers to 2
“aggressive interrogation” were admissible into evidence. I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals, but I respectfully do not agree with the Court’s reasoning and
cannot join its opinion.
I — The Quarles Public Safety Exception Is Not Categorical
The court of appeals decided the Quarles public safety exception did not apply because the
situation did not involve a missing gun. The Court today decides the exception does apply because
public safety—insofar as the kidnapping victim was a member of the public—was involved. From
my own reading of Quarles, the public safety exception is not categorical and does not turn on
whether there is a missing gun, whether there is a kidnapping, or whether public safety can be
generally pointed to. Instead, the exception applies when the Miranda warnings themselves can
cause more harm than good: when the warnings themselves implicate public safety.
A look at the facts involved in Quarles is necessary to understanding how the public safety
exception works, and, knowing how it works, it is clear to me that the situation in Appellee’s case
fails to meet that standard. In Quarles:
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol in Queens, N.Y., when a young woman approached their car. She told them that she had just been raped by a black male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the name “Big Ben” printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just entered an A & P supermarket located nearby and that the man was carrying a gun.
The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted [Quarles], who matched the description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter. Apparently upon seeing the officer, [Quarles] turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a drawn gun. When [Quarles] turned the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight of him for several seconds, and upon regaining sight of [Quarles], ordered him to stop and put his hands over his head. 3
Although more than three other officers had arrived on the scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the first to reach [Quarles]. He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. [Quarles] nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, “the gun is over there.” Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded .38–caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed [Quarles] under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651–52 (1984).
The police in Quarles were told that the suspect was armed, but when they apprehended him
he had no gun yet he had an empty shoulder holster. Any reasonable police officer could deduce that
the suspect must have gotten rid of the gun somewhere in the supermarket. Though the suspect could
not do anything himself with the now-missing gun, someone else in the supermarket could. If anyone
else found the gun before the police did, that person could present a clear and present danger to the
police, the other people inside the supermarket, and the people outside the supermarket should the
person leave with the gun. Plainly, time was of the essence.
In holding that there should be a public safety exception to Miranda, the Supreme Court
explained that:
if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles’ position might well be deterred from responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft’s question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. The plain import is that the Quarles public safety exception is intended 4
to prevent the Miranda warnings themselves from endangering the public. This could happen, as the
Supreme Court explained, where, after being informed of his rights, the suspect chooses to insist on
his right to remain silent and not answer any questions, but answers are necessary to prevent an
immediate danger to the public. Id. In Quarles, this was simple enough—there was a loaded weapon
somewhere in the supermarket, and “[s]o long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the
supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the
public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon
it.” Id.
Although Quarles involved a gun that, if not found, could be used to cause harm to the public
and Appellee’s case involves a kidnapped person that herself did not pose a harm to the public, if
the police could not find her in time the potential harm could have fallen on her. If Appellee had
been given Miranda warnings and he thereafter chose to remain silent in the face of the roadside
interrogation, his silence could have created an imminent danger to the safety of the kidnapping
victim, herself a member of the public, because her location was unknown and therefore her rescue
was not at all assured.
To be sure, she was actually located at an address that the police had identified during their
investigation, though they did not know it at the time. The police knew two locations where
Appellee’s phone, from which he had been making his ransom calls as “El Guero,” had pinged
from.1 One location was Appellee’s residence in Palmview; the other location, also in Palmview, was
where the victim was eventually found.2 As a result of their investigation, the police had probable
1 Rep. R. vol. 2, State’s Ex. 1. 2 Id. 5
cause to support search warrants to enter both locations. And the situation was arguably exigent such
that they did not even need warrants to enter both locations to search for the victim. In hindsight, if
Appellee was given Miranda warnings and he exercised his right to remain silent, the police
nevertheless could have rescued the kidnapping victim and Appellee’s silence would not have
created an imminent danger.
But at the time of the roadside interrogation, it was not known that the victim was at either
of the two identified locations. She could have been at a third, unknown location. This placed her
in a different and more precarious situation than the gun in Quarles, because at least in Quarles the
gun was somewhere in the grocery store, and it would have only been a matter of time to find it. If,
on the other hand, at the time of the roadside interrogation, surveillance had established and
confirmed the victim’s location and the police were confident that the victim was not in any
immediate danger, Appellee’s silence following the Miranda warnings would not have caused a
threat to the safety of the victim or the public, and the Quarles exception would not apply.
But her location and safety were not established and confirmed. Under the reasoning of
Quarles, which asks whether the warnings themselves could cause a threat to public safety, it was
reasonable for the police to conduct the roadside interrogation of Appellee without giving him
Miranda warnings. Appellee’s statement given during the roadside interrogation was therefore
admissible, and the court of appeals’s judgment, affirming the trial court’s exclusion of the
statement, should be reversed.
II — Conclusion
In sum, the Quarles public safety exception to giving Miranda warnings does not turn upon
the presence of a gun, whether someone was kidnapped, or whether public safety can be generally 6
pointed to. The exception instead turns upon whether the warnings themselves could create a threat
to public safety. Thus, I agree with the Court that the court of appeals erred in determining that the
exception was not met based on the lack of a gun. However, I disagree with the Court’s categorical
approach that a kidnapping of a child inherently implicates public safety and therefore qualifies for
the exception. As in Quarles, it depends on the circumstances. In this case, the police who stopped
Appellee on the roadside were faced with a situation where, if they had given Appellee the Miranda
warnings and he thereafter exercised his right to remain silent, they might never learn of the location
of the kidnapping victim in order to rescue her. The warnings themselves could have caused an
imminent threat to the victim’s safety.
I concur in the Court’s judgment only.
Filed: June 23, 2021 Publish