Massie v. Lightner

Centre County Court of Common Pleas

Massie v. Lightner

61 Pa. D. & C.2d 797, 1973 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 492

CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County

DecidedMarch 21, 1973

Docketno. 109

StatusPublished

This text of 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 797 (Massie v. Lightner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Centre County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Massie v. Lightner, 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 797, 1973 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 492 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).

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Opinion

CAMPBELL, P. J.,

— Plaintiff is a member of the Bellefonte Area Education Association. The teacher members of the association were engaged in a work stoppage (strike) from September 11 until September 26, 1972, when this court ordered their return to work. Thereafter, plaintiff’s employer, the Bellefonte Area School District, deducted from plaintiff ’s salary the sum of $563.76 for the 12 days that she did not work. She now brings this mandamus action to compel the school board to pay her for the amount withheld.

Defendant has filed a demurrer, alleging that the complaint does not state a cause of action.

The issue raised in this case is squarely answered by the Act of July 23, 1970, P. L. 563 (No. 195), the very act which gave plaintiff the right to strike. Article X, sec. 1006, of the Public Employe Relations Act states as follows:

“No public employe shall be entitled to pay or compensation from the public employer for the period engaged in any strike”: 43 PS §1101.1006

Plaintiff argues that she contracted to teach 180 days and that there is sufficient time to make up the 12 days within the school year if the Bellefonte Area School District extends the school calendar. The school directors have not done so. If the school board should decide to make up the 12 days, then plaintiff would be entitled to payment after she had rendered the service.

The court is aware of no principle of law which requires an employer to pay a person on strike for work which she did not perform. Furthermore, it would be a violation of the law to gratuitously pay the same. For these reasons, we enter the following order:

And now, March 21, 1973, defendant’s preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are sustained and the complaint is dismissed.

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CAMPBELL, P. J.,

— Plaintiff is a member of the Bellefonte Area Education Association. The teacher members of the association were engaged in a work stoppage (strike) from September 11 until September 26, 1972, when this court ordered their return to work. Thereafter, plaintiff’s employer, the Bellefonte Area School District, deducted from plaintiff ’s salary the sum of $563.76 for the 12 days that she did not work. She now brings this mandamus action to compel the school board to pay her for the amount withheld.

Defendant has filed a demurrer, alleging that the complaint does not state a cause of action.

The issue raised in this case is squarely answered by the Act of July 23, 1970, P. L. 563 (No. 195), the very act which gave plaintiff the right to strike. Article X, sec. 1006, of the Public Employe Relations Act states as follows:

“No public employe shall be entitled to pay or compensation from the public employer for the period engaged in any strike”: 43 PS §1101.1006

Plaintiff argues that she contracted to teach 180 days and that there is sufficient time to make up the 12 days within the school year if the Bellefonte Area School District extends the school calendar. The school directors have not done so. If the school board should decide to make up the 12 days, then plaintiff would be entitled to payment after she had rendered the service.

The court is aware of no principle of law which requires an employer to pay a person on strike for work which she did not perform. Furthermore, it would be a violation of the law to gratuitously pay the same. For these reasons, we enter the following order:

And now, March 21, 1973, defendant’s preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are sustained and the complaint is dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

61 Pa. D. & C.2d 797, 1973 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 492, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/massie-v-lightner-pactcomplcentre-1973.