Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Insurance Co. v. Morrison

745 S.W.2d 461, 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 470, 1988 WL 18743
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 28, 1988
DocketNo. 09 87 054 CV
StatusPublished

This text of 745 S.W.2d 461 (Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Insurance Co. v. Morrison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Insurance Co. v. Morrison, 745 S.W.2d 461, 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 470, 1988 WL 18743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

OPINION

BURGESS, Justice.

In 1984, Michael Morrison died when his car veered off the road and hit a tree. A handwritten note was found at the scene which appeared to be a suicide note. Primarily because of the note, the investigating officers concluded the collision was a suicide and ceased their investigation.

Whether Morrison died by his own hand became an issue because nine months before his death Morrison bought a life insurance policy from appellant, which provided that appellant was not obligated to pay proceeds if the insured committed suicide within two years of issuance. Appellee, [462]*462Morrison’s wife and beneficiary, brought suit against the insurance company when it denied appellee’s claim under the policy on the ground that Morrison had committed suicide. Only one special issue was presented to the jury: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Michael Wayne Morrison committed suicide?” The jury answered, “We do not.”

Appellant challenges the jury’s answer, arguing on appeal that the evidence establishes suicide as a matter of law and alternatively that the jury’s finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

We begin by acknowledging that there is a legal presumption against suicide. Combined Am. Ins. Co. v. Blanton, 163 Tex. 225, 353 S.W.2d 847, 848 (1962). Appellant has met its burden of producing evidence of suicide to rebut the presumption, however. Smith v. Tennessee Life Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). Once rebutted, the presumption is not evidence and is not to be weighed or treated as evidence. Blanton, 353 S.W.2d at 849; Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Krayer, 366 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex.1963). Suicide was a defense to the contract for insurance, though, so presumption notwithstanding, the burden of proof was upon the insurance company to satisfy the jury that the deceased committed suicide. Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 253 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1952, writ ref’d).

When inquiring whether evidence establishes suicide as a matter of law, a court of appeals must determine whether the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the jury’s verdict, amounts to more than a scintilla of evidence to support the verdict. Langlotz v. Citizens Fidelity Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex.1974). Because the evidence in this case was circumstantial, we may overturn the jury’s verdict only if reasonable minds could not differ as to the inferences to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence. Krayer, 366 S.W.2d at 780. Therefore, we inquire whether there is some evidence to raise the inference of homicide or accident, the only other possible hypotheses. Id.

Around midnight on November 15, 1984, Michael Morrison’s car veered off the road and ran head-on into a tree. A passerby discovered the car and reported its location at 9:45 the next morning. When a patrolman arrived at the scene, there were some twenty to thirty people milling around. The area was not secured until sometime after Texas Department of Public Safety troopers arrived at 10:08 a.m..

After the car had been removed from the scene, a trooper found a note and a pair of shoes and socks on the ground by the tree, covered with a passenger mat from a car. The deceased was not wearing shoes or socks and a passenger mat was missing from his car. The note was handwritten on a worn application for certificate of title, and read as follows:

I’ll always love you Babs. I have mistakes in my life and can’t face them like I should. Always I helped other people and it cost me my life. Sorry! Mike Tell Mom I love her. I wish you could have had a better life with me. I wish I could see you one last time, but that would just make ... Never let any take advantage of you. Sell everything and move out of Texas. [Sic.]

Appellant produced evidence at trial to show that Morrison was depressed at the time he died and was having marital, legal, and health problems. Morrison’s sister testified he believed his wife had been unfaithful to him and this belief had depressed him for some time. Morrison may have committed some dishonest acts at work shortly before his death and may have feared being caught. The autopsy showed Morrison had severe pneumonia in both lungs. His sister testified she urged him to see a doctor, but he refused. She testified that when she asked him “what was so important that he was going to sit there and let himself die over,” he responded, “ ‘Debbie, I would be better off dead.’ ”

Appellant’s hypothesis is that, despondent, Morrison decided to take his own life. He pulled to the side of a dark and desolate road, walked through the brush to a tree [463]*463and tucked his shoes, socks and a note under a passenger mat to protect them from fire in the event his car should explode on impact. Appellant speculates Morrison placed the shoes and socks with the mat in order to alert whoever found him barefoot to look for his shoes and socks; when they found them, they would find his note. He then went back to his car and, using the telephone pole as a guide, purposely drove the car into the tree. The jury was not bound to accept this hypothesis, however, and the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, does cast doubt upon it.

The jurors could certainly have been disinclined to believe that Morrison, or anyone, would purposely kill himself in the manner hypothesized by appellant. They may have found it unlikely that Morrison would choose to hit a tree that was half hidden behind shoulder high brush, when there were more visible obstacles in the area, including a bridge abutment and a telephone pole, any one of which would have been sufficient for the purpose and easier to reach. The jury might have also found it incredible that a non-professional driver could drive with the skill required to hit the tree on purpose. Morrison would have had to guide his car across gravel and grass, through a depression, then forty feet through tall, thick underbrush before hitting the tree. At the sixty to seventy miles per hour Morrison was traveling, approximately one and a half seconds would have lapsed between the time he left the road and the moment of impact. Morrison’s car skidded six feet upon leaving the roadway. Tire tracks show that Morrison made no compensating move after the skid. In order to hit the tree on purpose, then, he would have had to have predicted the skid and made adjustments in his driving path to compensate for the skidding. Two of the investigating officers, who themselves log many hours driving, testified that it would have been difficult even for them to have hit the tree purposely. No evidence was presented to indicate that Morrison had special talents as a driver.

There is some evidence to support an inference that Morrison’s death was a homicide. The expert testimony conflicted as to whether the note was in the deceased’s handwriting. The jury was free to conclude it was not. Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co.,

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Related

Smith v. Tennessee Life Insurance Co.
618 S.W.2d 829 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1981)
Bernard v. Dresser Industries, Inc.
691 S.W.2d 734 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Jordan
253 S.W.2d 906 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1952)
Langlotz v. Citizens Fidelity Insurance Company
505 S.W.2d 249 (Texas Supreme Court, 1974)
In Re King's Estate
244 S.W.2d 660 (Texas Supreme Court, 1951)
Combined American Insurance Company v. Blanton
353 S.W.2d 847 (Texas Supreme Court, 1962)
Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co.
638 S.W.2d 862 (Texas Supreme Court, 1982)
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Krayer
366 S.W.2d 779 (Texas Supreme Court, 1963)
Berne v. Keith
361 S.W.2d 592 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
745 S.W.2d 461, 1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 470, 1988 WL 18743, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/massachusetts-indemnity-life-insurance-co-v-morrison-texapp-1988.