UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:20-cv-03438 (TNM) v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Some three years ago, Plaintiffs sued the Government, seeking vacatur of various
immigration policies. They claimed that the policies were procedurally defective because the
Government did not first conduct an environmental analysis under the National Environmental
Policy Act. In the time since, this case has seen three rounds of dispositive motion briefing and
one Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs now seek to amend their Complaint again. This time, the
Court denies their request.
I.
Plaintiffs sued in November 2020, challenging the Government’s immigration policies.
Compl., ECF No. 1. While their initial Complaint was barebones, they amended it about ten
months later, adding a host of challenges to specific immigration policies. Amend. Compl., ECF
No. 17. The Amended Complaint included, as relevant here, a challenge to an unnamed policy
that they alleged instructed Customs and Border Patrol agents “to give permission slips to seek
more permanent legal status to those illegal border crossers they meet, and to help them board buses to destinations within the interior of the country.” Id. ¶¶ 232–34. Plaintiffs refer to this as
the “mass release” policy.
But less than two months after Plaintiffs amended their Complaint, it was already out of
date. The Government issued a new policy in November 2021 titled “Parole Plus Alternative to
Detention.” Exhibits at 2–4, ECF No. 58-4. And eight months later, in July 2022, the
Government changed policies again, this time to one called “Policy on the Use of Parole Plus
Alternatives to Detention to Decompress Border Locations.” Id. at 5–8. A year later, in May
2023, the Government again changed tack, issuing yet another new policy named “Policy on
Parole with Conditions in Limited Circumstances Prior to the Issuance of a Charging
Document.” Id. at 9–15.
While all that was going on, this case proceeded apace. The parties briefed, and the
Court ruled on, a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 19, 22, 23, 27. In
December 2022, after the second policy change, the Government turned over the administrative
record to Plaintiffs. Oct. 20, 2022 Minute Order; ECF No. 33. And from February through June
2023, the parties briefed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 34, 37, 38, 41, 43, 45.
The Court ruled on those motions in September, significantly narrowing the scope of the claims
and clarifying which Plaintiffs may have standing to sue. Massachusetts Coal. for Immgr. Ref. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL 6388815 (D.D.C. 2023).
Now, Plaintiffs move to again amend their Complaint. They wish to add a new claim
addressing the purported “mass release” policy they first identified in 2021. Mot., ECF No. 58.
This claim addresses the most recent version of that policy and is offered in response to the
Court’s finding that their previous claim was moot. Massachusetts Coal., 2023 WL 6388815, at
*9. The Government opposes Plaintiffs’ motion, and the motion is now ripe for decision.
2 II.
Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(d). Mot. at 1. Under Rule 15(d), a court “may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a
supplemental pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Because Rule 15(d) does not set forth a standard
for assessing motions filed under it, the Rule 15(a) standard presumptively applies.
Under Rule 15(a)(2), the “court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The three touchstones in deciding whether to grant leave to
amend are whether the amendment “will promote the economic and speedy disposition of the
entire controversy between the parties,” whether it will “cause undue delay or trial
inconvenience,” and whether it will “prejudice the rights of any of the other parties to the
action.” Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This is a “liberal standard,” Firestone
v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and in most cases, a court should grant leave
to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Still, there are limits. The choice whether to grant leave to amend is “within the
discretion of the trial court.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330
(1971). And amendment is sometimes unwarranted—particularly where there has been “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party,” or where an
amendment is futile. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. At times, the Court can also construe a significant
delay in moving to amend the Complaint as a constructive waiver of the new claims. Zenith
Radio Corp., 401 U.S. at 332. In any event, the Court must always assess the prejudice to the
nonmoving party in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. Id. at 330–31.
3 III.
Plaintiffs brought this case in November 2020. Compl. at 50. They amended their
Complaint once, as a matter of course, after the Government moved to dismiss. See Amend.
Compl.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). They now seek to amend their Complaint a second time, so
they require either the written consent of the opposing party or leave of the Court. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2). The Government has denied its consent, Opp’n at 1, ECF No. 60, so the question
here is whether the Court should grant leave to amend. It will not.
Plaintiffs’ motion comes too late in the day, and would work too much disruption to the
trial schedule, to be granted. Consider briefly the procedural history of this case. The first
Complaint was filed three and a half years ago, in November 2020. Compl. at 50. The current
operative Complaint was filed some ten months later, in September 2021. Amend. Compl. at
113. The parties and the Court have now labored for two and a half years under the operative
Complaint, filing and ruling on dispositive motions and conducting discovery.
Allowing amendment now would cause much of that time and effort to go to waste. The
Government has had the opportunity to challenge Plaintiffs’ claims at both the motion-to-dismiss
stage and the summary-judgment stage of this case. Those dispositive motions have winnowed
down the live issues to whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue regarding two specific policies.
And the Court’s upcoming evidentiary hearing is designed to address that issue, and that issue
alone.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:20-cv-03438 (TNM) v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Some three years ago, Plaintiffs sued the Government, seeking vacatur of various
immigration policies. They claimed that the policies were procedurally defective because the
Government did not first conduct an environmental analysis under the National Environmental
Policy Act. In the time since, this case has seen three rounds of dispositive motion briefing and
one Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs now seek to amend their Complaint again. This time, the
Court denies their request.
I.
Plaintiffs sued in November 2020, challenging the Government’s immigration policies.
Compl., ECF No. 1. While their initial Complaint was barebones, they amended it about ten
months later, adding a host of challenges to specific immigration policies. Amend. Compl., ECF
No. 17. The Amended Complaint included, as relevant here, a challenge to an unnamed policy
that they alleged instructed Customs and Border Patrol agents “to give permission slips to seek
more permanent legal status to those illegal border crossers they meet, and to help them board buses to destinations within the interior of the country.” Id. ¶¶ 232–34. Plaintiffs refer to this as
the “mass release” policy.
But less than two months after Plaintiffs amended their Complaint, it was already out of
date. The Government issued a new policy in November 2021 titled “Parole Plus Alternative to
Detention.” Exhibits at 2–4, ECF No. 58-4. And eight months later, in July 2022, the
Government changed policies again, this time to one called “Policy on the Use of Parole Plus
Alternatives to Detention to Decompress Border Locations.” Id. at 5–8. A year later, in May
2023, the Government again changed tack, issuing yet another new policy named “Policy on
Parole with Conditions in Limited Circumstances Prior to the Issuance of a Charging
Document.” Id. at 9–15.
While all that was going on, this case proceeded apace. The parties briefed, and the
Court ruled on, a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 19, 22, 23, 27. In
December 2022, after the second policy change, the Government turned over the administrative
record to Plaintiffs. Oct. 20, 2022 Minute Order; ECF No. 33. And from February through June
2023, the parties briefed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 34, 37, 38, 41, 43, 45.
The Court ruled on those motions in September, significantly narrowing the scope of the claims
and clarifying which Plaintiffs may have standing to sue. Massachusetts Coal. for Immgr. Ref. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL 6388815 (D.D.C. 2023).
Now, Plaintiffs move to again amend their Complaint. They wish to add a new claim
addressing the purported “mass release” policy they first identified in 2021. Mot., ECF No. 58.
This claim addresses the most recent version of that policy and is offered in response to the
Court’s finding that their previous claim was moot. Massachusetts Coal., 2023 WL 6388815, at
*9. The Government opposes Plaintiffs’ motion, and the motion is now ripe for decision.
2 II.
Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(d). Mot. at 1. Under Rule 15(d), a court “may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a
supplemental pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Because Rule 15(d) does not set forth a standard
for assessing motions filed under it, the Rule 15(a) standard presumptively applies.
Under Rule 15(a)(2), the “court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The three touchstones in deciding whether to grant leave to
amend are whether the amendment “will promote the economic and speedy disposition of the
entire controversy between the parties,” whether it will “cause undue delay or trial
inconvenience,” and whether it will “prejudice the rights of any of the other parties to the
action.” Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This is a “liberal standard,” Firestone
v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and in most cases, a court should grant leave
to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Still, there are limits. The choice whether to grant leave to amend is “within the
discretion of the trial court.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330
(1971). And amendment is sometimes unwarranted—particularly where there has been “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party,” or where an
amendment is futile. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. At times, the Court can also construe a significant
delay in moving to amend the Complaint as a constructive waiver of the new claims. Zenith
Radio Corp., 401 U.S. at 332. In any event, the Court must always assess the prejudice to the
nonmoving party in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. Id. at 330–31.
3 III.
Plaintiffs brought this case in November 2020. Compl. at 50. They amended their
Complaint once, as a matter of course, after the Government moved to dismiss. See Amend.
Compl.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). They now seek to amend their Complaint a second time, so
they require either the written consent of the opposing party or leave of the Court. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2). The Government has denied its consent, Opp’n at 1, ECF No. 60, so the question
here is whether the Court should grant leave to amend. It will not.
Plaintiffs’ motion comes too late in the day, and would work too much disruption to the
trial schedule, to be granted. Consider briefly the procedural history of this case. The first
Complaint was filed three and a half years ago, in November 2020. Compl. at 50. The current
operative Complaint was filed some ten months later, in September 2021. Amend. Compl. at
113. The parties and the Court have now labored for two and a half years under the operative
Complaint, filing and ruling on dispositive motions and conducting discovery.
Allowing amendment now would cause much of that time and effort to go to waste. The
Government has had the opportunity to challenge Plaintiffs’ claims at both the motion-to-dismiss
stage and the summary-judgment stage of this case. Those dispositive motions have winnowed
down the live issues to whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue regarding two specific policies.
And the Court’s upcoming evidentiary hearing is designed to address that issue, and that issue
alone.
Permitting amendment now would inject new issues into this case. The Court would
need to assess whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue over this new, as-yet-untested claim. That
may require re-opening of discovery. More, the Court would need to address the merits of this
claim. Although the Court has been able to evaluate Plaintiffs’ other claims through successive
4 rounds of dispositive motion briefing, it has had no such opportunity here. And the Government
would be entitled to seek, at a minimum, summary judgment briefing before the evidentiary
hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (b). But allowing more briefing would require the Court to
put off the upcoming evidentiary hearing and delay resolution of this case for several more
months. This delay would prejudice the Government.
Plaintiffs state that no further dispositive motion briefing would be necessary. Reply at
10, ECF No. 61. But parties have a general right to file such dispositive motions. See Jones v.
L.A. Cent. Plaza LLC, 74 F.4th 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2023). And in an Administrative Procedure
Act case like this one, summary judgment is ordinarily the mechanism the Court uses to evaluate
Plaintiffs’ claims. Cayuga Nation v. Bernhardt, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2019). This case
illustrates that very principle: Although the Court will soon be holding an evidentiary hearing,
that post-summary judgment proceeding addresses solely the Court’s jurisdiction, rather than the
merits of the case. So it is not true that the Court could leapfrog further dispositive motions and
take Plaintiffs’ new claims directly to judgment.
The resulting delay counsels strongly against amendment. Congress has expressed its
judgment that three years is presumptively too long for a civil case to remain pending in the
federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 476(a)(3). This case has already passed that threshold. The
Court is loath to let it linger longer.
Nor is it the case that Plaintiffs have been fully diligent in seeking amendment. See
Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. The Government turned over the administrative record in December
2022. ECF No. 33. At that point, Plaintiffs were on notice that the policy they had challenged
was no longer in effect. Still, they chose not to amend their Complaint. Instead, they made the
decision to proceed to summary judgment and argue that the claim was not moot. They were
5 entitled to make that choice. But, as a result, they passed up their opportunity to timely amend
their Complaint. Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 332 (explaining that failure to timely amend
complaint may be construed as waiver of right to amend). The Court cannot further delay this
case because they wish to do so now. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950)
(“There must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to
be relieved from.”).
Indeed, Plaintiffs could have known about the policy changes even before they received
the administrative record. As it turns out, at least one of the policy changes was publicly known
as early as September 2022. See, e.g., Ofc. of the Inspector Gen’l, DHS, U.S. Border Patrol
Faces Challenges Administering Post-Apprehension Outcomes Consistently Across Sectors at 4
n.6, 19 n.24 (Sept. 13, 2022), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-09/OIG-22-
68-Sep22.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7UJ-32LF] (Parole Plus Alternative to Detention). Still others
became public over the next several months and, by the time summary judgment briefing rolled
around, all three policy changes were publicly known. See Florida v. United States, 660 F.
Supp. 3d 1239, 1257 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (Policy on the Use of Parole Plus Alternatives to
Detention to Decompress Border Locations); Muzaffar Chishti & Kathleen Bush-Joseph, U.S.
Border Asylum Policy Enters New Territory Post-Title 42, Migration Policy Institute Policy Beat
(May 25, 2023), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/border-after-title-42
[https://perma.cc/RK7M-RYUM] (Policy on Parole with Conditions in Limited Circumstances
Prior to the Issuance of a Charging Document). Considering the public knowledge of these
policy changes, it is not clear that Plaintiffs used appropriate speed in amending their Complaint.
Weighed against the delay in resolving this case, the prejudice to Plaintiffs from denying
their motion is minimal. This denial does not prevent them from raising a claim based on the
6 new policy in another case. All it does is avoid tacking on a new claim in this case, where doing
so would circumvent the Federal Rules’ structure for pretrial dispositive motions practice.
In sum, then, the relevant factors weigh against granting leave to amend. Amending
would significantly delay the resolution of this case. Plaintiffs did not exercise reasonable speed
in seeking leave to amend. And denying amendment would not significantly prejudice Plaintiffs.
In the face of such lopsided interests, the Court must deny the motion, even under Rule 15(a)’s
liberal standard.
IV.
The Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ predicament. Attempting to litigate in the face of
quickly changing policies can be like playing Whack-a-Mole. Still, Plaintiffs have not suggested
that the Government has changed its policies to evade their lawsuit. Indeed, the changing
policies appear to result at least in part from a complex and dynamic situation at the border.
This lawsuit has already dragged on more than three years. It was filed during the last
presidential administration and, at this pace, it may well continue into the next. “At some point
all litigation must end. I see no compelling reason for further delaying this one.” Jimenez v.
U.S. Dist. Ct., 84 S.Ct. 14, 19 (1963) (Goldberg, J., in chambers). So the Court denies Plaintiffs’
motion, and the case will proceed to the evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ standing to sue as
scheduled.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion to Amend is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
2024.05.15 15:31:41 -04'00' Dated: May 15, 2024 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.