Mason v. Woods

172 F.2d 857, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2785
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 16, 1949
DocketNo. 484
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 172 F.2d 857 (Mason v. Woods) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mason v. Woods, 172 F.2d 857, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2785 (eca 1949).

Opinion

MAGRUDER, Judge.

On September 29, 1948, complainants, as executors under the will of Theodorus Bailey, deceased, filed the present complaint under § 204(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 924(a), claiming to be! aggrieved by an order of the Housing Expediter issued August 30, 1948, denying (except for a minor adjustment) a protest which had been filed by Bailey in June, 1947- Bailey died on September 25, 1947, while the protest proceedings were pending.

For many years Bailey had been the owner of a house located at 137 W. 82nd Street, New York City, which, prior to December, 1944, he had operated as a rooming house. He remodeled the premises into an apart-

ment house, with ten dwelling units, the maximum rents of nine of which are involved in the complaint now before us. These newly created housing accommodations were first rented at various dates in February, March, April and May of 1945, after the effective date of the Rent Regulation for Housing in the New York City Defense-Rental Area (8 F.R. 13914, 11 F.R. 4016). Hence, under § 4(e) of the Rent Regulation, the first rents charged by the landlord for these apartments became the lawful maximum rents, subject, however, to subsequent reduction by the Administrator, or his area rent director, by proceedings under § 5(c) of the Rent Regulation. The downward adjustment so provided was on the basis of the rent generally prevailing in the defense-rental area for comparable housing accommodations on the maximum rent date (here, March 1, 1943),. with appropriate allowance, in cases like the pres--' ent involving construction, to reflect general-increases in costs of construction in the area since the maximum rent date.

It was obviously necessary to establish a speedy procedure for reducing all such self-determined “first rents” which were out of line, in order to eliminate discrimination against landlords whose rents were frozen as of the maximum rent date, and otherwise to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Therefore, the Rent Regulation required, in § 4(e), that within thirty days after so renting “the landlord shall register the accommodations as provided in section 7.” Such registration consisted, as stated in § 7, of filing in the area rent office a registration statement, on a form provided for this purpose, which “shall identify each dwelling-unit and shall specify the maximum rent provided by this regulation for such dwelling unit and shall contain such other information as the Administrator shall require.” In cases where a proper registration statement was timely filed, the area rent-director received prompt information of the new renting and thus might speedily proceed to review the first rent to determine whether it ought to be reduced under the applicable standard. In such case, any order by the area rent director reducing the maximum rent operated prospectively only.

[859]*859If, on the other hand, the landlord failed to file a proper registration statement within the time specified, he ought not to gain by his own default. Therefore, § 4(e) of the Rent Regulation, as amended (10 F.R. 2404), provided that if the landlord should fail “to file a proper registration statement within the time specified”, the self-determined rent received by the landlord “shall be received subject to refund to the tenant ■of any amount in excess of the maximum rent which may later be fixed by an order under section 5(c) (1).” The subsection also provided that if the Administrator “finds that the landlord was not at fault in failing to file a proper registration statement within the time specified, the order under section 5(c) (1) may relieve the landlord of thg duty to refund.” In addition, by way of self-limitation upon the administrative power to order a refund, the subsection provided that where a proper registration is ■eventually filed, though not on time, “the landlord shall have the duty to refund only if the order under section 5(c) (1) is issued ■in a proceeding commenced by the Administrator within three months after the date ■of filing of such registration statement.”

After the landlord in the case at bar filed his registration statements for the nine apartments in question, the Area Rent Director; on July 28, 1945, served notice of a proceeding under § 5(c) (1) for the-reduction of the “first rents” to levels set forth in an attached schedule. This proceeding resulted in nine separate orders by the Area Rent Director, issued June 26, 1946, making reductions in amounts ranging from 10 to 15 per cent, much smaller reductions than he had originally proposed. As to seven of the apartments, the Area Rent Director found that the landlord had failed to file timely registration statements, and therefore he directed that the reductions be made retroactive to the respective dates of first renting and ordered refunds to the respective tenants of the amounts which had theretofore been collected by the landlord in excess of the reduced maximum rents so established.1 These orders were affirmed by the Regional Administrator, on petitions for review; and thereafter the landlord, in June, 1947, filed his formal protest against the reduction orders.

The protest was considered by a Board of Review. The Board recommended that the action of the Area Rent Director should be upheld, except as to minor adjustments upward, amounting to $6.50 per month in the aggregate for the nine apartments. The Housing Expediter, by order issued August 30, 1948, recited that he had independently considered the entire record, as well as the report of the Board of Review, and “finds that he is in substantial agreement with the findings and recommendations of the said Board”; and he therefore granted the protest to the limited extent indicated and in all other respects denied the same.

We shall first consider whether the facts appearing in the record warranted reductions in the “first rents”, under the applicable standards set forth in the regulation. On a factual issue of this sort, the scope of our review is narrow. We cannot set aside the administrative determinations as being “arbitrary or capricious” if there is substantial evidence to support them. Rabkin v. Bowles, Em.App.1944, 143 F.2d 600.

The Board of Review, and the Housing Expediter, relied upon an affidavit submitted by a Rent Inspector employed in the Area Rent Office. This they were at liberty to do if the inspector was qualified as an expert in the matters upon which he professed to express an expert judgment. Rabkin v. Bowles, supra, 143 F.2d at page 601. Complainants attack the expert qualifications of this inspector, but such attack cannot be sustained. It appears that prior to his employment in the Area Rent Office the Rent Inspector had had experience as a real estate broker in the Borough of Manhattan. Prior to the time he inspected complainants’ housing accommodations now in [860]*860question, together with other housing units he believed to be comparable, the inspector had had two and one-half years of experience in the Area Rent Office, a.nd in the course of such employment he had made “innumerable studies of the housing units registered with the Area Rent Office” and had “rendered many opinions regarding comparable rents and rental values which have been relied upon by the Area Rent Director in disposing of rent adjustment cases.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
172 F.2d 857, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2785, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mason-v-woods-eca-1949.