Mason v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 19, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00029
StatusUnknown

This text of Mason v. City of New York (Mason v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mason v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

MANAGING PARTNERS Phillip C. Hamilton, Esq. Lance A. Clarke, Esq. LLP HAMILTON|CLARKE October 16, 2023 BY ECF AND EMAIL Hon. Katherine Polk Failla United States District Judge Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street New York, New York 10005 Failla NYSDChambers@nysd.uscourts.gov Re: = Mason v. City of New York et al., No. 23 Civ. 0029 (KPF) Your Honor: We represent Plaintiff Andrew Mason, who was attacked by other incarcerated individuals at Rikers Island because of New York City policymakers’ deliberate indifference to the widespread and longstanding problem of inmate-on-inmate violence at Rikers. We write in opposition to Defendants’ belated letter motion seeking to bifurcate Monell discovery. Defendants’ request for bifurcation comes ten months into this case and five months into discovery. It is untimely and meritless. Bifurcation would be uniquely inappropriate in this case because Plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants are inextricably intertwined with his Monell claim—a reality borne out by Defendants’ own apparent inability to distinguish between Plaintiffs distinctly-pled claims against the City and Defendants Vincent Schiraldi and Kenneth Stukes in their individual capacities. None of the cases upon which Defendants rely in moving to bifurcate involves a widespread and systemic deliberate indifference Monell claim as this case does. Bifurcation under these circumstances would guarantee wasteful and duplicative proceedings. It would also contravene the interests of justice: The City’s ongoing deliberate indifference to the rampant violence at Rikers Island has been exhaustively documented, and it disserves the Constitution and the remedial purposes of § 1983 to pretend that this case is just about the actions of a few correctional officers. I. Defendants’ Motion is Untimely Defendants ignore that they consented to, and the Court entered, a joint scheduling order five months ago that does not bifurcate discovery. Dkt. No. 26 (Civil Case Management Plan, dated May 18, 2023). The current scheduling order cannot be modified absent good cause, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), and the “primary consideration” in determining whether good cause exists is the diligence of the moving party. Lieb v. Korangy Publishing, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 40, 2016 WL 8711195, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016). Defendants’ dilatory request demonstrates a lack of good cause for the motion. Defendants do not even attempt to explain why they waited five months into discovery—to raise this issue. ' They have known that Plaintiff was seeking Monell discovery since at least June 8,

' When Defendants filed a request to extend fact discovery in August 2023, they did not raise the prospect of moving to bifurcate Monel! discovery. Indeed, Defendants only filed this motion in response to Plaintiffs recent letter motion seeking to compel relevant discovery. Dkt. No. 37.

October 16, 2023 Page 2 LLP HAMILTON|CLARKE 2023, when Plaintiff served his first set of discovery requests. Indeed, the parties’ proposed civil case management plan—adopted by the Court in May—evinces that Defendants were contemplating filing a motion to bifurcate at outset of this case. See Dkt. No. 26 at 6 (noting that Defendants may “potentially” file a motion to bifurcate). Defendants offer no explanation why they waited over four months after receiving Plaintiff's discovery request to seek this relief. Il. Bifurcation Is Not Warranted “Just as bifurcation may save judicial resources, it [can] cause a waste of judicial resources.” Devito v. Barrant, No. 03 Civ. 1927, 2005 WL 2033722, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005). That is the case here. Defendants do not and cannot demonstrate that Rule 42’s goals of efficiency, convenience, and the prevention of prejudice would be served by bifurcation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Pavone v. Gibbs, No. 95 Civ. 0033, 1997 WL 833472, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1997) (movant’s burden). While Defendants’ letter seeks to recast Plaintiffs’ case as one involving only an isolated incident of neglect by individual correctional officers, this ignores the theories of liability Plaintiff actually asserts. Plaintiff's complaint includes three causes of action under § 1983 against Defendants Schiraldi and Stukes individually and a distinct Monell claim against the City of New York, none of which Defendants moved to dismiss.” Plaintiffs Monell claim is premised on the City’s ongoing failures to ensure that individuals incarcerated at Rikers are accorded even a modicum of safety from one another. See Dkt. No. 41 (FAC) at J] 113-123 (outlining policies and practices including housing violent and non-violent incarcerated individuals together; correctional officers’ routine abandonment of posts and failure to intervene in interpersonal violence; and the negligent hiring, retention, training of supervision of correctional officers, among other things). Defendants’ baseless assertion that Plaintiff's Monell claim is “frivolous” proves how weak Defendants’ position is on this motion. The opposite is true.* The City’s ongoing deliberate indifference to the safety of individuals at Rikers Island has been exhaustively documented. The court- appointed Nunez’ monitor—joined by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York— recently petitioned Judge Swain to place the facility in federal receivership after documenting that the City has repeatedly failed to correct rampant problems, including correctional officers’ routine

* Insofar as Defendants argue that the Court should indefinitely delay Plaintiff's depositions of Defendants Schiraldi and Stukes, Defendants continue to misapprehend that Plaintiff has sued Defendants Schiraldi and Stukes in their individual capacities for their personal indifference to the widespread constitutional violations occurring under their supervision. 3 Insofar as Defendants characterize Plaintiff's Monell claim as a “fishing expedition” and accuse Plaintiff of “staunchly pursuing” the depositions of Defendants Schiraldi and Stukes while making “no effort . . . to coordinate deposition dates of the officers who were working on and/or directly involved in the incident, including Officers Espino, Espejo, Figueroa, Allen, Conyers,” Dkt. No. 42 at 2, that argument is deeply disingenuous. Defendant identified Officers Espejo and Figueroa for the first time in a letter to Plaintiff on September 29, 2023 (two weeks ago), and that same letter also made clear that Officer Espino— whom Defendants identified in their initial disclosures—actually had no involvement in this incident whatsoever. If Plaintiff has not yet endeavored to depose the correctional officers involved in this incident, it is only because he only just learned their identities and would have deposed an officer with no relation to this incident had he done so. “ Pursuant to a consent judgment in Nunez v. City of New York, 11 Civ. 5845 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y.), a court-anpointed monitor has monjtored conditions at Rikers since October 2?. 20145.

October 16, 2023 Page 3 LLP HAMILTON|CLARKE abandonment of their posts and frequent failures to intervene in interpersonal violence.° Likewise, City policymakers have acknowledged the DOC’s widespread, systemic failures. For instance, on October 1, 2021—only four days before Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
Mason v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mason-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2023.