Mason H. Rose v. United States Postal Service

774 F.2d 1355, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 863, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 24523
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 31, 1985
Docket83-5830
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 774 F.2d 1355 (Mason H. Rose v. United States Postal Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mason H. Rose v. United States Postal Service, 774 F.2d 1355, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 863, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 24523 (9th Cir. 1985).

Opinion

FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs 1 appeal on behalf of handicapped persons the dismissal of their action for declaratory and injunctive relief to require the United States Postal Service to make all buildings leased by the Postal Service after January 1, 1977 accessible to handicapped persons and to enjoin the Postal Service from leasing buildings that are not accessible. 2 The district court held that the Postal Service had no duty to provide handicapped access to leased buildings under the Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1976), under sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (1976 & Supp. II), or under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const., Amend. V. See Rose v. United States Postal Service, 566 F.Supp. 367 (C.D.Cal.1983). We reverse.

DISCUSSION

The Architectural Barriers Act (Barriers Act) requires that buildings constructed or leased by the federal government be made accessible to handicapped persons. The issue before us is one of timing. The Postal Service argues that the Act requires leased buildings to comply when they are altered for some reason other than handicapped access. Plaintiffs argue that the Government must require compliance as a condition of the lease. The dispute centers on *1357 whether leasing or alteration is the event that triggers the Government’s duty under the Act.

Plaintiffs argue that the Rehabilitation Act imposes a similar duty on the Government under the provisions prohibiting discrimination against handicapped persons in Government programs and those requiring affirmative programs for hiring handicapped persons. Plaintiffs also rely on the Equal Protection Clause.

I. The Architectural Barriers Act.

A. Statutory Language.

The parties disagree as to which of two provisions in the Barriers Act controls the Government’s duty to make alterations in leased buildings for handicapped access. The resolution of this issue depends on whether we view section 4a or section 5 as the operative section of the Act.

Section 4a of the Barriers Act provides:

The United States Postal Service, in consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, shall prescribe such standards for the design, construction, and alteration of its buildings to insure whenever possible that physically handicapped persons will have ready access to, and use of, such buildings.

42 U.S.C. § 4154a. “Buildings” includes all buildings or facilities (with certain exceptions not relevant here) 3 “to be leased in whole or in part by the United States after [January 1, 1977].” 4 42 U.S.C. § 4151.

Section 5 provides:

Every building designed, constructed, or altered after the effective date of a standard issued under this chapter which is applicable to such building, shall be designed, constructed, or altered in accordance with such standard.

42 U.S.C. § 4155.

Plaintiffs and amici argue that the operative section of the Act is section 4a; that it requires the Postal Service to prescribe standards to alter buildings to make them accessible to the handicapped. Section 5, they argue, requires that the Postal Service follow its own standards when it undertakes that alteration.

The Postal Service, on the other hand, argues that section 5 is the operative provision; that it requires the Postal Service to alter buildings to make them accessible only when the buildings are otherwise being altered, and that it is only required to make accessible those portions of buildings that are being altered. 5

In adopting the Postal Service’s interpretation, the district court did not go beyond the statutory language because it found the language clear. 6 Amici and the Postal *1358 Service agree with the district court that the language is clear, but they urge opposite meanings from the “clear language.” Plaintiffs’ contention that the language is ambiguous gains strength not only from the vigorous disagreements among amici and the parties, but from the about-face in statutory interpretation of the statute made by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, the entity charged with adopting regulations to implement the Act. 7 In view of the Board’s present position that it does not know the meaning of the statute and our own difficulties in deriving the meaning from the language alone, we agree with plaintiffs that the statutory language is ambiguous. We turn to the legislative history for such illumination as it can bring. 8

B. Legislative History.

1. The 1968 Barriers Act.

The overall purpose of the Barriers Act, as passed in 1968, is not in doubt. It was “to insure that all public buildings constructed in the future by or on behalf of the Federal Government or with loans or grants from the Federal Government are designed and constructed in such a way that they will be accessible to and usable by the physically handicapped.” S.Rep. No. 538, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3214, 3215.

The original statute defined a building for purposes of the Act as

any building or facility ... the intended use for which either will require that such building or facility be accessible to the public, or may result in the employment or residence therein of physically handicapped persons, which building or facility is—
(1) to be constructed or altered by or on behalf of the United States;
(2) to be leased in whole or in part by the United States after [August 12, 1968], after construction or alteration in accordance with plans and specifications of the United States; or
(3) to be financed in whole or in part by a grant or a loan made by the United States after the date of enactment of this Act if such building or facility is subject to standards for design, construction, or alteration issued under authority of the law authorizing such grant or loan.

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Bluebook (online)
774 F.2d 1355, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 863, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 24523, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mason-h-rose-v-united-states-postal-service-ca9-1985.