IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
MASON FREDRICK, individually and No. 87580-9-I on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Appellant,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SKAGIT COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 2 D/B/A ISLAND HEALTH, a Public Hospital District,
Respondent.
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — Mason Fredrick filed a class action lawsuit against
Skagit County Public Hospital District No. 2 d/b/a Island Health (Island Health),
alleging it violated Washington’s wage requirements and labor standards under
the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA), chapter 49.46 RCW, and chapter
49.52 RCW by using an unlawful time-rounding policy for wages and failing to
provide sufficient meal periods. Island Health moved to dismiss Fredrick’s
complaint and compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement’s
(CBA’s) grievance procedure. The trial court granted the motion. We accepted
discretionary review of whether Fredrick’s statutory claims fall within the scope of
the CBA’s grievance procedure. Because they do not, we reverse the trial
court’s order dismissing the lawsuit and compelling arbitration and remand for
further proceedings. No. 87580-9-I/2
FACTS
On October 8, 2020, Island Health and representatives from its
“Diagnostic Imaging Technologists/Technicians” team executed a CBA. The
purpose of the CBA was to establish standards for wages, hours, and other
employment conditions. A provision governing employees’ work schedules
states that the “normal workday shall consist of eight (8) hours of work within
eight and one-half (8 ½) consecutive hours.” Another provision provides that
overtime “shall be computed to the nearest one quarter hour.” The CBA also
says that “[e]mployees shall receive an unpaid meal period of one half hour
during each shift and a paid rest period of fifteen (15) minutes in each four (4)
hour period of work.” The CBA provides a four-step grievance procedure and
defines “grievance” as an “alleged breach of the terms and conditions of the
[CBA].” It states that “[i]f any such grievance arises during the term of the [CBA],
it shall be submitted to the [four-step] grievance procedure,” which includes final
binding arbitration.
In July 2022, Fredrick began working at Island Health as a computed
tomography (CT) technician.1 In April 2023, she gave formal notice of her
resignation. On September 5, 2024, Fredrick filed a class action lawsuit against
Island Health, alleging it willfully failed to pay employees their owed wages by
using an unlawful time-rounding policy and willfully failed to provide second meal
periods to employees who worked shifts greater than 10.5 hours. She alleged
that the practices violated several Washington laws, including the MWA, chapter
1 The parties to the CBA included CT technicians.
2 No. 87580-9-I/3
49.52 RCW (wages), and WAC 296-126-092 (meal periods). Island Health
moved to dismiss Fredrick’s complaint and compel arbitration, arguing that her
claims fall within the scope of the CBA’s grievance procedure. Fredrick opposed
the motion, arguing the CBA does not bind the parties and, in any event, does
not apply to her statutory claims.
On November 20, 2024, the trial court granted Island Health’s motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration. It found that the CBA is valid and binding on the
parties and determined that Fredrick’s claims implicate the CBA’s terms
governing meal breaks, overtime, and payment of wages, so they fall within the
scope of the grievance procedure. It concluded that the claims are subject to
arbitration under the CBA and dismissed them for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
On June 26, 2025, Fredrick sought discretionary review under RAP
2.3(b)(2).2 On August 7, a commissioner of this court granted discretionary
review of “whether the CBA’s grievance provisions apply to her statutory claims.”3
ANALYSIS
Fredrick argues the trial court erred by dismissing her complaint and
compelling arbitration because her statutory wage and meal break claims are
outside the scope of the CBA’s grievance procedure. We agree.
2 Fredrick first appealed on December 13, 2024. On January 16, 2025, she moved this court to determine appealability, arguing that “she has an appeal as of right under RAP 2.2.” On January 28, a commissioner of this court determined that the order compelling arbitration “is subject only to discretionary review.” 3 The commissioner did not grant review on whether the CBA lacked mutual assent but ruled in a footnote that “Fredrick may brief the issue, and a panel of judges who consider this matter may address it if and as appropriate.” While Fredrick briefed the issue, we decline to address it.
3 No. 87580-9-I/4
We review a trial court’s order granting a motion to compel arbitration de
novo. Satomi Owners Ass’n v. Satomi, LLC, 167 Wn.2d 781, 797, 225 P.3d 213
(2009). To determine whether an arbitration provision is enforceable, we must
consider “whether the agreement encompasses the claims asserted.” Wiese v.
Cach, LLC, 189 Wn. App. 466, 474, 358 P.3d 1213 (2015). Arbitration clauses in
CBAs differ from arbitration clauses in bilateral employment contracts,
particularly as applied to statutory rights. Jeong Lee v. Evergreen Hosp. Med.
Ctr., 7 Wn. App. 2d 566, 577, 434 P.3d 1071 (2019), aff’d, 195 Wn.2d 699, 464
P.3d 209 (2020).
An arbitration agreement in a CBA does not encompass statutory claims
“unless the waiver of an employee’s right to [a] judicial forum for such claims is
‘clear and unmistakable.’ ” Cox v. Kroger Co., 2 Wn. App. 2d 395, 404, 409 P.3d
1191 (2018) (quoting Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs. Inc., 109 Wn. App. 347,
355, 35 P.3d 389 (2001)). A waiver of the right to a judicial forum is clear and
unmistakable if the CBA includes either (1) “an explicit arbitration clause wherein
the parties agree to submit all causes of action arising out of employment to
arbitration” or (2) “a general clause requiring arbitration under the employment
agreement, coupled with a provision that makes it unmistakably clear that the
statutes that are the basis for the asserted claims . . . are part of the agreement.”
Brundridge, 109 Wn. App. at 355. While a labor arbitrator can resolve
contractual disputes, it has no authority to invoke public laws outside the parties’
agreement. Id. at 356.
4 No. 87580-9-I/5
Our decision in Jeong Lee is instructive here. In that case, an emergency
room nurse at Evergreen hospital filed a class action lawsuit against the hospital,
alleging it denied nurses their statutorily guaranteed rest and meal breaks. 7 Wn.
App. 2d at 570-71. The hospital moved to compel arbitration under a CBA, and
the court denied the motion. Id. at 571. We affirmed. Id. at 571, 587. We
determined that the CBA’s grievance process “makes no reference of any kind to
any statute or to statutory rights.” Id. at 579. And “no part of the CBA explicitly
waives [the plaintiff]’s ability to enforce her statutory rights in court.” Id. So, we
concluded that the CBA “does not clearly and unmistakably waive [the plaintiff]’s
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
MASON FREDRICK, individually and No. 87580-9-I on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Appellant,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SKAGIT COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 2 D/B/A ISLAND HEALTH, a Public Hospital District,
Respondent.
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — Mason Fredrick filed a class action lawsuit against
Skagit County Public Hospital District No. 2 d/b/a Island Health (Island Health),
alleging it violated Washington’s wage requirements and labor standards under
the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA), chapter 49.46 RCW, and chapter
49.52 RCW by using an unlawful time-rounding policy for wages and failing to
provide sufficient meal periods. Island Health moved to dismiss Fredrick’s
complaint and compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement’s
(CBA’s) grievance procedure. The trial court granted the motion. We accepted
discretionary review of whether Fredrick’s statutory claims fall within the scope of
the CBA’s grievance procedure. Because they do not, we reverse the trial
court’s order dismissing the lawsuit and compelling arbitration and remand for
further proceedings. No. 87580-9-I/2
FACTS
On October 8, 2020, Island Health and representatives from its
“Diagnostic Imaging Technologists/Technicians” team executed a CBA. The
purpose of the CBA was to establish standards for wages, hours, and other
employment conditions. A provision governing employees’ work schedules
states that the “normal workday shall consist of eight (8) hours of work within
eight and one-half (8 ½) consecutive hours.” Another provision provides that
overtime “shall be computed to the nearest one quarter hour.” The CBA also
says that “[e]mployees shall receive an unpaid meal period of one half hour
during each shift and a paid rest period of fifteen (15) minutes in each four (4)
hour period of work.” The CBA provides a four-step grievance procedure and
defines “grievance” as an “alleged breach of the terms and conditions of the
[CBA].” It states that “[i]f any such grievance arises during the term of the [CBA],
it shall be submitted to the [four-step] grievance procedure,” which includes final
binding arbitration.
In July 2022, Fredrick began working at Island Health as a computed
tomography (CT) technician.1 In April 2023, she gave formal notice of her
resignation. On September 5, 2024, Fredrick filed a class action lawsuit against
Island Health, alleging it willfully failed to pay employees their owed wages by
using an unlawful time-rounding policy and willfully failed to provide second meal
periods to employees who worked shifts greater than 10.5 hours. She alleged
that the practices violated several Washington laws, including the MWA, chapter
1 The parties to the CBA included CT technicians.
2 No. 87580-9-I/3
49.52 RCW (wages), and WAC 296-126-092 (meal periods). Island Health
moved to dismiss Fredrick’s complaint and compel arbitration, arguing that her
claims fall within the scope of the CBA’s grievance procedure. Fredrick opposed
the motion, arguing the CBA does not bind the parties and, in any event, does
not apply to her statutory claims.
On November 20, 2024, the trial court granted Island Health’s motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration. It found that the CBA is valid and binding on the
parties and determined that Fredrick’s claims implicate the CBA’s terms
governing meal breaks, overtime, and payment of wages, so they fall within the
scope of the grievance procedure. It concluded that the claims are subject to
arbitration under the CBA and dismissed them for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
On June 26, 2025, Fredrick sought discretionary review under RAP
2.3(b)(2).2 On August 7, a commissioner of this court granted discretionary
review of “whether the CBA’s grievance provisions apply to her statutory claims.”3
ANALYSIS
Fredrick argues the trial court erred by dismissing her complaint and
compelling arbitration because her statutory wage and meal break claims are
outside the scope of the CBA’s grievance procedure. We agree.
2 Fredrick first appealed on December 13, 2024. On January 16, 2025, she moved this court to determine appealability, arguing that “she has an appeal as of right under RAP 2.2.” On January 28, a commissioner of this court determined that the order compelling arbitration “is subject only to discretionary review.” 3 The commissioner did not grant review on whether the CBA lacked mutual assent but ruled in a footnote that “Fredrick may brief the issue, and a panel of judges who consider this matter may address it if and as appropriate.” While Fredrick briefed the issue, we decline to address it.
3 No. 87580-9-I/4
We review a trial court’s order granting a motion to compel arbitration de
novo. Satomi Owners Ass’n v. Satomi, LLC, 167 Wn.2d 781, 797, 225 P.3d 213
(2009). To determine whether an arbitration provision is enforceable, we must
consider “whether the agreement encompasses the claims asserted.” Wiese v.
Cach, LLC, 189 Wn. App. 466, 474, 358 P.3d 1213 (2015). Arbitration clauses in
CBAs differ from arbitration clauses in bilateral employment contracts,
particularly as applied to statutory rights. Jeong Lee v. Evergreen Hosp. Med.
Ctr., 7 Wn. App. 2d 566, 577, 434 P.3d 1071 (2019), aff’d, 195 Wn.2d 699, 464
P.3d 209 (2020).
An arbitration agreement in a CBA does not encompass statutory claims
“unless the waiver of an employee’s right to [a] judicial forum for such claims is
‘clear and unmistakable.’ ” Cox v. Kroger Co., 2 Wn. App. 2d 395, 404, 409 P.3d
1191 (2018) (quoting Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs. Inc., 109 Wn. App. 347,
355, 35 P.3d 389 (2001)). A waiver of the right to a judicial forum is clear and
unmistakable if the CBA includes either (1) “an explicit arbitration clause wherein
the parties agree to submit all causes of action arising out of employment to
arbitration” or (2) “a general clause requiring arbitration under the employment
agreement, coupled with a provision that makes it unmistakably clear that the
statutes that are the basis for the asserted claims . . . are part of the agreement.”
Brundridge, 109 Wn. App. at 355. While a labor arbitrator can resolve
contractual disputes, it has no authority to invoke public laws outside the parties’
agreement. Id. at 356.
4 No. 87580-9-I/5
Our decision in Jeong Lee is instructive here. In that case, an emergency
room nurse at Evergreen hospital filed a class action lawsuit against the hospital,
alleging it denied nurses their statutorily guaranteed rest and meal breaks. 7 Wn.
App. 2d at 570-71. The hospital moved to compel arbitration under a CBA, and
the court denied the motion. Id. at 571. We affirmed. Id. at 571, 587. We
determined that the CBA’s grievance process “makes no reference of any kind to
any statute or to statutory rights.” Id. at 579. And “no part of the CBA explicitly
waives [the plaintiff]’s ability to enforce her statutory rights in court.” Id. So, we
concluded that the CBA “does not clearly and unmistakably waive [the plaintiff]’s
ability to bring individual statutory claims in court.” Id. at 580.
Here, like in Jeong Lee, the CBA has no explicit arbitration clause
encompassing all causes of action arising out of employment. Instead, the
CBA’s grievance procedure applies to only an “alleged breach of the terms and
conditions of the [CBA].” And Fredrick does not allege a breach of the terms and
conditions of the CBA. Instead, she alleges, among other things, that Island
Health violated the MWA and chapter 49.52 RCW by unlawfully rounding
employees’ time and failing to provide second meal periods to employees
working a shift over 10.5 hours. The CBA has no provisions that address
rounding employees’ time outside the context of overtime or that govern meal
breaks for shifts greater than 10.5 hours.
Island Health argues that Jeong Lee does not apply here because the
CBA is unmistakably clear that CT technicians agreed to meal breaks and wage
5 No. 87580-9-I/6
policies different from the statutory standards.4 According to Island Health, the
CBA’s language that “[e]mployees shall receive an unpaid meal period of one
half hour during each shift” encompasses all shifts, no matter their length. But
the CBA does not define “shift,” leaving it unclear whether the parties agreed to
only one half-hour meal break for any shift. Island Health also contends
Fredrick’s time-rounding claims fall within the scope of the CBA’s “Work
Schedule and Overtime” section. But no provision addresses the use of time-
rounding policies separate from overtime. So, it is not unmistakably clear that
the CBA encompasses the statutory basis of Fredrick’s claims.
Because no language in the CBA clearly and unmistakably waives
Fredrick’s right to bring her statutory claims in a judicial forum, we reverse the
trial court’s order dismissing her lawsuit and compelling arbitration and remand
for further proceedings.
WE CONCUR:
4 Under RCW 49.12.187(2), public employees may enter CBAs that vary from or supersede statutory rules about meal periods.