Mason 240482 v. Ryan

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 4, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-04987
StatusUnknown

This text of Mason 240482 v. Ryan (Mason 240482 v. Ryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mason 240482 v. Ryan, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

1 SH 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Nathan Sterling Mason, No. CV 19-04987-PHX-DGC (MHB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Charles L. Ryan, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Nathan Sterling Mason, who is currently confined in the Arizona State 16 Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis in Buckeye, Arizona, brought this civil rights action 17 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 19.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for 18 Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 4.)1 19 I. Background 20 On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated 21 the following claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment medical care claim against former Arizona 22 Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles Ryan in his individual capacity in 23 Count One; (2) an Eighth Amendment official capacity claim in Count One against current 24 ADC Director David Shinn; (3) an Eighth Amendment medical care claim in Count Four 25 against Nurse Practitioner Ende in his individual capacity; (4) First Amendment retaliation 26 claims against Special Security Unit Officer Taylor, Lieutenant Randall Lowe, Corrections 27

28 1 The Court will address the remaining pending motions (Docs. 34, 35, 38, 54) in a separate Order. 1 Officer (CO) III Jaymond Williams, Deputy Warden Ronald Abbl, CO II Evans, CO II 2 Kila, and CO II Vargas; and (5) a First Amendment retaliation claim and an Eighth 3 Amendment excessive force claim against CO II Hernandez in Count Three. (Doc. 28.) 4 The Court ordered these Defendants to answer the respective claims against them and 5 dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id.) 6 II. Legal Standard 7 “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 8 not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 9 Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 10 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 11 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 12 never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that 13 (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without 14 an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 15 public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only show that there are 16 ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 17 merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 18 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Shell 19 Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance 20 for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under this serious 21 questions variant of the Winter test, “[t]he elements . . . must be balanced, so that a stronger 22 showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d at 23 1072. 24 Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden of proof on each 25 element of the test.” See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 26 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a 27 mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the facts and law 28 1 clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th 2 Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 3 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner 4 litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and requires that 5 any injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct 6 the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 987, 7 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 8 III. Relevant Facts 9 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 10 In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff states that “he has suffered 11 chronic pain since 12/2015” and that he “is only provided ibuprofen 600 mg, 3x daily, and 12 has not even rec[ei]ved that for over a month[.]” (Doc. 4 at 1.) Plaintiff states that he had 13 an MRI on December 16, 2016 and saw a pain management specialist on March 28, 2017, 14 and he was “diagnosed with severe bulging/herniated cervical disc’s [sic], degenerative 15 disc disease, severe spinal stenosis, radiculopathy, and other serious spine conditions.” (Id. 16 at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that on October 31, 2018, he had spine surgery, but he is still 17 currently experiencing excruciating, chronic pain in his upper back, left shoulder, and neck. 18 (Id.) 19 B. Plaintiff’s Medical Records 20 In opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Defendant Shinn 21 presented the following evidence of Plaintiff’s medical treatment. On December 2, 2019, 22 Plaintiff was seen by Nurse Practitioner (NP) Cassidy Morales for complaints of chronic 23 neck and back pain. (Doc. 66-1 at 46.) Plaintiff reported that he had cervical surgery in 24 2018 and “that since the surgery he has continued to have pain” that “is increasing in 25 severity and radiating to his upper back and both of his arms.” (Id.) Plaintiff stated that 26 Keppra did not help his pain and, he requested to be prescribed Tramadol instead. (Id.) 27 Plaintiff was prescribed Tramadol. (Id.) NP Morales noted that most recent x-rays 28 1 indicated that Plaintiff’s “[a]lignment remains satisfactory with hardware in place since 2 prior exam. Odontoid remains remains intact.” (Id.) 3 On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff was seen onsite by NP Oyuki Coronado to follow-up 4 on Plaintiff’s December 23, 2019 blood test that showed non-detectable levels of 5 Tramadol. (Id. at 12, 43.) Plaintiff reported that he had been taking his Tramadol and was 6 “unsure why the non[-]detectable level came up.” (Id.) Plaintiff also reported that he was 7 “feeling well today” and the Tramadol had been helping his pain. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that 8 he would like to keep taking Tramadol if possible. (Id.) NP Coronado educated Plaintiff 9 on medication compliance and made a note to speak to the medical director in order to 10 clarify the results of Plaintiff’s blood test. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff’s medications were not 11 changed at this time. (Id.) 12 A January 24, 2020 medical record indicates that Plaintiff was returned to the prison 13 after an offsite appointment at AZ-Tech Radiology where he had a cervical and thoracic 14 spine MRI taken. (Doc. 66-1 at 2.) The medical record also indicates that Plaintiff has a 15 prescription for Tramadol that is valid until February 29, 2020.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Mason 240482 v. Ryan, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mason-240482-v-ryan-azd-2020.