Mashid Wadeea, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedNovember 19, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-01587
StatusUnknown

This text of Mashid Wadeea, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Mashid Wadeea, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mashid Wadeea, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MASHID WADEEA, Individually and on Case No.: 24-cv-1587-JLS-DDL Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, 11 ORDER RE MOTIONS TO SEAL Plaintiff, 12 v. [Dkt. Nos. 111, 114, 123, 126] 13 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, 14

15 Defendant.

17 Before the Court are four motions to seal. Dkt. No. 111, 114, 123, 126. First, Plaintiff 18 moves to seal portions of their opposition to Defendant’s motion for protective order and 19 two accompanying exhibits in their entirety. Dkt. No. 111. The other three motions concern 20 Plaintiff’s motion to compel, Defendant’s opposition, and Plaintiff’s reply, seeking to seal 21 the Dealer Agreement in its entirety and all references thereto. Dkt. No. 114 (Plaintiff’s 22 Motion to Compel), Dkt. No. 123 (Defendant’s Response in Opposition), Dkt. No. 126 23 (Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response). For the reasons explained below, the Court 24 DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion to seal her opposition to Defendant’s motion 25 for protective order and GRANTS the other three motions to seal. 26 LEGAL STANDARDS 27 The public enjoys “a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 28 including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 1 597 (1978). This longstanding principle “is based on the need for federal courts, although 2 independent – indeed, particularly because they are independent – to have a measure of 3 accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.” Ctr. 4 for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016). Thus, when 5 evaluating a request to seal judicial records, courts apply “a strong presumption in favor of 6 access” to those records. Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th 7 Cir. 2006).1 The party requesting sealing bears the burden of overcoming this strong 8 presumption. Id. 9 “Generally, the Court applies a good cause standard to motions to seal documents 10 related to a discovery motion.” Dunsmore v. San Diego Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 20-CV- 11 406-AJB-DDL, 2024 WL 628021, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2024). Although less 12 demanding than the “compelling reasons” standard, “good cause” nevertheless requires a 13 particularized showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if the information is 14 disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 15 (9th Cir. 2002). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or 16 articulated reasoning,” do not satisfy the good cause standard. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l 17 Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). 18 ANALYSIS 19 A. Dkt. No. 111 20 Plaintiff moves unopposed to seal Exhibits 5 and 6 to her opposition to Defendant’s 21 motion for a protective order [Dkt. No. 113] and the portions of the opposition referencing 22 those exhibits. Dkt. No. 111. These exhibits contain information designated by Defendant 23 as “Confidential” pursuant to the Protective Order. Dkt. No. 111 at 2. Specifically, Exhibit 24 5 is “an internal MBUSA email exchange” discussing “warranty claims made on tires.” 25 Dkt. No. 119-1, Declaration of Shawn R. Obi in Support of Defendant Mercedes-Benz Usa, 26 LLC’s Joinder to Plaintiff’s Unopposed Administrative Motion to File Under Seal (“Obi 27 Decl.”) at ¶ 6. Exhibit 6 is “an email exchange containing…discussions between MBUSA 28 1 and a third-party dealer regarding customer information and concerns” relating to tires. Id. 2 at ¶ 7. 3 In its joinder, Defendant argues that there is good cause to seal because these exhibits 4 “contain confidential business information that, if disclosed to the public could harm 5 MBUSA’s competitive standing.” Dkt. No. 119 at 2. As to Exhibit 5, Defendant asserts 6 that the emails contain highly confidential information regarding their business model, 7 business partners, and strategic decision making. Id. at 3. According to Defendant, “[w]ere 8 this information to be released, MBUSA could be harmed to the extent the document 9 explains considerations for vehicle offerings on the market.” Id. As to Exhibit 6, Defendant 10 argues that the dealer discussion concerns confidential information that “could harm 11 MBUSA’s competitive standing if distributed.” Id. 12 Having independently reviewed the exhibits, the Court does not find that Defendant 13 has satisfied the good cause standard. As an initial matter, the request to seal is 14 overbroad, as some portions of the Exhibits are clearly not confidential business 15 information. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 16 2003) (finding no good cause to seal documents in their entirety where a small number of 17 confidential details could be redacted with minimal effort); see also Murphy v. Kavo 18 America Corp., No. CV 110 410 YGR, 2012 WL 1497489 at *1 (N.D. Cal Apr. 27, 2012) 19 (“[T]o the extent that redacting the identifying information would provide the Court, and 20 the public, with meaningful information and not prejudice the individuals, documents 21 containing private information should be filed in redacted form rather than sealed in their 22 entirety.”) 23 Further, it is not apparent to the Court from the face of the emails what portions of 24 the exchanges could constitute confidential business information. Based on the Court’s 25 review, the emails do not contain any “strategic analysis,” nor do they expose the details 26 of Defendant’s “business model regarding warranty claims,” as Defendant asserts. Dkt. 27 No. 119 at 4. The emails discuss tire incidents like those in Plaintiff’s complaint. “The 28 mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, 1 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to 2 seal its records.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d at 1179. Defendant’s 3 broad claim of harm to its competitive standing provides no clarity in this respect and falls 4 short of the specificity required under the good cause standard. 5 Finally, that these emails were designated as Confidential pursuant to the protective 6 order is not enough. Obesity Rsch. Inst., LLC v. Fiber Rsch. Int'l, LLC, No. 15-CV-595- 7 BAS(MDD), 2017 WL 1035730, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) (“a blanket protective 8 order is not itself sufficient to show ‘good cause’ for sealing particular documents”); see 9 Blue Cross of California Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics Inc., No. CV-17-02286-PHX-DLR, 10 2018 WL 11352696, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2018) (denying motion to seal emails 11 disclosed during discovery on the sole basis that the emails were designated as confidential 12 pursuant to protective order). Parties must articulate facts showing good cause beyond 13 designations under a protective order, and Defendants, as explained above, have failed to 14 do so. 15 Without further explanation of how specific portions of the Exhibit are confidential 16 business information, the Court finds that no part of the emails warrant sealing. To give 17 Defendant an opportunity to explain why any redactions are supported by good cause, the 18 motion to seal is DENIED without prejudice. 19 B. Dkt. No. 114, 123, & 126 20 The remaining three motions to seal will be discussed together as each concerns the 21 Dealer Agreement. 22 First, Plaintiff moves unopposed to seal portions of her motion to compel discovery 23 responses [Dkt. No.

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Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC
809 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)

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Mashid Wadeea, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mashid-wadeea-individually-and-on-behalf-of-all-others-similarly-situated-casd-2025.