Masheter v. Diver

246 N.E.2d 567, 17 Ohio App. 2d 221, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 354, 1969 Ohio App. LEXIS 650
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 31, 1969
Docket3383
StatusPublished

This text of 246 N.E.2d 567 (Masheter v. Diver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Masheter v. Diver, 246 N.E.2d 567, 17 Ohio App. 2d 221, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 354, 1969 Ohio App. LEXIS 650 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969).

Opinions

Per Curiam.

This appeal on questions of law arises from a judgment entered on a jury verdict on October 26, 1967, in an appropriation proceedings instituted by the appellant, Director of Highways, against Frank E. Diver and others, appellees.

Appellant filed a resolution and finding to appropriate .22 of an acre (9584 sq. ft.) of land of which .11 of an acre (4792 sq. ft.) is within the existing highway right-of-way.

The land to be appropriated fronts to the north of U. S. Route 62 and the parcel of the land which the director appropriated amounted to approximately 37 feet off the front width of appellees’ lot which dimensions are 140.03 feet on the front by 466.6 feet in depth on the south side of U. S. Route 62. A driveway existed on the west side of appellees’ property, which was the only means of ingress and egress.

The original resolution and finding stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

*222 “COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, STARK COUNTY, OHIO
“In the Matter of the Appropriation by the State of Ohio of the Pee for Highway Purposes of the Lands of Prank E. Diver, et al, and necessary in the construction and improvement of State Noute No. U. S. 62, Section 28.93, Stark County, Ohio.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Eesolution and Finding
“Whereas, I have been unable to purchase certain hereinafter described property, needed in the construction and improvement of State Route No. U. S. 62, Section 28.93, Stark County, Ohio, which highway has been declared a limited access highway or freeway, in accordance with Section 5511.02 of the Revised Code of Ohio, and recorded on August 2, 1962, in Volume 47, page 791, of the Journal of the Director of Highways.
“Therefore, I find it is necessary for the public convenience and welfare and in accordance to Section 5501.11 of the Revised Code of Ohio, that action be taken under Section 5519.01 and related sections of the Revised Code of Ohio, to appropriate, in fee simple, the property hereinafter described in accordance with the plans and specifications on file in the Department of Highways, Columbus, Ohio, from the following named owners:” (Emphasis ours.)

A motion by the director to amend the original resolution and finding was sustained by the trial court in the following respects:

“* * * by striking from said resolution and finding the portion of paragraph 1 declaring the parcel as being a part of a limited access highway or freeway. Also, to add (27.99) after the words ‘section 28.93’ in the heading and paragraph 1.”

A jury verdict was returned for appellees in the amount of $350 compensation for the land taken, and $14,-150 as damages to the residue, and same was reduced to *223 judgment from which the director appeals and sets forth the following assigned error:

1. The court erred in holding in instructing the jury that the term “fee title” for highway purposes incorporated therein the taldng of access rights and included the right to sell and extinguish all rights in the owner.

It became very evident from reading the record of the opening statement of counsel for appellees that the trial court adopted the appellees’ contention and maintained it during the course of the trial in that the Director of Highways was seeking to appropriate a fee simple title in 175-WD (highway) which describes the parcel sought and which fee simple title would include all access and reversionary rights. The appellees contend also that the plans and specifications on file are irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of just compensation.

The plans and specifications are prepared pursuant to Section 5517.01, Revised Code, which provides, in part, as follows:

“The Director of Highways shall make a map of the highway, in outline and profile, and plans, specifications, profiles, and estimates covering proposed projects. * * * and cause one copy thereof to be placed on file in his office and another in the office of the division deputy director of highways for public inspection * *

As previously mentioned, the trial court granted the motion of appellant in striking from the resolution and finding “a limited access highway or freeway.” It then becomes a question as to what property the director seeks to appropriate, which must be in accordance with the plans and specifications which relate to and cover the proposed project.

It thus becomes the appellant’s contention that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to permit the testimony of the divisional engineer for the Department of Highways, which would have shown the uses to which the land sought to be appropriated would be put as affecting owner-appellees’ property, as well as the identity of the plans and specifications to be entered or to be *224 introduced into evidence during the course of the trial. Timely objections were made by counsel for the director to the rulings of the trial court in this respect. This we hold to be prejudicial error to appellant (director). See Masheter, Dir. of Hwys., v. Junk, 5 Ohio St. 2d 254, at page 256 as follows:

“The Court of Appeals pointed out that the landowners would not be prejudiced by allowing the amendment to correspond with the facts, and in all fairness the director was entitled to show the plan for the construction of the driveway as bearing on the amount the owners should be awarded for the property taken and the damage to the residue.” (Emphasis ours.)

The record reveals the testimony of Donald Hamilton, an appraiser holding the designation of M. A. I., who testified on behalf of the appellees that he had examined the plans and specifications of this particular project known as 175-WD (highway) and we find the following testimony on direct examination.

“Q. Mr. Hamilton, from your first inspection of this property and your experience as a real estate appraiser, I will ask you whether or not you have an opinion as to the fair market value of the entire property before the appropriation, that is prior to June 1, 1967? A. I do.
“Q. That is the land and the buildings now, is that correct? A. That’s right.
“Q. And what is that opinion? A. $22,000.00.
“Q. Mr. Hamilton, I will ask you if you have an opinion as to the fair market value of Parcel No. 175-WD taken in this case ?
“Mr. Kandel: Objection.
“The Court: Overruled.
“A. I do.
“Q. And what is that opinion? A. $350.00.
“Q. Now Mr. Hamilton, do you have an opinion as to the fair market value of the residue before the take ? A. I do.
“Q. What is that opinion?
“Mr. Kandel: Objection.

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Related

Masheter v. Junk
215 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
246 N.E.2d 567, 17 Ohio App. 2d 221, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 354, 1969 Ohio App. LEXIS 650, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/masheter-v-diver-ohioctapp-1969.