MASAYESVA FOR HOPI INDIAN TRIBE v. Zah

793 F. Supp. 1495, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10538
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJune 18, 1992
DocketCIV 74-842 PCT EHC
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 793 F. Supp. 1495 (MASAYESVA FOR HOPI INDIAN TRIBE v. Zah) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MASAYESVA FOR HOPI INDIAN TRIBE v. Zah, 793 F. Supp. 1495, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10538 (D. Ariz. 1992).

Opinion

*1497 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: HOPI CLAIMS

EARL H. CARROLL, District Judge. *

INTRODUCTION

I. Parties

Plaintiff Vernon Masayesva is the duly authorized Chairman of the Hopi Tribal Council of the Hopi Tribe, and appears herein as representative of the Hopi Tribe and its villages, clans and individual members.

Defendant Peterson Zah is the duly authorized Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, and appears herein as representative of the Navajo Nation 1 and its chapters, clans, and individual members.

Evelyn James is the duly authorized spokesperson of the San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe and appears herein in her representative capacity on behalf of the San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe and its individual members.

II. Background

In 1974, the Hopi Tribal Chairman commenced this action pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 640d-7 2 to determine Hopi rights and interests in the reservation created by the Act of June 14, 1934, 48 Stat. 960 (1934) (the “1934 Act”). The 1934 Act described the external boundaries of the Navajo Reservation, and conveyed an equitable interest in certain of these lands to the Navajo Nation and “such other Indians as may already be located thereon.” 3

This lawsuit is the second action between the Navajo and Hopi Tribes to settle title in reservation lands in northeastern Arizona. The rights of the Navajo and Hopi Tribes in a parcel withdrawn by Executive Order on December 16, 1882 (“the 1882 Reservation”) were previously litigated in a separate line of cases. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F.Supp. 125 (D.Ariz.1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758, 83 S.Ct. 1559, 10 L.Ed.2d 703 (1963); Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir.1974). Supplementary pro *1498 ceedings still continue regarding the payment of “owelty” for differences in value of land received, damage to the land partitioned to the Hopi Tribe (the Hopi Partitioned Lands, or “HPL”), and prepartition “use” of the HPL by Navajos. Although the 1882 Reservation litigation is not relevant to the disposition of this lawsuit, the events of that dispute provide background understanding of the Navajo-Hopi land dispute, and may guide this Court in various ways in its decision.

The present case has centered on who were “such other Indians” entitled to assert interests in the 1934 Reservation, which lands in the 1934 Reservation were subject to litigation, and where “such other Indians” were “located” in 1934; these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will determine where “such other Indians” were located. Subsequent to these findings, the Court will conduct a trial regarding partition of the 1934 Reservation pursuant to § 640d-7(b) (Phase II).

III. Who are “such other Indians”?

The District Court previously held that the Hopi Indians were “such other Indians”: “The Court takes judicial notice that a Hopi village existed at Moencopi on June 14, 1934. Moencopi is within the 1934 Act land grant, and therefore, the Hopi are within the ‘such other Indians’ clause and are holders of equitable interests.” Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F.Supp. 1183, 1193 (1978) (hereinafter, “Sekaquaptewa I”), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 619 F.2d 801 (hereinafter, Sekaquaptewa II”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010, 101 S.Ct. 565, 66 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980).

The San Juan Southern Paiute Indians (the “Paiutes” or “Paiute Tribe”) are also “such other Indians” and holders of equitable interests in the 1934 Reservation. In previous orders, this Court upheld the Department of Interior recognition of the Paiutes as an Indian tribe, and held that the Court had jurisdiction to determine their interests in the 1934 Reservation as “any other tribe of Indians”, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 640d-7. 4

These findings will address only the location of Hopi Indians in 1934; separate findings will be issued regarding the location of the Paiutes in 1934.

IV. Which lands are excluded from litigation?

Certain lands within the boundaries of the 1934 Reservation were expressly exempted from the granting clause of Section 1 of the 1934 Act. These include the 1882 Reservation and certain lands previously reserved by Congress for water power purposes and power sites. Moreover, other lands had been permanently reserved by Congress prior to 1934, and were thus not in dispute, including lands reserved by the 1868 Treaty with the Navajo Nation, 15 Stat. 667 (located in the northeastern corner of the 1934 Reservation), and lands withdrawn by the Act of May 23, 1930, 46 Stat. 378, and the Act of February 21, 1931, 46 Stat. 1204 (both along the western edge of the 1934 Reservation).

Further, allotted lands for which patents issued were excluded from the scope of this litigation pursuant to § 640d-16(a). 5

The Navajo Nation had argued that other lands were excluded from the scope of the litigation, as well. The 1934 Act conveyed an equitable interest to the Navajos and “such other Indians” on “vacant, unreserved, and unappropriated public lands”. The Navajo Nation brought a number of motions for partial summary judgment asking this Court to find that certain lands within the boundaries of the 1934 Reservation were not “vacant, unreserved, and unappropriated”, and thus not subject to the claims of the Hopi Indians. The Court held that some of these lands were “unreserved and unappropriated” and thus not subject to Hopi and Paiute claims, *1499 including lands purchased on behalf of the Navajo Nation, privately owned lands relinquished pursuant to Section 2 of the 1934 Act, and lands conveyed to the State of Arizona for the “support of the common schools” which were surveyed prior to withdrawal of the land pursuant to Executive Order. Further, the Court held that other lands were “reserved and appropriated” and subject to Hopi claims, including allotted lands for which patents did not issue, and “school lands” which were un-surveyed or surveyed after withdrawal of the land pursuant to Executive Order.

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Bluebook (online)
793 F. Supp. 1495, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/masayesva-for-hopi-indian-tribe-v-zah-azd-1992.