Marziale v. Maney

529 So. 2d 504, 1988 WL 67042
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 28, 1988
DocketCA-7149
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 529 So. 2d 504 (Marziale v. Maney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marziale v. Maney, 529 So. 2d 504, 1988 WL 67042 (La. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

529 So.2d 504 (1988)

Elizabeth and Michael MARZIALE
v.
Joseph and Iris MANEY, State of Louisiana Through Dept. of Transportation and Development, et al.

No. CA-7149.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

June 28, 1988.
Rehearing Denied August 11, 1988.

*505 Edmund W. Golden, Golden, Fonte & Faulkner, Metairie, for plaintiffs.

Norman L. Sisson, Sharon F. Lyles, Lawrence A. Durant, Durant, Pierce & Malone, Baton Rouge, for defendants—State of La.

Before BARRY and WILLIAMS, JJ., and PRESTON H. HUFFT, Judge Pro Tem.

BARRY, Judge.

The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development [DOTD] appeals from a judgment holding it fifty percent responsible for injuries sustained by Elizabeth Marziale in an automobile accident on an elevated portion of Interstate 10, known as the High-Rise Bridge [HRB]. The trial court's reasons summarize the facts:

The uncontroverted and undisputed facts are that Marziale was driving her 1981 vehicle on September 15, 1983, in the extreme left lane, east bound, to work at Lake Forest Shopping Center, at approximately 8:30 a.m., on the elevated portion of Inter-state 10 (I-10) approaching the upgrade of the HRB. She was traveling 50 mph (the legal limit is 55 mph) approximately five to six car lengths behind a van. As she proceeded up the bridge slope, her view ahead was completely and totally obstructed because of the van and the grade of the HRB. Suddenly, without any warning or signal, the van swerved into the center lane, exposing for the first time, a car stopped directly ahead of Marziale in the left lane. She immediately removed her foot from the accelerator, looked into the rear view mirror to ascertain if she could change into the center lane, and discovered that it was blocked by a car on her right. She immediately applied her brakes, moved to the far right side of the left lane and struck the rear of the stalled car, just below the bridge apex.

The Marziales sued DOTD, the City of New Orleans, Joseph and Iris Maney, the owner and the driver of the stalled vehicle, and the respective insurers. The Marziales evidently settled and dismissed all the defendants except DOTD. Third party plaintiffs concurred in the motions to dismiss. The trial was bifurcated on liability and quantum.

After the trial and prior to judgment the court granted DOTD's motion to re-open the case on a limited basis. The judge re-opened the record for the defense to impeach or contradict the theory of Andrew Ramisch, a plaintiff's expert, as to the feasibility of restriping the HRB. The Marziales were permitted to offer additional proof and examples of the adoption of the restriping configurations. The State's writ application to this Court relative to the trial judge permitting the plaintiff to introduce evidence was denied. No. C-5750.

The trial court found DOTD negligent and strictly liable and held Mrs. Marziale fifty percent (50%) and DOTD fifty percent (50%) at fault. Mrs. Marziale was awarded $1,440,682 which was reduced by her 50% fault to $720,341 plus expert fees.

The trial court did not mention the other defendants or their possible percentages of fault. The settling defendants' percentage of fault should have been at issue in order to reduce the total award proportionately. La.C.C.P. Art. 1812; La.C.C. Art. 2324. See also Ainsworth v. Employees Insurance Company, 427 So.2d 1220 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), affm'd 433 So.2d 709 (La. 1984). Because we find that the plaintiffs did not carry their burden of proof, this matter is pretermitted.

DOTD specifies nine trial court errors: (1) and (2) holding that Iris Maney's car was stalled, and if stalled, that it did not contribute to the accident; (3) failing to find Mrs. Marziale the sole cause of the accident; (4) concluding DOTD's failure to *506 provide shoulders on the HRB was unreasonable which created an obviously dangerous situation for the reasonably prudent driver; (5) concluding DOTD cannot avoid liability because the bridge was built to existing standards; (6) ignoring defense expert testimony; (7) permitting the opinion of plaintiff's expert (which was contradicted) to overrule DOTD's administrative decision as to the HRB; (8) finding DOTD strictly liable; (9) awarding excessive damages.

DOTD is the State agency responsible for the design, construction and maintenance of safe highways, including the HRB. However, DOTD is not responsible for every accident occurring on state highways nor is it the guarantor of the safety of travelers thereon or an insurer against any and all injury which may result from defects in such highways or interstate systems. Sinitiere v. Lavergne, 391 So.2d 821 (La.1980); Evans v. Salter, 450 So.2d 706 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984).

The trial court found liability under Art. 2315 negligence and Art. 2317 strict liability. In Bennett v. Bardwell, 480 So.2d 349 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1985), the difference between the two theories as they relate to DOTD's liability for an auto accident on a bridge was discussed:

[T]he only difference between the two theories is that in a strict liability case, based on LSA-C.C. Art. 2317, the claimant is relieved of proving that the owner knew or should have known of the unreasonable risk of injury created by the thing he owns.
. . . . .
Liability based on negligence is imposed when the DOTD is actually or constructively aware of a hazardous condition and fails to take corrective action within a reasonable time. Robinson v. State Through Dept. of Transp., 454 So.2d 257 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 122 (La.1984). This liability stems from its duty under LSA-R.S. 48:21 to `improve, maintain, repair, and regulate the use of public transportation systems and to perform such other functions with regard to public highways, roads, and other transportation related facilities as may be conferred on the department by applicable law.' LSA-R.S. 48:1 includes bridges in its definition of `highway.'

480 So.2d at 351-52.

Under either theory the claimant must prove that the HRB created an unreasonable risk of injury that resulted in damage. To prove negligence the plaintiff must prove that DOTD knew or should have known of the risk and failed to render the HRB safe. Under strict liability DOTD's knowledge of the risk would be presumed. The reasonableness (under notions of blameworthiness) of DOTD's conduct would be determined in light of that presumed knowledge. See Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Company, 418 So.2d 493 (La.1982).

While the basis for determining the existence of a duty is different in strict liability and ordinary negligence cases, the duty is the same. Myers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 493 So.2d 1170 (La.1986). DOTD is only required to maintain the highways in a reasonably safe condition for motorists exercising ordinary care and reasonable prudence. Dagnall v. Louisiana Department of Highways, 426 So.2d 276 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983), writ denied 433 So.2d 160 (La. 1983); Oliver v. Parish of Jefferson, 408 So.2d 275 (La.App. 4th Cir.1981), writ denied 413 So.2d 495 (La.1982).

Whether DOTD has breached its duty, whether the roadway at the scene of the accident was in an unreasonably dangerous condition, depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Myers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
529 So. 2d 504, 1988 WL 67042, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marziale-v-maney-lactapp-1988.