Mary's River Lumber Co. v. Sullivan
This text of 768 P.2d 939 (Mary's River Lumber Co. v. Sullivan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Defendant tenant1 appeals from a judgment of restitution of the premises to plaintiff landlord on this FED claim. He assigns as error the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of legal capacity to sue. ORCP 21A(4). We affirm.
Plaintiff filed its initial complaint in the name of “Judson Parkway Condominiums.” That name was not registered as an assumed business name. ORS 648.007 prohibits the conducting of business under an assumed business name unless it has been registered pursuant to ORS chapter 648. ORS 648.135(2) provides that a person who conducts business in violation of ORS 648.007 lacks standing to maintain a cause of action for the benefit of the business.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied because of a violation of UTCR 5.010.2 Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint that changed the name of the plaintiff to Mary’s River Lumber Company. Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss. The court held an evidentiary hearing3 and denied the motion. We review to determine whether there is any evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff was not conducting business4 under the name “Judson Parkway Condominiums.” See [363]*363Hendrickson v. Carson, 69 Or App 482, 486, 686 P2d 1066, rev dismissed 298 Or 428 (1984).
Plaintiff used the name “Judson Parkway Condominiums” in newspaper advertisements for vacancies and on the sign outside the complex. However, defendant’s rental agreement was with Mary’s River Lumber Co., and he was instructed to make checks payable to that entity. Receipts were initialed “MRL.” The one exception was a pre-purchased money order payable to “Judson Parkway Condominiums,” which plaintiff accepted as a deposit before defendant was instructed as to the proper payee. Regardless, there is evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion.5
Affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
768 P.2d 939, 95 Or. App. 360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marys-river-lumber-co-v-sullivan-orctapp-1989.