Mary Rayman v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 14, 2024
DocketSF-0752-19-0131-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Mary Rayman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Mary Rayman v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mary Rayman v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MARY E. RAYMAN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-19-0131-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: May 14, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Linda Ward-Smith , Las Vegas, Nevada, for the appellant.

Erin L. Collins , Esquire, and Matthew S. Voss , Esquire, North Las Vegas, Nevada, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the requested hearing. On petition for review, the appellant makes the following arguments: (1) she was not aware of her “‘preference eligible’ veteran

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

status,” and she was hired into an excepted service position in error because she did not have “the required eligibility documentation”; (2) she should have been “reinstated under the competitive services [sic] appointment” when she was hired in 2018; (3) the agency’s approval of her Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) request demonstrates that she was an “employee” with Board appeal rights; and (4) the agency committed a prohibited personnel practice by discriminating against her due to her planned medical procedure. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We have considered the appellant’s argument, made for the first time on review, that the agency erred when she was appointed to an excepted service position, and she should have been reinstated in the competitive service when she was hired in 2018. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. We have also considered her assertion that she was unaware of her preference eligible status. Id. She identifies no evidence in support of these arguments. Moreover, her argument regarding her alleged preference eligible status appears contradictory to her own submission, 3

which shows that she is a 5-point “Post-Vietnam-Era Veteran.” 2 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 10, Tab 12 at 52-53 (the appellant’s DD-214). The Board will normally only consider an argument raised for the first time on review if it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the petitioner’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The appellant has not made such a showing. Even if we found for the purposes of our analysis that this argument was based on new evidence, she has not persuaded us that she is an employee pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1), such that she has Board appeal rights to challenge her removal. See, e.g., Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (stating that the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision). Thus, this argument is without merit. The appellant additionally argues on petition for review that the agency admitted that she was an employee when it granted her FMLA leave request. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. She also includes an FMLA fact sheet, which indicates that FMLA leave is only available to individuals who, among other things, worked for their employer for at least 12 months and completed at least 1,250 hours of service during the preceding 12-month period. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-9. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board will generally not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). The appellant has not made such a showing. Moreover, the parties cannot confer jurisdiction by a contract or agreement where none otherwise exists. Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 17 (2017), aff’d sub nom., Williams v. Merit Systems 2 Her argument in this regard does not appear to implicate the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) or the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998. 4

Protection Board, 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We are not persuaded by the appellant’s argument, made below and on review, that the agency’s decision to grant her request for FMLA leave warrants a finding that she is an employee with Board appeal rights. Accordingly, the appellant’s argument is without merit. Finally, the appellant asserts that the agency committed a prohibited personnel practice by discriminating against her due to her planned medical procedure. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. As the administrative judge found, the Board lacks jurisdiction over such a claim absent an otherwise appealable action. IAF, Tab 16, Initial Decision at 7; see Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 13 (2012). For the reasons described herein, we deny the petition for review and affirm the initial decision.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Williams v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.
892 F.3d 1156 (Federal Circuit, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Mary Rayman v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mary-rayman-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.