IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Mary Rawle, The Center for Gestalt Development, Inc., John J. Powell, and Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, LLP, Appellants-Defendants FILED Aug 31 2026, 9:16 am
v. CLERK Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Charles Bowman,
Appellee-Plaintiff
August 31, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-PL-2715
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable David K. Najjar, Judge The Honorable A.J. Johnson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No.
29D05-2207-PL-5477
Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
Judges Bradford and Pyle concur.
Kenworthy, Judge.
Case Summary [1] In May 2021, the Center for Gestalt Development (the “Center”) sued Charles
Bowman in Pennsylvania federal court alleging infringement of an exclusive license to publish certain copyrighted materials on Gestalt therapy. About four months later, the Center dropped the lawsuit. Then, in May 2022, the Center once more filed suit in Pennsylvania federal court, alleging infringement of its copyright. Attorney John Powell of the Pennsylvania law firm Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, LLP (“Montgomery McCracken”) represented the Center in the second district court action.
[2] On July 22, 2022, Bowman filed a complaint in the Hamilton Superior Court against the Center; the Center’s president, Mary Rawle; Powell; and Montgomery McCracken (collectively, “Defendants”) on several tort claims alleging malfeasance in Defendants’ pursuit of the Pennsylvania actions. Defendants filed a notice of removal to Indiana federal court on August 16. While in district court, Bowman stipulated he was not seeking damages greater than $75,000, so his lawsuit was remanded to Indiana state court on December 30.
[3] On January 23, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss Bowman’s lawsuit, challenging personal jurisdiction and arguing failure to state a claim for relief. Bowman moved for default judgment on December 17, 2024. On September 15, 2025—with the motion to dismiss still pending—the trial court granted Bowman’s motion for default judgment. Defendants filed a motion to correct error, which the court denied.
[4] Defendants raise a number of issues for appellate review, which we consolidate and restate as:
1. Did the trial court err in granting default judgment against Defendants?
2. Did the trial court have personal jurisdiction over Defendants?
[5] We first hold the trial court abused its discretion by granting default judgment against Defendants. We then conclude the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over Rawle, Montgomery McCracken, and Powell.
[6] We reverse and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History [7] Bowman is a practitioner of Gestalt therapy in Indiana. In 2019, he published a
book titled Psychopathology of Awareness, which contained a previously unpublished manuscript by Dr. Frederick Perls, the widely recognized founder of Gestalt therapy. 1 In May 2021, the Center sued Bowman in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania over the publication, claiming the exclusive right to publish Dr. Perls’ manuscript under copyright law. The parties engaged in settlement talks after the Center voluntarily dropped the lawsuit. But no settlement materialized. In May 2022, the Center filed a second action in Pennsylvania federal court, seeking damages for the alleged copyright violation. 2
[8] On July 22, Bowman sued Defendants in Indiana state court, alleging abuse of process, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. 3 The complaint maintained Rawle and the Center caused service of process to be issued against Bowman, and that the sole purpose of the Center’s claims in Pennsylvania had been to extort money from him. More specifically, Bowman alleged Rawle and the Center investigated the value of his home in Indiana and hired local counsel, E. Victor Indiano, to coerce him into a settlement. Bowman included excerpts from a demand letter Indiano drafted, which the complaint described as filled with “highly intrusive personal information that was totally irrelevant” to the claims the Center filed in Pennsylvania federal court. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 31. Bowman further
1 Bowman published the book as co-editor alongside French resident and fellow practitioner, Jean-Marie Robine. The book was published in France under the auspices of the Institut Français de Gestalt-Thérapie. 2 The Pennsylvania federal court dismissed the Center’s suit for improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction in October. 3 The complaint included a fifth count claiming pecuniary losses, which Bowman subsequently withdrew.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2715 | August 31, 2026 Page 4 of 26 claimed each of the named defendants conspired “to initiate [f]rivolous” lawsuits and were each “equally liable for the other’s wrongful actions[.]” Id. at 41.
[9] On August 16, Defendants filed notice of removal of Bowman’s suit to the Southern District of Indiana. In November, Defendants sued Bowman in the same district court, for a third time alleging a copyright violation. As for Bowman’s removed action, he stipulated he was not seeking damages greater than $75,000, so the district court remanded the matter to the Hamilton Superior Court on December 30 for lack of jurisdiction.
[10] On January 23, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss Bowman’s remanded lawsuit. Defendants’ motion to dismiss alleged (1) lack of personal jurisdiction over Rawle, Montgomery McCracken, and Powell; and (2) failure to state a claim for relief. 4 Defendants argued “merely filing and serving the Pennsylvania [c]omplaint on Bowman” did not establish specific jurisdiction over them in Indiana state court. Id. at 60. According to the motion, the Center’s relationship with Rawle, Powell, or Montgomery McCracken “ha[d] no bearing on whether personal jurisdiction” existed over them. Id. at 61. As for the letter excerpted in Bowman’s complaint, the motion asserted Indiano sent the communication and the letter alone was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Bowman filed a response opposing dismissal, and the
4 The Center did not challenge personal jurisdiction, but it did allege Bowman failed to state a claim for relief.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2715 | August 31, 2026 Page 5 of 26 trial court held a hearing in May, after which the court took the matter under advisement.
[11] In October 2024, the trial court held a case management conference. The court had yet to rule on the motion to dismiss, but it set the matter for trial. Defendants did not attend the conference. In November, the trial court issued a case management order setting certain pretrial deadlines, including one for the filing of Defendants’ answer. The deadline passed and Defendants did not file an answer. On December 17, Bowman moved for default judgment after a second deadline related to the statement of contentions and the witnesses list passed without Defendants filing anything. Defendants submitted their opposition to default judgment in early January 2025, and the trial court held a hearing on the matter later that month, and again in March. In April, the court issued an order staying the matter pending resolution of the Indiana federal court copyright action. 5 About four months later, the Indiana federal court granted summary judgment in Bowman’s favor in the copyright case, and Bowman informed the Hamilton Superior Court of this development.
[12] In September 2025, the trial court entered default judgment against Defendants. The court concluded in part:
1. On July 22, 2022, Plaintiff[] filed [his] Complaint.
5 On the same day, the court published an entry explaining it had intended to stay the matter as early as February 2024. See id. at 161–62.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2715 | August 31, 2026 Page 6 of 26 2. On August 16, 2022[,] all Defendants appeared in this case and filed a Notice of Filing Notice of Removal to Federal Court.
3. Exhibit A to the Notice of Removal stated:
6. Defendants each received a copy of the Complaint and Summons in this action on July 25, 2022. Given the service on Defendants on July 25, 2022, Defendants’
deadline to answer the Complaint was August 15, 2022[.]
4. By removing the case to Federal Court, Defendants’ deadline to answer the Complaint was automatically extended by seven days to August 22, 2022[,] pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81.]
5. Defendants did not answer the Complaint in federal court, and hence, were in peril of default as of August 22, 2022. As of this date, Defendants waived their defenses, including any that might have been asserted in a Motion to Dismiss.
***
9. On January 23, 2023, Defendants filed in this Court a Motion to Dismiss. This was five months after their August 22, 2022[,] deadline to answer the Complaint.
10. On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. That Motion remains pending.
11. On November 4, 2024, the Court entered a Case Management Order stating in part:
The Court hereby sets the following deadlines.
1) November 15, 2024—Defendants shall file Answer(s) to Complaint.
2) December 13, 2024—Each party to file a statement of contentions and its preliminary witnesses and exhibits.
3) February 14, 2024—Discovery closes. 6
12. Defendants did not file an Answer to the Complaint by November 15, 2024.
13. By December 13, 2024[,] Defendants did not file a Statement of Contentions and preliminary witnesses and exhibits, even though Plaintiff filed his.
14. On December 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Verified Motion for Default Judgment in the amount of $75,000.
***
23. Here, default judgment is appropriate for the following reasons:
a. Defendants did not file an Answer by either the August 24, 2022[,] deadline pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Pro 81(c)
or this Court’s Order to file an answer by November 15, 2024.
6 The reference to “2024” in the trial court’s order appears to be a mistake.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2715 | August 31, 2026 Page 8 of 26 b. Defendants did not file a Statement of Contentions and preliminary witnesses and exhibits by their December 13, 2024[,] deadline. . . .
c. Defendants’ arguments opposing default judgment are unpersuasive for the following reasons:
i. Defendants contend that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. This argument was waived because it was not asserted as a defense before Defendants’ deadline to file an answer, i.e., by August 24, 2022[,] or November 15, 2024.
***
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED[.]
Id. at 18–25.
[13] Defendants moved to correct error, and the trial court denied their motion.
Standards of Review [14] We review a ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.
Bruder v. Seneca Mortg. Servs., LLC, 188 N.E.3d 469, 471 (Ind. 2022). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. But where a decision turns on a question of law, we apply de novo review. Dickerson v. Toney, 253 N.E.3d 1159, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021)), trans. denied.
[15] Under Indiana Trial Rule 55(A), a trial court is authorized to enter default judgment if a defendant fails to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. Expert Pool Builders, LLC v. Vangundy, 224 N.E.3d 309, 314 (Ind. 2024). A default judgment is an extreme remedy, reserved for parties who fail to defend or prosecute a suit. Id. at 314–15. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to enter a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 312. Indiana law prefers disposition of cases on their merits, so a trial court should exercise its discretion in light of the disfavor in which default judgments are held. Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Constr. Co., 798 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. 2003). In other words, “the trial court must balance the need for an efficient judicial system with the judicial preference for deciding disputes on the merits.” Kmart Corp. v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. “Any doubt of the propriety of a default judgment should be resolved in favor of the defaulted party.” Riddle v. Cress, 153 N.E.3d 1112, 1113 (Ind. 2020).
The trial court abused its discretion in granting default judgment.
[16] In this case, the trial court granted Bowman’s motion for default judgment
without addressing the merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court determined Defendants waived available defenses, including a challenge to personal jurisdiction, “because it was not asserted as a defense” before the deadline “to file an answer[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 24. For the reasons explained below, we conclude otherwise.
[17] Indiana trial rules permit certain defenses to be asserted by motion as follows:
(A) When Presented. The time allowed for the presentation of defenses and objections in a motion or responsive pleading shall be computed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 6(C).
(B) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim , or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required; except that at the option of the pleader, the following defenses may be made by motion:
***
(2) Lack of jurisdiction over the person,
***
(6) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which shall include failure to name the real party in interest under Rule 17;
***
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted or within twenty [20] days after service of the prior pleading if none is required. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, any of the defenses in section (B)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (8) is waived to the extent constitutionally permissible unless made in a motion within twenty [20] days after service of the prior pleading. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion.
***
(G) Consolidation of Defenses in Motion. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it any other motions herein provided for and then available to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted. He may, however, make such motions as are allowed under subdivision (H)(2) of this rule.
(H) Waiver or Preservation of Certain Defenses.
(1) A defense of lack of personal jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, or the same action pending in another state court of this state is waived to the extent constitutionally permissible:
(a) if omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (G),
(b) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15(A) to be made as a matter of course.
(2) A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a defense of failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19(B), and an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(A) or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.
Ind. Trial Rule 12 (2007).
[18] In relevant part, Indiana trial rules also provide the applicable deadline for service of a responsive pleading following service of a Rule 12 motion:
(C) Service of Pleadings and Rule 12 Motions. A responsive pleading required under these rules, shall be served within twenty [20] days after service of the prior pleading. Unless the court specifies otherwise, a reply shall be served within twenty [20]
days after entry of an order requiring it. The service of a motion permitted under Rule 12 alters the time for service of responsive pleadings as follows, unless a different time is fixed by the court:
(1) if the court does not grant the motion, the responsive pleading shall be served in ten [10] days after notice of the court’s action;
(2) if the court grants the motion and the corrective action is allowed to be taken, it shall be taken within ten [10] days, and the responsive pleading shall be served within ten [10] days thereafter.
T.R. 6 (2013).
[19] In Morton-Finney v. Gilbert, a panel of this Court considered whether a defendant’s failure to file an answer entitled the plaintiff to default judgment. 646 N.E.2d 1387, 1388 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Morton-Finney was employed by the Indianapolis Public Schools as an instructional program facilitator, and she filed a petition for a temporary restraining order against the defendant superintendent to prevent her reassignment to a less desirable position. Id. Without filing an answer, the superintendent moved to dismiss Morton-Finney’s petition for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(B)(6). Id. Morton-Finney moved for default judgment. Id. The trial court denied default judgment and granted the superintendent’s motion to dismiss. Id. On appeal, Morton-Finney contended she was entitled to default because the superintendent did not file an answer. Id. The reviewing panel disagreed, concluding the superintendent had filed a timely response. Id. According to the court, “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a proper responsive motion.” Id.
[20] Along similar lines, in Sportsman’s Paradise, Inc. v. Sports Center, Inc., a panel of this Court was faced with deciding if an untimely answer was sufficient to avoid default judgment. 424 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). The defendants’ counsel in Sportsman’s Paradise entered an appearance and attempted to file answers and counterclaims, which the trial court struck as untimely pursuant to Trial Rule 6. Id. at 1074–75. The plaintiff moved for default judgment. After a hearing, the court granted default judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The panel concluded the trial court erred, explaining, “The crucial time for determining whether a party has in fact failed to plead is at the time the motion for default is filed.” Id. at 1075. Sportsman’s Paradise interpreted Rule 55(A) to indicate an answer is sufficient to avoid default, even if the answer is filed late under Rule 6. See id. That’s because, as the Court explained, one of the “primary objectives” of Rule 55 is to “allow for the enforcement of a timely litigation process for the purpose of avoiding procedural delay.” Id. Where the defendants had filed an answer before the plaintiff moved for default judgment, the Court reasoned, it was “virtually impossible for the moving party to establish” the defendants failed to plead in contravention of Rule 55. Id.
[21] Here, Bowman filed his complaint in state court on July 22, 2022. Defendants received service of the complaint and summons on July 25. Defendants’ counsel entered an appearance on August 16 and on the same day they filed a notice of removal to the Southern District of Indiana. Defendants did not file an answer before removal. The district court remanded the matter to the state court on December 30. On January 23, 2023, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, challenging personal jurisdiction and alleging failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See T.R. 12(B)(2), (6). Bowman filed a response opposing dismissal, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion in May. The court then took the matter under advisement—and so it remained until the grant of default judgment in 2025.
[22] In the order granting default judgment, the trial court found Defendants waived available defenses as early as August 15, 2022—which was twenty days following receipt of service. Strictly speaking, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was filed after the twenty-day deadline set in Trial Rule 6(C). But we must also look at the time the motion for default judgment is filed to determine whether a party has failed to plead. See Sportsman’s Paradise, 424 N.E.2d at 1075. Trial Rule 12 permitted Defendants to assert and consolidate defenses in a responsive motion, which is precisely what they did. See T.R. 12(B), (G). By the time Bowman moved for default in late 2024, Defendants’ responsive motion challenging personal jurisdiction and alleging failure to state a claim was squarely before the trial court. See Morton-Finney, 646 N.E.2d at 1388. At that point, the motion to dismiss—still under the court’s advisement—was sufficient to avoid default judgment. See Sportsman’s Paradise, 424 N.E.2d at 1075.
[23] Relatedly, the trial court found Defendants “were in peril of default as of August 22, 2022[,]” which is the date the court determined Defendants’ answer was due in federal court following notice of removal. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 19 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(2)(C)). Bowman reprises the trial court’s reasoning in his appellate brief, arguing Defendants waived all available defenses because they did not file a response in federal court. See Appellee’s Br. at 16–17.
[24] For cases removed to federal court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) state:
(1) Applicability. These rules apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court.
(2) Further Pleading. After removal, repleading is unnecessary unless the court orders it. A defendant who did not answer before removal must answer or present other defenses or objections under these rules within the longest of these periods:
(A) 21 days after receiving—through service or otherwise—a copy of the initial pleading stating the claim for relief;
(B) 21 days after being served with the summons for an initial pleading on file at the time of service; or
(C) 7 days after the notice of removal is filed.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c) (2009).
[25] “Generally, the removal of a case to federal court divests the state court of jurisdiction.” Noons v. First Merchs. Bank, 268 N.E.3d 1250, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “An order remanding an action to federal court suspends or holds the state court jurisdiction in abeyance either until the action is terminated in federal court or until the action is remanded to the state court.” Id.; see also Tom James Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 221 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (indicating after removal to federal court became effective, all proceedings in state court had ceased), trans. denied.
[26] Whether Defendants waived the right to move to dismiss is distinct from the question of whether Defendants waived the right to challenge personal jurisdiction altogether. See Touro Coll. v. Fondazione Touro Univ. Rome Onlus, No. 16 Civ. 3136 (DAB), 2017 WL 4082481, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017) (“[T]he question related to Rule 81(c)(2) is whether [d]efendants waived the right to bring a Motion to Dismiss, not whether they waived their personal jurisdiction objection itself”). In the context of a non-removed case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted the federal equivalent to Rule 12 to permit a litigant to challenge personal jurisdiction either in a responsive pleading filed within the applicable deadline under FRCP 12(a), “or in a motion with no similar time limit specified.” Hedeen Int’l, LLC v. Zing Toys, Inc., 811 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Pierson v. Nat’l Inst. for Lab. Rels. Rsch.,
No. 15 C 11049, 2016 WL 6093490, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016) (applying the holding in Hedeen Int’l in removed case).
[27] Against this backdrop, we are not persuaded Defendants waived all 12(B) defenses while the case was in federal court. In any event, Bowman never moved for default judgment in federal court; rather, he stipulated his damages were no greater than $75,000, thereby depriving the federal court of jurisdiction and resulting in remand to Indiana state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). And while the case was removed, jurisdiction of the state court was suspended until remand. Noons, 268 N.E.3d at 1253. In short, FRCP 81 does not control the outcome here.
[28] Independent of the waiver analysis, the trial court found Bowman entitled to default judgment as a sanction for Defendants’ failure to comply with court discovery orders. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 23 (citing T.R. 37(B)(2)(c)). Trial Rule 37(B)(2)(c) permits trial courts to sanction a party who “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery” by, among other things, rendering default “against the disobedient party.” On this alternative basis, the court granted default judgment partly because Defendants did not file an answer on November 15, 2024. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 147 (case management order). First, as Defendants argue, Rule 37 is inapplicable because the timely filing of an answer “is not a situation involving discovery violations[.]” Appellants’ Br. at 36; see also Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ind. 2013) (observing Rule 37 gives trial courts discretion to impose sanctions to ensure cooperative discovery). Second, with the motion to dismiss under advisement since May 2023, no answer was due until the court ruled on the pending motion. See T.R. 6(C). Given our preference for deciding disputes on their merits and avoiding procedural delay, Sportsman’s Paradise, 424 N.E.2d at 1075, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by granting default. See Bruder, 188 N.E.3d at 471. Where, as here, a party’s responsive motion remains pending and before the trial court when a party moves for default judgment, the court has an obligation to address the motion to dismiss before deciding to grant default.
There is no specific jurisdiction in Indiana.
[29] Rawle, Montgomery McCracken, and Powell challenge the trial court’s
personal jurisdiction over them. Defendants contend the court’s grant of default judgment in Bowman’s favor is void in the absence of personal jurisdiction. See Appellants’ Br. at 39 (citing Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154–55 (Ind. 1998)). We agree.
[30] Personal jurisdiction refers to a trial court’s power to impose a judgment on a particular defendant. Boyer v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2015). “We analyze whether personal jurisdiction exists in Indiana under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. TikTok Inc., 245 N.E.3d 681, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied; see also T.R. 4.4(A) (listing acts serving as a basis for jurisdiction and stating, “a court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of this state or the United States”). Before an Indiana court can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the defendant to have “minimum contacts” with the state, so the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 509. A minimum contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction involves two separate concepts: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Tom James, 221 N.E.3d at 1269. No party argues general jurisdiction is applicable in this case.
[31] As the Indiana Supreme Court explained:
Specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state so that the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into court there. A single contact with the forum state may be sufficient to establish personal specific jurisdiction over a defendant, if it creates a substantial connection with the forum state and the suit is related to that connection. But a defendant cannot be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.
LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the defendant has contacts with the forum state sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, due process mandates the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable. Id.
[32] Personal jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tom James, 221 N.E.3d at 1266 (citing Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 508). “[W]hether personal jurisdiction exists can depend upon factual determinations concerning a defendant’s contacts with the forum state—in which case the challenger bears the burden of disproving personal jurisdiction.” Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 508. If the trial court issues findings of jurisdictional facts, those findings are reviewed for clear error. Tom James, 221 N.E.3d at 1266. “Where the trial court did not find jurisdictional facts, we may accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts to the extent they are not challenged, and we may view challenged facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Davis v. Simon, 963 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted), trans. dismissed. A default judgment without minimum contacts violates due process and is void. Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1154.
[33] In the present case, the trial court did not make jurisdictional findings. Bowman is a resident of Indiana. Rawle is president of the Center and resides in Maine. Powell is a licensed attorney in Pennsylvania. Montgomery McCracken is a Pennsylvania law firm organized under the laws of that jurisdiction. The Center is incorporated in New York with its headquarters in Maine. Only Rawle, Powell, and Montgomery McCracken challenge personal jurisdiction.
[34] In his complaint, Bowman alleged Defendants sued him in Pennsylvania federal court for the sole purpose of extorting money from him. Bowman claimed Rawle and the Center gathered “highly intrusive personal information” about his net worth and—armed with this information—hired an Indiana attorney who sent him a demand letter in pursuit of their “utterly frivolous” claims in Pennsylvania. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 31. Bowman accordingly claimed the “conspiring Defendants [were] equally liable for the other’s wrongful actions” in the State of Indiana. Id. at 41.
[35] In Boyer, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to personal jurisdiction in a case similarly alleging damages based in tort. 42 N.E.3d at 507–08. The plaintiffs in Boyer were residents of Indiana who sued a Kentucky attorney over her representation of a client (the plaintiffs’ former employee) in an employment discrimination suit. Id. After examining the defendant’s contacts in Indiana, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision finding a lack of personal jurisdiction over the attorney. Id. at 512. The Court emphasized that a defendant’s relationship to plaintiffs or third parties, without more, did not create a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 511–12 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014)). Central to the Court’s analysis was the absence of Indiana-directed conduct: the defendant was not licensed in Indiana, had never practiced here, and otherwise had no contacts with this state aside from those necessary to represent her former client. Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 511–12. In sum, as the defendant’s connection to Indiana resulted from the actions of others, the attorney herself “neither created nor invoked sufficient minimum contacts within Indiana to warrant specific personal jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 512.
[36] This Court had occasion to consider an analogous question in Richards & O’Neil, LLP v. Conk, where the plaintiff brought suit in Indiana state court against the New York law firm Richards & O’Neil, LLP and one of its attorneys. 774 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The dispute arose from the sale of a privately-owned company headquartered in Indianapolis, Day Dream, Inc., to Cullman Ventures, Inc., a New York corporation. Id. Following the sale of Day Dream, there was a dispute between its shareholders and Cullman, and the parties engaged in arbitration in New York. Id. at 544. Pursuant to the arbitration, Richards & O’Neil attorneys appeared pro hac vice in Indiana courts on behalf of Cullman and Day Dream, and some of its lawyers traveled to Indiana to conduct document review. Id. at 545. The New York arbitration settled as to all shareholders, except Edward Conk. Id.
[37] Conk subsequently sued Richards & O’Neil in Indiana on several theories, including breach of contract and professional negligence. Id. Conk also sued one of the partners at the firm because the attorney signed a legal opinion letter distributed to shareholders which allegedly contained misleading information upon which Conk relied. Id. at 544, 546. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, in which they raised a personal jurisdiction challenge. Id. at 545. The trial court denied the motion. Id.
[38] On appeal, this Court reversed. The panel concluded Richards & O’Neil and the attorney did not have sufficient contacts in Indiana to warrant jurisdiction. Id. at 546. In explaining its holding, the court emphasized Richards & O’Neil was a New York partnership, did not have an office in Indiana, and did not advertise or solicit business in the state. Id. Regarding the attorney-defendant, the court held his contacts within Indiana were too attenuated as he had never traveled here on business and whatever contacts he had arose from the actions of his client. See id. at 546–47.
[39] In this matter, Montgomery McCracken is a Pennsylvania partnership the Center hired to prosecute the second action in Pennsylvania federal court. Like the firm in Conk, Montgomery McCracken has no offices in Indiana and does not advertise or solicit business in this state. There is no indication Montgomery McCracken attorneys regularly practice or conduct business in Indiana courts. Powell is not licensed to practice in Indiana and there is no evidence he practiced here before this lawsuit. He has no contacts within Indiana aside from those necessary to represent his client. See Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 511–12; Conk, 774 N.E.2d at 546–47. Importantly, Bowman’s complaint alleged the Center and its lawyers conspired to pursue frivolous claims against him in Pennsylvania, not Indiana. In addition, it was attorney Indiano who drafted the supposedly threatening letter Bowman quoted in his complaint, which he received before the Center had retained either Montgomery McCracken or Powell. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 15. Indiano’s letter alone does not create a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. See Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 511. We conclude there are not sufficient contacts within Indiana to justify subjecting Montgomery McCracken or Powell to jurisdiction in this state.
[40] The outcome is no different for Rawle. Bowman alleged Rawle caused service of process to issue against him in Indiana despite knowing the Center’s Pennsylvania actions lacked merit. He also alleged Rawle, the Center, or their counsel gathered information about his Indiana residence to extort money and were responsible for the demand letter Indiano drafted. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 28–29. “But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over” her.
Walden, 571 U.S. at 285–86. The fact Bowman received service of process in Indiana and a demand letter, standing alone, does not show Rawle created contacts within or a substantial connection to Indiana warranting jurisdiction. See Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 512; see also Walden, 571 U.S. at 285–86.
[41] In short, neither Rawle, Montgomery McCracken, nor Powell invoked sufficient minimum contacts within Indiana to support specific jurisdiction over them. The trial court cannot exercise jurisdiction over these defendants in a manner consistent with due process. See Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1154. As a result, the court’s grant of default judgment is void, and Bowman’s claims against Rawle, Montgomery McCracken, and Powell must be dismissed. See id. 7
Conclusion [42] The trial court’s grant of default judgment is reversed as to all Defendants. We
remand with instructions to dismiss Bowman’s claims against Rawle, Montgomery McCracken, and Powell as the court lacks jurisdiction over them. Because the Center does not challenge personal jurisdiction, we remand the claim against it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including
7 The personal jurisdiction analysis is not complete just because sufficient minimum contacts are found. Where a defendant has contacts with the forum state sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction, we must still determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable. TikTok, 245 N.E.3d at 691. However, because we conclude Rawle, Montgomery McCracken, and Powell did not have sufficient contacts within Indiana, we need not reach the reasonableness inquiry. These three defendants additionally argue Bowman’s complaint against them failed to state a proper claim. As we determine Indiana courts do not have jurisdiction over them here, we will not address those arguments.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2715 | August 31, 2026 Page 25 of 26 the trial court’s consideration of the Center’s pending 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.
[43] Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS Charles R. Whybrew Lewis Wagner & Trimble Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Paul B. Overhauser Overhauser Law Offices LLC Greenfield, Indiana