Mary L. Neugent v. United States Department of the Interior

640 F.2d 386, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 21194
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJanuary 8, 1981
Docket79-2363
StatusPublished

This text of 640 F.2d 386 (Mary L. Neugent v. United States Department of the Interior) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mary L. Neugent v. United States Department of the Interior, 640 F.2d 386, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 21194 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Opinion

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The Republic of Mexico in 1843 issued a land grant in what is now the State of Colorado to two colonizers, Ceran St. Vrain and Cornelio Vigil. This became known as the Las Animas Grant and the St. VrainVigil Grant. It included land along the Arkansas River near the present town of Hasty, Colorado. 1 St. Vrain and Vigil 2 in turn made sub-grants to induce settlers onto the land.

*387 Following the Mexican War the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, proclaimed on July 4, 1848 (9 Stat. 922), extended the boundaries of the United States to include the area covered by the St. Vrain-Vigil Grant (9 Stat. 926, Art. V). Pursuant to procedures called for by the terms of said Treaty the United States confirmed the prior Mexican grants to St. Vrain and Vigil by the Act of Congress of June 21, 1860, 12 Stat. 71, 72, entitled “An Act to confirm certain land claims.” This Act provided a procedure for recognizing the claims of individuals who acquired their rights as settlers or grantees holding under or taking from St. Vrain-Vigil. In the legislation Congress also limited the confirmation to the amount of land covered by their original claim, less titles of settlers, and in any event “not more than eleven square leagues [3] to each of said claimants, . . . [to] be located in two equal tracts, each of square form, in any part of the tract claimed by the said Vigil [4] and St. Vrain selected by them ....” (12 Stat. 71).

Appellant Neugent is a descendant of Vigil and the great granddaughter of Rumaulda [also written “Rumalda”] Rite, 5 who claimed both as an heir of Vigil and as a settler to a small claim. Her claim as a settler was denied by the Register and Receiver who, pursuant to Act of Congress, was settling the claims to the land as required by the 1848 Treaty. Rite then filed an appeal, but no record has been found of the disposition of the appeal.

*388 Subsequent litigation ensued over claims to various portions of the land by a William Craig, who conveyed to one Henry W. Jones. According to appellant, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado later decided that Craig had been guilty of fraud in obtaining title to the land he claimed. Appellant Neugent has recently investigated this entire matter and uncovered a docket entry in certain land records which recites, inter alia :

Range No. 63 West District of Arkansas Valley
By Whom Patented
See Letter B # 227 Feby. 2, 1916 [Emphasis added]

Las Amimas Grant Jany 8,1878 [App. 35] She also asserts:

Just a few years past, while researching the Colorado land records Mrs. Neugent, in the company of her husband, found a docket entry which she copies verbatim, “Wm. Craig Patent Revoked. Refer to letter (file) B227, dated February 2, 1916.
This notation appeared as a docket entry on the Bureau of Land Management Tract Record where the Henry W. Jones Tract was recorded. Opposition page 4, Affidavit of Mary Neugent, page 1.
This is a record of the Department of the Interior.
Mrs. Neugent cannot now find this record.

Neugent Br. at 7-8.

These circumstances induced Neugent to file a request under the Freedom of Information Act by letter of June 27, 1977 addressed to the Secretary of the Interior. 6 *389 This litigation has eventually settled down principally to a dispute over the letter “B # 227 dated Feby 2, 1916”. Originally it was thought that the letter was dated July 2, 1916, but the parties now agree that “Feby 2, 1916” is most likely the correct date.

However, the Heine Affidavit, upon which the Government’s motion for summary judgment largely relied, concludes:

15. From my research, I am convinced that there is no letter file or letter oí July 2, 1916, the Jones and Craig patents have not been revoked, and there are no “fiscal entries” involving the lands claimed by Ramalda Rite.

App. 10. (Emphasis added.) This conclusion has two deficiencies. (1) It is not clear whether the Government is still relying on a July 2, 1916 date for the letter. (The Hargett Affidavit has the same deficiency, App. 12, ¶ 4.) It has now been determined that the letter was dated Feby 2, 1916, and the Government should address itself to that date if it has not done so already. (2) The Government should also explain its conclusion that “the Jones and Craig patents have not been revoked” (App. 10), in light of the entry with respect to “Wm. Craig” which appears at App. 38, i. e., “Relinquishment to US”. 7

The Government, after spending 27 hours (and undoubtedly more) searching the records, concluded that document B-227 no longer exists. The district court granted summary judgment over the opposing claim by Neugent that the search had been insufficient. On appeal Neugent adduces the definite proof that the letter (or file) once existed to argue that there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether the search was sufficiently thorough. Mrs. Neugent also states that relevant cadastral records in the Government’s possession have neither been searched by the Government nor made available to her. The Government has not expressly claimed that it searched the files for a Feby 2 letter.

Cases such as this pose hard problems for courts. We sympathize with both parties since each party is completely sincere and has considerable support in fact and logic for its position. In somewhat similar cases before this court, further investigation has, in some instances, discovered documents that were claimed by the Government to be non-existent on the basis of initial searches. This does not mean that a further search is always required; no easy uniform rule can be applied. In this case, however, after reviewing the parties’ opposing contentions and affidavits, 8 we conclude there is a genuine issue of fact, notwithstanding the ex *390 tensive search already made in obvious good faith, as to whether the government has performed a complete search. • The record should indicate that the cadastral records and any other likely source have been thoroughly searched with negative results. Conceivably, these cadastral records already may have been searched, but the government makes no such positive assertion. We accordingly remand the case to the district court to direct the Secretary to conduct a further search along lines suggested by our comments below. We also direct appellant to be more cooperative as indicated.

First,

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640 F.2d 386, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 21194, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mary-l-neugent-v-united-states-department-of-the-interior-cadc-1981.