NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2817-24
MARY E. OXLEY DEAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN G. DEAN, IV,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Argued December 2, 2025 – Decided March 23, 2026
Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-0871-20.
Robert H. Siegel argued the cause for appellant (Siegel Law, attorneys; Robert H. Siegel, of counsel and on the briefs).
Rebecca A. Hand argued the cause for respondent (Cosner Law Group, attorneys; Rebecca A. Hand, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant John G. Dean, IV, appeals from the Family Part's April 22,
2025 order denying his request for reconsideration of the March 10, 2025 order,
which denied his request for modification or termination of alimony and granted
in part plaintiff Mary E. Oxley Dean's request for counsel fees. We affirm.
I.
The parties were married for approximately thirteen years, from October
26, 2006, until their divorce on December 17, 2019. The parties voluntarily
entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) on August 7, 2019, which
was initially incorporated into their Judgment of Divorce from Bed and Board
and later into their Final Judgment of Divorce.
During the marriage, defendant was employed with the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, and at the time of the parties' divorce, he was earning a
base salary of $151,291. Defendant agreed to pay limited durational alimony to
plaintiff of $47,000 per year, calculated upon his base salary, his Veterans
Administration pension (VA pension) of $47,138 per year, and his yearly
Veterans (VA) disability income of $22,512 for a total annual income of
$216,213. According to paragraph 1.3 of the MSA, defendant's alimony
obligation would terminate when defendant "actually retires and [plaintiff]
A-2817-24 2 commences receipt of 65% of [defendant's] pension and Thrift Savings Plan"
(TSP).
Relevant to this appeal, paragraph 2.9 of the MSA addressed defendant's
VA pension, federal government pension (FERS) 1 and TSP. The MSA noted
that the VA pension was "already in pay status," and plaintiff would be "named
[a]lternate [p]ayee for the amount of [fifty dollars] per month of this benefit in
order for her to continue her health coverage, if necessary." Plaintiff was named
as defendant's beneficiary on this account to receive "pre and post [s]urvivor
[a]nnuity." No further distribution of this account was designated.
The parties agreed that plaintiff would receive 65% of the FERS pension
"at the time of [defendant's] retirement." They also agreed to have a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) prepared "within thirty (30) days of the
execution of this [MSA]" to "ensure segregation of [plaintiff's] share." As for
the TSP account, the parties agreed that plaintiff would also receive 65% of that
account "at the time of [defendant's] retirement," and a QDRO would be
1 Although not included in the record, FERS is an acronym for the Federal Employees Retirement System. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, FERS Information, OPM (March 12. 2026), https://www.opm.gov/retirement- center/fers-infrmation/.
A-2817-24 3 prepared "to ensure partial immediate segregation of 65% to [plaintiff] . . .
within thirty (30) days after the execution of this [MSA]."
Defendant's federal employment ended on January 31, 2024. In April
2024, he accepted a new full-time position with Syracuse University as
Associate Director of Defense Programs, earning approximately $140,000
annually.
However, before he started his new position, defendant filed a motion to
terminate or modify alimony, resulting in the February 22, 2024 order. Although
the family court did not grant defendant's request, the court directed plaintiff
"immediately upon [] receipt of FERS pension benefits, [to] notify [d]efendant,
and the parties shall thereafter enter into a [c]onsent [o]rder terminating
[d]efendant's alimony obligation, effective the date [p]laintiff begins receiving
her FERS pension benefits." The court based its decision on defendant's
"representation that he [was] retiring, which the [c]ourt interpret[ed] as a
permanent retirement, not merely moving from one position to the next after a
brief (or more long term) pause."
On April 2, 2024, defendant filed another motion seeking to terminate his
alimony obligation. On June 7, 2024, the court denied defendant's request to
terminate his alimony obligation without prejudice. The order, in part, stated
A-2817-24 4 that the parties, "by consent," agreed defendant's alimony obligation would end
"upon [p]laintiff's receipt of her monthly FERS pension benefits , as well as her
receipt of her portion of the [TSP] monies[,]" which had not yet occurred.
In December 2024, defendant stopped making his alimony payments
without the court's approval. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed an enforcement
motion, seeking to compel defendant to resume making his alimony payments.
Defendant filed a cross-motion—his third attempt—to terminate alimony based
on his purported retirement.
On March 10, 2025, the family court issued an order granting plaintiff's
enforcement motion, finding defendant in violation of litigant's rights, directing
defendant to resume alimony payments, denying defendant's cross-motion to
terminate alimony, and awarding plaintiff counsel fees of $2,500 . The court
explained that defendant "testified on February 22, 2024, in response to the
[c]ourt's questions, that he was fully retired and that he did not intend on
obtaining alternate employment at that time." Within two months of that
hearing, defendant accepted new employment. Thus, the court concluded
defendant acted in bad faith "by claiming he was fully retired when he really
had every intention of seeking new employment elsewhere."
A-2817-24 5 Defendant filed for reconsideration, which the court denied on April 22,
2025.
On appeal, defendant argues the family court erred by denying
reconsideration of the March 10, 2025 order and misapplying the Supreme
Court's holding in Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 514 (1990), and by denying his
request for a plenary hearing. Defendant also claims the court erred in its
analysis of defendant's modification request by using his time-of-divorce
income rather than his income at the time of retirement.
II.
A.
Our court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration
under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,
244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020);
Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022); Pitney Bowes
Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div.
2015). "The rule applies when the court's decision represents a clear abuse of
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2817-24
MARY E. OXLEY DEAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN G. DEAN, IV,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Argued December 2, 2025 – Decided March 23, 2026
Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-0871-20.
Robert H. Siegel argued the cause for appellant (Siegel Law, attorneys; Robert H. Siegel, of counsel and on the briefs).
Rebecca A. Hand argued the cause for respondent (Cosner Law Group, attorneys; Rebecca A. Hand, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant John G. Dean, IV, appeals from the Family Part's April 22,
2025 order denying his request for reconsideration of the March 10, 2025 order,
which denied his request for modification or termination of alimony and granted
in part plaintiff Mary E. Oxley Dean's request for counsel fees. We affirm.
I.
The parties were married for approximately thirteen years, from October
26, 2006, until their divorce on December 17, 2019. The parties voluntarily
entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) on August 7, 2019, which
was initially incorporated into their Judgment of Divorce from Bed and Board
and later into their Final Judgment of Divorce.
During the marriage, defendant was employed with the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, and at the time of the parties' divorce, he was earning a
base salary of $151,291. Defendant agreed to pay limited durational alimony to
plaintiff of $47,000 per year, calculated upon his base salary, his Veterans
Administration pension (VA pension) of $47,138 per year, and his yearly
Veterans (VA) disability income of $22,512 for a total annual income of
$216,213. According to paragraph 1.3 of the MSA, defendant's alimony
obligation would terminate when defendant "actually retires and [plaintiff]
A-2817-24 2 commences receipt of 65% of [defendant's] pension and Thrift Savings Plan"
(TSP).
Relevant to this appeal, paragraph 2.9 of the MSA addressed defendant's
VA pension, federal government pension (FERS) 1 and TSP. The MSA noted
that the VA pension was "already in pay status," and plaintiff would be "named
[a]lternate [p]ayee for the amount of [fifty dollars] per month of this benefit in
order for her to continue her health coverage, if necessary." Plaintiff was named
as defendant's beneficiary on this account to receive "pre and post [s]urvivor
[a]nnuity." No further distribution of this account was designated.
The parties agreed that plaintiff would receive 65% of the FERS pension
"at the time of [defendant's] retirement." They also agreed to have a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) prepared "within thirty (30) days of the
execution of this [MSA]" to "ensure segregation of [plaintiff's] share." As for
the TSP account, the parties agreed that plaintiff would also receive 65% of that
account "at the time of [defendant's] retirement," and a QDRO would be
1 Although not included in the record, FERS is an acronym for the Federal Employees Retirement System. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, FERS Information, OPM (March 12. 2026), https://www.opm.gov/retirement- center/fers-infrmation/.
A-2817-24 3 prepared "to ensure partial immediate segregation of 65% to [plaintiff] . . .
within thirty (30) days after the execution of this [MSA]."
Defendant's federal employment ended on January 31, 2024. In April
2024, he accepted a new full-time position with Syracuse University as
Associate Director of Defense Programs, earning approximately $140,000
annually.
However, before he started his new position, defendant filed a motion to
terminate or modify alimony, resulting in the February 22, 2024 order. Although
the family court did not grant defendant's request, the court directed plaintiff
"immediately upon [] receipt of FERS pension benefits, [to] notify [d]efendant,
and the parties shall thereafter enter into a [c]onsent [o]rder terminating
[d]efendant's alimony obligation, effective the date [p]laintiff begins receiving
her FERS pension benefits." The court based its decision on defendant's
"representation that he [was] retiring, which the [c]ourt interpret[ed] as a
permanent retirement, not merely moving from one position to the next after a
brief (or more long term) pause."
On April 2, 2024, defendant filed another motion seeking to terminate his
alimony obligation. On June 7, 2024, the court denied defendant's request to
terminate his alimony obligation without prejudice. The order, in part, stated
A-2817-24 4 that the parties, "by consent," agreed defendant's alimony obligation would end
"upon [p]laintiff's receipt of her monthly FERS pension benefits , as well as her
receipt of her portion of the [TSP] monies[,]" which had not yet occurred.
In December 2024, defendant stopped making his alimony payments
without the court's approval. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed an enforcement
motion, seeking to compel defendant to resume making his alimony payments.
Defendant filed a cross-motion—his third attempt—to terminate alimony based
on his purported retirement.
On March 10, 2025, the family court issued an order granting plaintiff's
enforcement motion, finding defendant in violation of litigant's rights, directing
defendant to resume alimony payments, denying defendant's cross-motion to
terminate alimony, and awarding plaintiff counsel fees of $2,500 . The court
explained that defendant "testified on February 22, 2024, in response to the
[c]ourt's questions, that he was fully retired and that he did not intend on
obtaining alternate employment at that time." Within two months of that
hearing, defendant accepted new employment. Thus, the court concluded
defendant acted in bad faith "by claiming he was fully retired when he really
had every intention of seeking new employment elsewhere."
A-2817-24 5 Defendant filed for reconsideration, which the court denied on April 22,
2025.
On appeal, defendant argues the family court erred by denying
reconsideration of the March 10, 2025 order and misapplying the Supreme
Court's holding in Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 514 (1990), and by denying his
request for a plenary hearing. Defendant also claims the court erred in its
analysis of defendant's modification request by using his time-of-divorce
income rather than his income at the time of retirement.
II.
A.
Our court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration
under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,
244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021); Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020);
Hoover v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022); Pitney Bowes
Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div.
2015). "The rule applies when the court's decision represents a clear abuse of
discretion based on plainly incorrect reasoning or failure to consider evidence
or a good reason for the court to reconsider new information." Pressler &
Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2026).
A-2817-24 6 We ordinarily accord great deference to discretionary decisions of Family
Part judges, in recognition of the family courts' "special jurisdiction and
expertise in family matters." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83
(2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "Discretionary
determinations, supported by the record, are examined to discern whether an
abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546,
564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547 (2006)). However,
"[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Hitesman v.
Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
B.
Defendant contends the family court erred by misapplying the
reconsideration standard under Rule 4:49-2 and disregarding the holding of
Innes. 117 N.J. at 514. Specifically, defendant argues the court erred by
underestimating the amount by which his income had decreased and by
including his VA pension as income in contravention of the Innes holding, which
prohibits double counting of income "generated by a retirement share that has
been equitably distributed." Id. at 514. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that the
A-2817-24 7 family court neither misapplied the reconsideration standard nor disregarded the
holding of Innes.
Under Rule 4:49-2, motions for reconsideration are granted only under
very narrow circumstances in which either: "1) the [c]ourt has expressed its
decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious
that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance
of probative, competent evidence." Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274,
288 (App. Div. 2010) (citations omitted).
Defendant initially claims that the court erred in its analysis of whether
changed circumstances warranting a modification or termination of alimony had
occurred because it relied upon defendant's time-of-divorce base salary of
$151,291 rather than his income of approximately $180,000 at the time his
employment with the Department of Defense ended. This assertion is without
merit.
"Parties to a divorce action may enter into voluntary agreements
governing the amount, terms, and duration of alimony, and such agreements are
subject to judicial supervision and enforcement." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34,
48 (2016) (quoting Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 203 (1999)). Such
agreements executed "voluntarily and understandingly for the purpose of
A-2817-24 8 settling the issue of [alimony] are specifically enforceable, but only to the extent
that they are just and equitable." Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569
(1970) (citations omitted).
Agreements may be modified "upon a showing of changed
circumstances." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 49 (quoting Berkowitz, 55 N.J. at 569).
When a party moves to terminate or reduce alimony, the court must first
determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances. R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. Super. 58, 62 (App. Div. 2014).
The changed circumstances analysis begins with the clear and unequivocal
terms of the MSA. See Bisbing v. Bisbing, 445 N.J. Super. 207, 218 (App. Div.
2016). When assessing changed circumstances, a family court must examine
the parties' current situation and compare it to the situation when the support
obligation was initially entered. Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App.
Div. 1990) ("It is clear that the changed-circumstances determination must be
made by comparing the parties' financial circumstances at the time the motion
for relief is made with the circumstances which formed the basis for the last
order fixing support obligations."); see also Deegan v. Deegan, 254 N.J. Super.
350, 354-55 (App. Div. 1992) ("An analysis of 'changed circumstances' is not
limited to what the parties might have contemplated at the time of the divorce
A-2817-24 9 . . . [but rather] 'whether the change in circumstances is continuing and whether
the agreement or decree has made explicit provision for the change.'" (quoting
Lepis, 83 N.J. at 152)).
Here, the terms of the MSA pertaining to alimony provided for the factors
upon which alimony was based, which included defendant's base salary of
$151,291, his VA pension of $47,138, and his VA disability income of $22,512,
totaling gross annual income of $216,213. Nothing in the MSA nor in caselaw
supports defendant's contention that his base salary of approximately $180,000
at the time he left his employment with the Department of Defense should be
used to assess whether his financial circumstances have substantially changed
"impair[ing] [his] ability to support himself." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157. Thus, the
family court's use of defendant's income as set forth in the MSA as a starting
point for the changed circumstances analysis was not palpably incorrect or
irrational; nor did the court overlook any legal authority on this issue.
Defendant next contends the court misapplied Innes by including the VA
pension and disability benefits in calculating income. He argues that the court
ignored Innes by including the VA pension as income when it had been equitably
distributed.
In Innes, the Court held:
A-2817-24 10 What the trial court can no longer do, however, is determine alimony by considering income generated by a retirement share that has been equitably distributed, either at the time of divorce or when it considers a modification application. . . . Hence, we hold that payments generated by pension benefits that had been previously equitably distributed are not income for purposes of alimony modification.
[117 N.J. at 514.]
The Court held that "it is inappropriate to make equitable distribution of a
retirement benefit and then consider that distributed share for purpose of
determining alimony" because "'double-dipping' of this asset [is] improper."
Ibid.
The Court's holding in Innes has no application here because the VA
pension, as the unambiguous terms of the MSA confirm, was included as income
for alimony purposes and were not equitably distributed. Paragraph 1.1 of the
MSA expressly states that the VA pension and VA disability income were
included as income for the purpose of calculating defendant's biweekly alimony
obligation of $1,858. Moreover, the VA pension was in "pay status," and
therefore, was part of defendant's income stream. On the contrary, the FERS
and TSP accounts were to be divided through QDROs, with plaintiff receiving
a designated share of those assets. Accordingly, we discern no error in the court
A-2817-24 11 considering those same income streams in evaluating defendant's post-judgment
modification request.
C.
Defendant next argues that the family court erred by denying his request
for a plenary hearing on the issue of whether the VA pension should be included
as income for purposes of determining this post-judgment modification request.
A plenary hearing is necessary only when a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Palmieri v. Palmieri, 388 N.J. Super. 562, 564 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Shaw v.
Shaw, 138 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div. 1976)). "[N]ot every factual dispute
that arises in the context of matrimonial proceedings triggers the need for a
plenary hearing." Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 422 (App. Div. 2010)
(quoting Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (1995)) (alteration in
original).
[T]o be entitled to a hearing on whether a previously- approved support award should be modified, the party moving for the modification bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. Specifically, the party seeking modification of an alimony award must demonstrate that changed circumstances have substantially impaired the ability to support himself or herself.
[Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. at 290-91 (quoting Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 28 (2000) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)) (alteration in original).]
A-2817-24 12 The MSA provides for termination of alimony upon the following
conditions: (1) defendant's actual retirement; and (2) plaintiff's receipt of both
the FERS and TSP distributions. It is undisputed that plaintiff remains
employed full-time, earning approximately $140,000, and that the TSP account
has not yet been distributed. The record is void of any updated information
regarding defendant's VA pension or VA disability income. Therefore, the
family court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a plenary hearing
because defendant did not meet the threshold showing of changed circumstances
and failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
entitling him to a plenary hearing.
D.
Defendant contends the family court erred in not granting reconsideration
of paragraphs one through four of its March 10, 2025 order. Paragraph two of
the order granted plaintiff's requests for attorneys' fees. Our review of this claim
is impeded because defendant fails to articulate the basis for his assertion that
the court erred in not reconsidering this specific provision of the March 10, 2025
order. See R. 2:6-2; cf. Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105,
112 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that a complaint is dismissed for failing to
articulate a basis for its claim).
A-2817-24 13 An award of attorneys' fees in family matters rests in the sound discretion
of the family court. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a; R. 5:3-5(c). We will overturn the
family court's decision concerning an attorney fee award "only on the 'rarest
occasion,' and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Barr v. Barr,
418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J.
Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317
(1995)).
In this case, the family court concluded that defendant acted in bad faith
because he failed to advise the court in his pleadings of his new employment
and testified he was fully retired and did not intend on obtaining alternat e
employment at that time. The record supports the court's finding of bad faith.
Moreover, paragraph 5.2 of the MSA states: "[s]hould either party fail to
abide by the terms of this Agreement, the defaulting party will indemnify the
other for all reasonable expenses and costs, including attorneys' fees incurred in
successfully enforcing this agreement." Defendant unilaterally ceased making
alimony payments in December 2024, and as a result, plaintiff was compelled
to file an enforcement motion. The court found defendant in violation of
litigant's rights, and therefore, plaintiff prevailed in her enforcement application.
A-2817-24 14 Therefore, we reject defendant's argument that the court erred in not
reconsidering the attorney fee award because we discern no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
Clerk of the Appellate Division
A-2817-24 15