Mary Decker v. Clifford Homes, LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided July 6, 2015·No. 03-15-00393-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 03-15-00393-CV 5933580 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/6/2015 7:18:43 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK

No. 03-15-00393-CV __________________________________________________________________ FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/6/2015 7:18:43 AM __________________________________________________________________ JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk MARY DECKER AND/OR ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 1607 MAIN STREET, CEDAR PARK, TEXAS 78613,

Appellants,

v.

CLIFFORD HOMES, LLC,

Appellee. __________________________________________________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW, WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 15-0508-CC4 __________________________________________________________________

APPELLEE’S RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF WRIT __________________________________________________________________

Dr. J. Hyde Texas Bar No. 24027083 THE J. HYDE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 111 E. 17th Street #12015 Austin, TX 78711 Telephone: (512) 200-4080 Fax: (512) 582-8295 E-mail: jhyde@jhydelaw.com

Counsel for Appellee No. 03-15-00393-CV __________________________________________________________________

IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS __________________________________________________________________

MARY DECKER AND/OR ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 1607 MAIN STREET, CEDAR PARK, TEXAS 78613,

Appellee. __________________________________________________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW, WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 15-0508-CC4 __________________________________________________________________

APPELLEE’S RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF WRIT __________________________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellee Clifford Homes, LLC, by and through undersigned counsel,

respectfully responds to the Emergency Motion for Stay of Writ (“Motion”) filed

by Appellant Mary Decker, and in support thereof states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. In a nutshell, Decker’s Motion seeks to stay issuance of a writ of

possession until the trial court sets a supersedeas bond—an event that took place

2 before the Motion was filed. Decker’s request is moot, and the stay issued by this

Court on 2 July 2015 should be lifted.

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

2. In this post-foreclosure forcible detainer action, the trial court

rendered a final judgment of possession in favor of Clifford Homes on 23 June

2015 following a summary-judgment hearing. (See Attachment B to Motion).

That judgment is on appeal in this proceeding.

3. On June 25, Decker filed a “Motion for Bond Application” in the trial

court. (See Attachment C to Motion).1 On June 29, Clifford Homes filed a

response to that motion. (See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Bond

Application and Emergency Motion to Stay Writ of Possession Until Bond Is Set,

attached hereto as Exhibit 1).

4. On June 29 and 30, counsel for the parties communicated via e-mail

with the county court administrator regarding Decker’s Bond Application. (See

Attachment E to Motion; see also E-mails attached hereto as Exhibit 2). In

response to the court administrator’s request, on June 30 the undersigned e-mailed

the administrator copies of Decker’s application and Clifford Homes’ response,

along with each party’s proposed order. (See Exhibit 2). In the e-mail, the

1 Decker asserts in the Motion that she requested that the trial court set a bond at the conclusion of the summary-judgment hearing and that the trial court “refused” to do so. (See Motion, at ¶ 5). But the trial court’s “refusal” was not arbitrary, as Decker suggests. The trial court merely informed the parties that he was not setting a bond at that time because no bond application had been filed.

3 undersigned reiterated the importance of a speedy ruling in light of the Property

Code’s strict deadline for superseding eviction judgments. (See id.).

5. The next day, July 1, the trial court signed and filed an order ruling on

Decker’s Bond Application and setting the type and amount of security required to

suspend enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. (See Order, attached hereto

as Exhibit 3).

6. On July 2, the undersigned checked the case docket and, seeing the

order reflected, requested and obtained a copy from the clerk’s office via e-mail.

(See e-mail from A. Wiseman to J. Hyde, attached hereto as Exhibit 4). Later that

day, Decker filed the underlying Motion without conferring with Clifford Homes,

and the Court entered a stay order shortly thereafter. Had Decker checked the

docket or conferred with the undersigned before filing the Motion, she would have

learned that the Motion was moot before she filed it.2

7. Although somewhat beyond the scope of the Motion, Clifford Homes

notes that the trial court’s July 1 order on the Bond Application is proper on its

merits. The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to suspend enforcement of the trial

court’s judgment while an appeal is pending. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(f). In

2 As this Court noted in its July 2 Order, Decker’s Motion, though styled a petition for writ of mandamus, “is actually a motion in a pending appeal.” As such, the Motion was required to contain a certificate stating that the filing party conferred, or made a reasonable attempt to confer, with all other parties about the merits of the motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1(a)(5). Decker made no such attempt to confer, and the Motion did not contain a certificate of conference (although one was inexplicably referenced in the Table of Contents).

4 eviction suits like the one at issue, in setting the bond “the county court shall

provide protection for the appellee to the same extent as in any other appeal, taking

into consideration the value of rents likely to accrue during appeal, damages which

may occur as a result of the stay during appeal, and other damages or amounts as

the court may deem appropriate.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.007(a); see also TEX. R.

APP. P. 24.2(a)(2) (requiring that the amount of security to suspend enforcement of

judgments “for the recovery of an interest in real or personal property” be at least

“the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue”).

8. The trial court appropriately set the appellate security in accordance

with the parameters of the Property Code and the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(See Exhibits 1 & 3). Decker may suspend enforcement of the judgment by

depositing the ordered security into the registry of the county court no later than 6

July 2015. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.007(a) (“A judgment of a county court in an

eviction suit may not under any circumstances be stayed pending appeal unless,

within 10 days of the signing of the judgment, the appellant files a supersedeas

bond in an amount set by the county court.”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(2)

(“When the judgment is for the recovery of an interest in real or personal property,

the trial court will determine the type of security that the judgment debtor must

post.”).

5 9. Clifford Homes would also note that the underlying appeal of the trial

court’s summary judgment is itself frivolous, as it involves an argument (often

made by the same attorney) that this Court has rejected multiple times in the past

few years. Specifically, Decker argued on summary judgment that a title dispute—

in the form of a challenge to the validity of the foreclosure sale of the Property to

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