Mary Cunningham V.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 5, 2016
• Docket: 14-56763
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 05 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: MARY MARGARET No. 14-56763 CUNNINGHAM, D.C. No. 8:14-cv-00652-JFW Debtor.

MEMORANDUM* MARY MARGARET CUNNINGHAM,

Appellant,

v.

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, Putative Assigness of FDIC as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank its assignees and/or successors in interest J.P. Morgan Subsidiary; et al.,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 27, 2016**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Chapter 7 debtor Mary Margaret Cunningham appeals pro se from the

district court’s orders affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders dismissing

Cunningham’s adversary proceeding without leave to amend and denying

Cunningham’s motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d)(1). We review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a

bankruptcy court, applying the same standard of review the district court applied to

the bankruptcy court’s decision. In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.3d 1162, 1166

(9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court properly dismissed Cunningham’s adversary

proceeding because Cunningham lacks standing to pursue claims that are property

of the bankruptcy estate. See Canatella v. Towers (In re Alcala), 918 F.2d 99, 102

(9th Cir. 1990) (causes of action which accrued before a Chapter 7 petition is filed

are part of the estate vested in the trustee); see also 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (“[P]roperty

of the estate that is not abandoned under this section and that is not administered in

the case remains property of the estate.”); Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino

Cty. Superior Court Case Numbered SPR 02211, 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.

2006) (bankruptcy code endows bankruptcy trustee with exclusive right to sue on

behalf of estate).

2 14-56763 The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cunningham

leave to amend her complaint because her lack of standing could not be cured by

amendment. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir.

2008) (“[T]he court need not extend the general rule that parties are allowed to

amend their pleadings if amendment would be an exercise in futility” (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cunningham’s

motion under Rule 59(e) because Cunningham failed to demonstrate any basis for

relief. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 applicable to

bankruptcy cases); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.

2001) (discussing factors for granting a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 59(e)).

We reject as without merit Cunningham’s contentions that the bankruptcy

court exhibited bias and violated due process.

AFFIRMED.

3 14-56763