Mary Conception Anderson v. Snohomish County, et al.

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 MARY CONCEPTION ANDERSON, CASE NO. C25-1705-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 SNOHOMISH COUNTY, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Adam Cornell’s motion to stay 16 discovery pending disposition of a partial Rule 12(c) motion (Dkt. No. 28). Having thoroughly 17 considered the briefing and the relevant record, the Court DENIES the motion to stay for the 18 reasons explained herein. 19 Plaintiff is a former Snohomish County District Court pro tem judge. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 3, 20 12, 21.) Defendants include the County and some of its District Court Judges and Prosecuting 21 Attorneys. (Id. at 4–5.) In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was the sole black woman 22 appointed as a County judge. (Id. at 3.) In response, Defendants discriminated against her, 23 including filing blanket discriminatory RCW 3.34.110 disqualifications in matters Plaintiff 24 would otherwise preside over. (Id. at 52–54.) This hampered Plaintiff’s ability to serve as a 25 District Court pro tem judge and undermined her campaign for a Superior Court judgeship. (See 26 generally id.) As to Defendant Cornell, Plaintiff alleges that he, while acting as the County’s 1 elected Prosecuting Attorney from 2018–2022, authorized/approved a coordinated officewide 2 blanket disqualification campaign. (Id. at 5, 52–54.) Plaintiff’s complaint asserts state and federal 3 claims against Defendant Cornell (and others) for discrimination and civil rights violations. (See 4 Dkt. No. 1 at 44–54.) 5 In support of her claims, Plaintiff propounded to Defendant Cornell 15 Interrogatories 6 and 16 Requests for Production. (Dkt. No. 30 at 58–77.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants 7 collectively moved for partial judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 24), arguing that any claim 8 based on filing of an affidavit of prejudice is either barred by prosecutorial immunity or runs 9 afoul of separation of powers. (See id. at 9–12.) Based on the outstanding Rule 12(c) motion, 10 Defendant Cornell requested a stay of discovery from Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 30 at 2.) When 11 Plaintiff declined, Defendant Cornell filed the instant motion (Dkt. No. 28). In support of his 12 motion to stay, Defendant Cornell cites his allegedly limited role in this case and his likelihood 13 of success on the merits, based solely on a prosecutorial immunity defense. (See generally id.) 14 The Court has broad discretion to stay a proceeding incidental to the inherent power to 15 control its own docket. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 16 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). However, the party seeking the stay “carries the heavy burden of 17 making a ‘strong showing’ why discovery should be denied.” Gary v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 18 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (quoting Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th 19 Cir. 1975)). Defendant Cornell fails to make this showing. In determining whether to grant such 20 a stay, the Court can consider a variety of factors, including whether Defendant Cornell has 21 demonstrated “that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; the breadth of discovery and the burden 22 of responding to it; and the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” Jensen v. 23 Capital One Fin. Corp., 2024 WL 4554408, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2024). These factors 24 largely counsel against the stay Defendant Cornell seeks. 25 First, the discovery Plaintiff seeks, (see Dkt. No. 30 at 58–77), is not unduly broad or 26 burdensome to Defendant Cornell. It appears reasonably tailored to the claims asserted against 1 him (given his alleged leadership role in the campaign against Plaintiff). (See generally Dkt. No. 2 1.) Nor is it lost on the Court that Defendant Cornell is represented by the same County attorneys 3 as other defendants in this matter. (See Dkt. No. 18.) This further alleviates any burden specific 4 to Defendant Cornell. Second, Plaintiff’s discrimination claim(s) and the resulting defenses are 5 highly contextual. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 17, 24.) Prosecutorial immunity, for example, is 6 not as absolute as Defendant Cornell may argue it to be. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 7 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009) (noting that such immunity does not attach when not acting as an 8 officer of the court); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275 (1993) (distinguishing between 9 protected and unprotected prosecutorial conduct). Thus, the Court cannot say at this point that 10 Defendant Cornell has made the merits showing needed to avoid discovery. Third, Plaintiff’s 11 case is fact intensive and requires discovery to support her claims (and defeat raised defenses). 12 And Defendant Cornell fails to provide the Court with assurance(s) that, if it were to take some 13 time to resolve the Rule 12(c) motion, Plaintiff would still have sufficient time to gather the 14 evidence needed to prosecute her claims (before the discovery cut off). Again, establishing a lack 15 of prejudice (to Plaintiff from the proposed stay) is Defendant Cornell’s burden as the movant 16 here—not the other way around. Defendant Cornell fails to make this showing. 17 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to stay discovery (Dkt. No. 28) is DENIED. 18 19 DATED this 17th day of February 2026. A 20 21 22 John C. Coughenour 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26