Mary Conception Anderson v. Snohomish County, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01705
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 MARY CONCEPTION ANDERSON, CASE NO. C25-1705-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 SNOHOMISH COUNTY, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to disqualify Plaintiff as an 16 attorney in this matter (Dkt. No. 11). For the reasons described below, the motion is DENIED 17 without prejudice. 18 In support of its request for disqualification, Defendant relies in part on Washington’s 19 Rules of Professional Conduct, which bars a lawyer from advocating in matters where they may 20 be a material witness. (See id. at 1–2) (citing RPC 3.7). But the rule’s purpose is to protect 21 against a conflict of interest—not to support blanket disqualification. See RPC 3.7 Comment 4 22 (“balancing is required between the interests of the [party seeking to represent themselves] and 23 those of the [Court] and opposing party”); RPC Comment 8 (the rule does not divest discretion 24 from the Court “in determining whether disqualification is truly warranted”).1 And at least for 25 1 Nor is it clear whether disqualification here would represent a substantial hardship to Plaintiff. 26 See RPC 3.7(a)(3). 1 now, blanket disqualification does not appear necessary to balance the needs of all involved. 2 Defendant also points to authority for the proposition that the right to self representation 3 does not necessarily apply when the party is also assisted by counsel—meaning it is not absolute 4 in such an instance. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 1–4) (citing U.S. v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th 5 Cir. 1981); Lanigan v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 609 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1985); O'Reilly v. 6 New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1982)). True, but this does not negate Plaintiff’s 7 general right to self representation, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1975), or 8 this Court’s discretion in assessing whether hybrid representation may be appropriate. See U.S. v. 9 Zafaranchi, 2025 WL 1839890, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing Halbert, 640 F.2d at 10 1009). And, at least to date, Defendant fails to demonstrate how or why hybrid representation is 11 impractical here. 12 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to disqualify (Dkt. No. 11). As the 13 case proceeds, Defendant may re-raise the issue but only if presented with an intractable barrier 14 to its defense from such an arrangement for which the parties are unable to resolve on their own. 15 In the meantime, though, the Court declines to prospectively disqualify Plaintiff from 16 representing herself in this matter. 17 18 DATED this 15th day of October 2025. A 19 20 21 John C. Coughenour 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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