Mary C. v. Charles E.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Mary C. v. Charles E.

188 A.D.2d 718, 590 N.Y.S.2d 597, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13532

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 3, 1992

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 188 A.D.2d 718 (Mary C. v. Charles E.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mary C. v. Charles E., 188 A.D.2d 718, 590 N.Y.S.2d 597, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13532 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1992).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.), entered March 5, 1992, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 5, to adjudicate respondent as the father of a child born to petitioner.

We reject petitioner’s contention that Family Court erred in dismissing her application to adjudicate respondent the father of her child. An order of filiation had previously been entered against another man adjudicating him as the child’s father. The other man also admitted in open court to being the father. Petitioner in this proceeding seeks to vacate the prior order based upon her "belief’ that respondent may be the child’s father. It was previously determined, however, that there was a 99.9% probability that the other man was the father (see, Swann v Schoenfield, 163 AD2d 850, appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 889). Having previously asserted that the other man was the child’s father, petitioner’s current assertions based only on this belief and which were contrary to her prior sworn admissions were not sufficient to warrant a vacatur of the prior order (see, Matter of Rosa v Diaz, 136 AD2d 512, amended 137 AD2d 448). "A court order purporting to settle something so fundamentally important as the paternity of a child is not susceptible of vacatur upon so dubious a ground” (supra, at 514; see, Matter of June B. v Edward L., 69 AD2d 612). It was petitioner’s burden to show that the prior order should be set aside and the evidence she presented [719]*719simply did not support a grant of the requested relief (see, Matter of Rosa v Diaz, supra).

Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Levine, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.), entered March 5, 1992, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 5, to adjudicate respondent as the father of a child born to petitioner.

We reject petitioner’s contention that Family Court erred in dismissing her application to adjudicate respondent the father of her child. An order of filiation had previously been entered against another man adjudicating him as the child’s father. The other man also admitted in open court to being the father. Petitioner in this proceeding seeks to vacate the prior order based upon her "belief’ that respondent may be the child’s father. It was previously determined, however, that there was a 99.9% probability that the other man was the father (see, Swann v Schoenfield, 163 AD2d 850, appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 889). Having previously asserted that the other man was the child’s father, petitioner’s current assertions based only on this belief and which were contrary to her prior sworn admissions were not sufficient to warrant a vacatur of the prior order (see, Matter of Rosa v Diaz, 136 AD2d 512, amended 137 AD2d 448). "A court order purporting to settle something so fundamentally important as the paternity of a child is not susceptible of vacatur upon so dubious a ground” (supra, at 514; see, Matter of June B. v Edward L., 69 AD2d 612). It was petitioner’s burden to show that the prior order should be set aside and the evidence she presented [719]*719simply did not support a grant of the requested relief (see, Matter of Rosa v Diaz, supra).

Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Levine, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

188 A.D.2d 718, 590 N.Y.S.2d 597, 1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13532, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mary-c-v-charles-e-nyappdiv-1992.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack