Mary Beth Laird, Nee Walley v. John Carlton Laird

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 18, 2020
• Docket: 53,651-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered November 18, 2020. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 53,651-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

MARY BETH LAIRD, NEE Plaintiff-Appellant WALLEY

versus

JOHN CARLTON LAIRD Defendant-Appellee

Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana Trial Court No. 060738

Honorable Robert C. Johnson, Judge

ROUNTREE LAW OFFICES Counsel for Appellant By: James A. Rountree

JOHN C. LAIRD, APLC Counsel for Appellee, By: John C. Laird JTL Ventures, LLC

DONALD L. KNEIPP Counsel for Appellee, John Carlton Laird

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ. PITMAN, J.

Appellant Mary Beth Laird appeals the district court’s judgment in

favor of Appellees John Carlton Laird and JTL Ventures, LLC. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

This community property dispute was previously before this court in

Laird v. Laird, 46,459 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/22/11), 69 So. 3d 1173, and Laird

v. Laird, 52,560 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 443, writ denied,

19-00715 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So. 3d 969 (“Laird II”). In Laird II, Mr. Laird

appealed the district court’s judgment in favor of Mrs. Laird for $56,039.06,

with legal interest from the date of demand with all costs of the proceedings

to be paid by Mr. Laird. On appeal, this court amended the district court’s

judgment to state that interest begins to run at the date of judgment and

affirmed the casting of costs to Mr. Laird. This court stated that costs of

appeal were to be split evenly between the parties.

On April 30, 2019, Appellees filed a motion to deposit money into the

registry of the court in satisfaction of the judgment. They requested that the

district court accept the deposited funds and render judgment acknowledging

that all judgments rendered in the proceedings against Mr. Laird, as

modified by the court of appeal, have been satisfied in full and ordering the

cancellation of all judgments filed by Mrs. Laird. They stated that at the

time of this filing, legal interest accrued in the amount of $3,147.40, for a

total judgment in the amount of $59,186.46. They offered a calculation of

costs and determined that Mrs. Laird owed them $2,359.41 in costs. They

requested that Mrs. Laird show cause why the amount tendered should not

be accepted as full satisfaction of all judgments and claims. On August 13, 2019, Mrs. Laird filed an opposition and requested that

the motion be denied at Appellees’ cost. She emphasized that the district

court ruled that Mr. Laird was to pay all costs of the proceedings. She

calculated that Mr. Laird owed her $11,551.99 in costs, in addition to the

$56,039.06 judgment plus legal interest.

On September 11, 2019, a hearing was held regarding the amount of

interest and the amount of court costs, if any, owed by the parties to each

other.1

On October 10, 2019, the district court filed a ruling. It determined

that justice and equity dictate that each party should bear its own costs. It

found that interest was due from the date of judgment until the date of tender

on April 30, 2019. Accordingly, the district court determined that

Appellees’ tender of $59,186.46 was the total amount due to Mrs. Laird and

ordered that this sum be deposited into the registry of the court and paid to

Mrs. Laird in full satisfaction of all interest and costs.

On December 12, 2019, the district court signed a judgment decreeing

Appellees’ tender of $59,186.46 is the total amount due to Mrs. Laird. It

ordered that any costs that may be due to Mrs. Laird are offset by the

reimbursement of costs she owes to Mr. Laird for the split costs of appeal

and the costs she was previously ordered to pay.

On December 20, 2019, Mrs. Laird filed a motion to appeal the

December 12, 2019 judgment that required her to pay half of the costs.

1 The district judge who rendered the judgment appealed in Laird II retired. A different district judge presided over this hearing and rendered the ruling and judgment at issue in the appeal now before this court. 2 On January 15, 2020, Mrs. Laird filed a motion to withdraw the

$59,186.46 from the registry of the court. The district court ordered that the

Clerk of Court issue a check payable to Mrs. Laird in that amount.

DISCUSSION

Costs

In her first assignment of error, Mrs. Laird argues that the district

court erred on remand when it disregarded the appellate court’s

determination that Mr. Laird pay all costs. She contends that a district court

is not entitled to ignore the ruling of the appellate court. She states that

because the appellate court ordered that appellate costs be split evenly

between the parties, Mr. Laird owes money to her in unpaid costs.

Appellees argue that the district court’s allocation of costs was correct

and in accordance with all judgments rendered in this case. They state that

the district court did not change any cost allocations and, instead, allocated

the costs according to previous district court rulings. They contend that the

district court’s calculations would have resulted in Mrs. Laird paying over

$2,300 in costs, but it ruled that no party owed the other any further

costs. They state that the district court acted within its discretion to allocate

costs in a proper and equitable manner.

La. C.C.P. art. 1920 states, in part, that “the court may render

judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider

equitable.” On review, a trial court’s assessment of costs can be reversed

only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Hodnett v. Hodnett, 36,532

(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 827 So. 2d 1205.

We note that the district court did not alter the assessment of appellate

costs by this court in Laird II. Instead, it only addressed costs from the 3 district court proceedings. After hearing arguments from the parties and

reviewing the record of the proceedings, the district court determined that

justice and equity dictated that each party should bear its own costs. The

district court is uniquely capable of assessing its costs and clarifying its

orders, and the district court’s determination of costs in this case does not

contradict any orders of this court. Nothing in the record before this court

suggests that the district court abused its discretion in the assessment of

costs in this matter.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Accrual of Legal Interest

In her second assignment of error, Mrs. Laird argues that the district

court erroneously stopped the accrual of legal interest on April 30, 2019, i.e.,

the date Mr. Laird filed his motion to deposit. Citing Sims v. Hays,

521 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1988), she contends that a tender that stops

the accrual of interest must be in the correct amount and unconditional. She

states that Mr. Laird did not deposit the funds into the registry of the court

until August 5, 2019. She argues that the tender was not unconditional

because Mr. Laird requested that a rule to show cause be issued. She

contends that interest continues to accrue.

Appellees argue that their deposit was valid, unconditional and made

in accordance with the law applicable to deposits. They contend that the

amount was sufficient to pay Mrs. Laird in full all sums due her under the

judgment and that her withdrawal of the deposit in January 2020 was in

satisfaction of all sums due to her in this matter.

When the object of the performance is the delivery of a thing or a sum

of money and the obligee, without justification, fails to accept the 4 performance tendered by the obligor, the tender, followed by deposit to the

order of the court, produces all the effects of a performance from the time

the tender was made if declared valid by the court. La. C.C. art. 1869. The

effect of a valid tender and deposit is to end the accrual of interest and costs.

Canada v. Myers, 511 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1987), writ denied,

514 So. 2d 1181 (La. 1987).

As we stated in Laird II, interest began to run on the date of judgment.

See also Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 99-0723 (La. 10/19/99), 748 So. 2d 423.

Appellees deposited sufficient funds into the registry of the court to satisfy

the entirety of the obligation plus the accrued interest to the date of deposit.

Although the motion to deposit also requested a rule to show cause, nothing

prevented Mrs. Laird from seeking an order to receive the amount awarded

plus accrued interest when it was deposited. The issue of court costs could

have been bifurcated and addressed separately. The trial court did not err

when it declined to accrue additional interest after the date the funds were

deposited in the registry of the court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court

in favor of Appellees John Carlton Laird and JTL Ventures, LLC. Costs of

this appeal are assessed to Appellant Mary Beth Laird.

AFFIRMED.