Marvin D. Dade v. Commonwealth
This text of Marvin D. Dade v. Commonwealth (Marvin D. Dade v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
MARVIN D. DADE MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2042-02-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK JUNE 24, 2003 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judge
Felipita Athanas (Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Marvin D. Dade (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of
abduction with the intent to defile, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-48; animate object sexual penetration, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-67.2; and taking indecent liberties with a minor, in
violation of Code § 18.2-370. On appeal, he challenges only the
abduction conviction, contending the abduction was incidental to
the animate object sexual penetration offense and not a separate
offense. For the reasons stated, we affirm the conviction.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. BACKGROUND
KM, age 12, testified that on May 22, 2001 she was living in
Portsmouth with her mother, two sisters, and appellant, who was
her mother's boyfriend. On that evening, her mother left home for
work. KM stayed at home with her sisters and appellant. Around
1:00 or 2:00 a.m., KM was in the bathroom and heard appellant
calling to her to bring him water.
She went into her mother's bedroom, turned on the light, and
saw appellant sitting on the bed. KM noticed a glass of water
already sitting on the table. She mentioned the water to
appellant and said, "I'm going back to bed."
At that point, appellant grabbed her by her left arm, and she
fell on the bed. When asked why she did not run away when
appellant grabbed her, KM responded, "He was too strong." After
turning off the lights, he lay down on top of her and started
pulling down her shorts and her panties. He then pulled his own
pants down. She heard a zipper and "automatically knew he was
taking off his pants." She then felt his hand in her "private
parts." She testified it felt like a sharp fingernail. He took
his finger out of her vagina and began touching his penis.
On cross-examination, KM testified she told the police that
she woke up in her own bedroom and appellant was standing over
her. She also told the police that appellant ejaculated on her,
not the bedspread.
- 2 - After the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief,
appellant moved to strike the evidence, arguing KM's testimony was
inconsistent and not credible. After appellant presented his
case, he failed to renew his motion to strike.
ANALYSIS
Appellant concedes he did not raise the issue of "incidental
abduction" at trial. Therefore, we must determine whether the
"ends of justice exception" to Rule 5A:18 applies.
"The Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court." Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998) (citing Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991)); see also Rule 5A:18.
However, Rule 5A:18 provides for consideration of a ruling by the trial court that was not objected to at trial "to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice." Rule 5A:18. "'The ends of justice exception is narrow and is to be used sparingly'" when an error at trial is "'clear, substantial and material.'" Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 220-21, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10-11 (1989)). "In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred." Id. at 221, 487 S.E.2d at 272 (citing Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)).
In order to show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, an appellant must demonstrate more than that the Commonwealth failed to prove an element of the offense . . . . The appellant must demonstrate that
- 3 - he or she was convicted for conduct that was not a criminal offense or the record must affirmatively prove that an element of the offense did not occur.
Id. at 221-22, 487 S.E.2d at 272-73 (emphasis in original).
Michaels v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 601, 607-08, 529 S.E.2d
822, 825-26 (2000).
Appellant contends he did not abduct KM, since the
detention was not separate and apart from, but was merely
incidental to, the restraint employed in the indecent liberties
and object sexual penetration offenses. Thus, he concludes, the
ends of justice exception in Rule 5A:18 applies, and we should
consider his sufficiency argument. We disagree.
Appellant is correct in his general statement of the law.
A defendant may be convicted of abduction in addition to "another crime involving restraint of the victim, both growing out of a continuing course of conduct, . . . only when the detention committed in the act of abduction is separate and apart from, and not merely incidental to, the restraint employed in the commission of the other crime." Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310, 314, 337 S.E.2d 711, 713-14 (1985).
Powell v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 540-41, 522 S.E.2d 344, 361
(2001).
Appellant cites Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310, 337
S.E.2d 711 (1985), to support his position. To the contrary,
the facts in Brown support the conviction. In Brown, the
appellant entered victim's car, struck her, threatened her and
- 4 - then drove to a secluded location, where the sexual assault took
place. Id. at 312, 337 S.E.2d at 712. The Supreme Court found
"the detention underlying the abduction conviction was not the
kind of restraint that is inherent in the act of rape." Id. at
314, 337 S.E.2d at 714.
Appellant argues, "[t]he only evidence of restraint was
that [appellant] laid [sic] on top of [KM]." Appellant ignores
KM's testimony that appellant grabbed her as she tried to leave
the room. Appellant also ignores the testimony that appellant
tricked KM into leaving the bathroom and into entering his
bedroom by asking for water. See Kent v. Commonwealth, 165 Va.
840, 183 S.E. 177 (1935) (defendant induced victim to accompany
him in his car with the promise he would re-pay victim for an
outstanding debt). Neither of these acts was "inherent in" the
commission of object sexual penetration or indecent liberties.
In fact, both the grabbing and the inducement occurred prior to
these other crimes, which occurred on the bed. Clearly, the
record includes evidence to support all the elements of the
crime of abduction.
Appellant argues Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 366
S.E.2d 274 (1988), allows this Court to apply the ends of
justice exception to Rule 5A:18 in the case of sufficiency
arguments.
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