Marvik v. The Screen Actors Guild

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedAugust 5, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-01161
StatusUnknown

This text of Marvik v. The Screen Actors Guild (Marvik v. The Screen Actors Guild) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marvik v. The Screen Actors Guild, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 STEVE MARVIK, ) Case No.: 1:21-cv-01161 AWI JLT ) 12 Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED 13 v. ) IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING THE ) ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 14 SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, et al., ) 15 Defendants. ) ) 16 )

17 Steve Marvik seeks to proceed pro se in this action against the Screen Actors Guild, all Blacks, 18 former president Barack Obama, the Fox News Network, the Cable News Network, and unidentified 19 “snitches.” (See Doc. 1 at 1-3.) In addition, Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis with this 20 action. (Doc. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Plaintiff is unable to state a claim 21 upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the Court recommends the motion to proceed in forma 22 pauperis be DENIED and the complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice. 23 I. Request to proceed in forma pauperis 24 As a general rule, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a United States 25 District Court must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the Court may authorize the 26 commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who 27 submits an affidavit that . . . the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. 28 § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, an action may proceed despite a failure to prepay the filing fee only if leave 1 to proceed in forma pauperis is granted by the Court. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1178, 1177 2 (9th Cir. 1999). 3 The Ninth Circuit determined “permission to proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of 4 privilege and not a right; denial of an in forma pauperis status does not violate the applicant’s right to 5 due process.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Weller v. Dickson, 314 6 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963)). In addition, the Court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to 7 proceed IFP. O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990); Weller, 314 F.2d at 600-01. In 8 making a determination, the court “must be careful to avoid construing the statute so narrowly that a 9 litigant is presented with a Hobson’s choice between eschewing a potentially meritorious claim or 10 foregoing life’s plain necessities.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 11 The Court recommends Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied because, 12 as discussed below, the complaint fails to state a meritorious claim upon which relief may be granted. 13 See, e.g., Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A district court may deny 14 leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint 15 that the action is frivolous or without merit”); Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 16 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). 17 II. Screening Requirement 18 When an individual seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the 19 complaint and shall dismiss a complaint, or portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or 20 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant 21 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 22 A plaintiff’s claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the 23 wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” 24 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). In other words, a complaint is frivolous if the litigant 25 sets forth “not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. 26 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Thus, the Court may dismiss a complaint that is unintelligible, 27 fanciful, or disjointed. See, e.g., Iegorova v. Feygan, 2019 WL 4929910 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 28 2019); Zochlinski v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2010 WL 11691501 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27. 2010). 1 III. Pleading Standards 2 General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 3 pleading must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of the 4 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may 5 include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 6 A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and 7 succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The 8 purpose of the complaint is to inform the defendant of the grounds upon which the complaint stands. 9 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted, 10 Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers 11 labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 12 factual enhancement.

13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Vague 14 and conclusory allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 15 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further, 16 [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when 17 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The 18 plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint 19 pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ 20

21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should 22 assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal 23 conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id.

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Related

Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
534 U.S. 506 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Anant Kumar Tripati v. First National Bank & Trust
821 F.2d 1368 (First Circuit, 1987)
Temple v. Ellerthorpe
586 F. Supp. 848 (D. Rhode Island, 1984)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Minetti v. Port of Seattle
152 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Noll v. Carlson
809 F.2d 1446 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
Marvik v. The Screen Actors Guild, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marvik-v-the-screen-actors-guild-caed-2021.