Martun Derbinyants v. William Barr

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 23, 2020
Docket16-74035
StatusUnpublished

This text of Martun Derbinyants v. William Barr (Martun Derbinyants v. William Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Martun Derbinyants v. William Barr, (9th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 23 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTUN DERBINYANTS, AKA Martin Nos. 16-74035 Darbinyan, AKA Martun Darbinyan; 17-72596 ZARIK DERBINYANTS, AKA Zarmoui Karagezian, AKA Zarmuhi Karagyozyan, Agency Nos. A075-686-114 A075-686-116 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 21, 2020**

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

Concurrence by Judge GRABER

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Martun Derbinyants (a.k.a. Martin Darbinyan) and Zarik Derbinyants (a.k.a.

Zarmuhi Karagyozyan) (“Petitioners”) seek review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA”) 2016 decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order of

removal for having filed a frivolous asylum application and of the BIA’s 2017

decision denying their motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel. We

dismiss and deny their petitions, respectively.

With respect to the order of removal, Petitioners contend only that they were

never warned of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application. See Matter

of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151, 155 (BIA 2007) (setting forth requirements for finding of

frivolous asylum application). However, this issue was not raised before the BIA, and

thus has not been exhausted. As such, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim and

dismiss the petition in appeal No. 16-74035. See Ahir v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 912,

917–18 (9th Cir. 2008).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen.

Petitioners failed to satisfy the procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), because

they never filed a bar complaint with the appropriate disciplinary authorities nor

reasonably explained their failure to do so. Id. at 639. Furthermore, as the BIA also

noted, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from their prior

2 counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, as their allegations do not seriously undermine the

determinations in the removal proceeding regarding the frivolous warning or the

frivolousness of the application itself. See Martinez-Hernandez v. Holder, 778 F.3d

1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). We deny their petition in appeal No. 17-

72596.

DISMISSED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.

3 FILED Derbinyants v. Barr; 16-74035, 17-72596 JUL 23 2020 GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

I concur but would address the merits of Petitioners’ argument that they were

never warned of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application. In my

view, although Petitioners did not raise that issue before the BIA, the BIA’s final

order is better read to have decided it. In a footnote, the BIA stated:

We note there is no dispute that the respondent was provided notice of the consequence of filing a frivolous asylum application, and the Immigration Judge complied with the other procedural requirements outlined in Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151, 157–58 (BIA 2007), for satisfying a finding of frivolousness (I.J. at 5-7).

We thus have jurisdiction to review the claim. Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901,

914 (9th Cir. 2018). Nevertheless, I would conclude that substantial evidence

supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioners had sufficient notice. See

Kulakchyan v. Holder, 730 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (stating

standard). Written notice is adequate even where an applicant has limited English

proficiency or claims error by the translator. Id.; Cheema v. Holder, 693 F.3d

1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, the asylum applications and declaration that

Petitioner Martun Derbinyants signed included written warnings of the

consequences, and the interpreter credibly testified that she translated the warnings.

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Baljinder Cheema v. Eric H. Holder Jr.
693 F.3d 1045 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
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730 F.3d 993 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Ahir v. Mukasey
527 F.3d 912 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
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Y-L
24 I. & N. Dec. 151 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2007)
LOZADA
19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1988)

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