Martinez-Vazquez v. Saul

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 AMOR M.-V., Case No.: 20-cv-2084-DEB 12

Plaintiff, 13 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S v. COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR 14 ATTORNEY FEES KILOLO KIJAKAZI, 15 Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. [DKT. NO. 20] 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees (“Motion”) 18 pursuant to Social Security Act § 206(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. No. 20. For the 19 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff Amor M. filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner of Social 22 Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her application for social security disability 23 insurance benefits. Dkt. No. 1. The parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand, which the Court 24 granted. Dkt. Nos. 15-16. The Clerk of the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 25 Dkt. No. 17. Pursuant to the parties’ Joint Motion, the Court awarded Plaintiff $1,700.00 26 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Dkt. 27 Nos. 18-19. 28 1 On remand, the Commissioner found Plaintiff disabled and awarded $127,518.00 in 2 retroactive benefits. Dkt. No. 20. The Commissioner withheld $31,879.50 from the past 3 due benefits in the event Plaintiff’s counsel requested payment of fees. Id. at 6. 4 Through this Motion, Plaintiff’s counsel, Young Cho, seeks $16,000.00 in attorney’s 5 fees (12.5% of the past due award) and requests the Court direct him to reimburse Plaintiff 6 the $1,700.00 in EAJA fees awarded by the Court. Dkt. No. 20 at 20. The Commissioner 7 does not object to the requested fee award and agrees the request “contravenes neither the 8 fee agreement nor the statute.” Dkt. No. 22. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), “a court entering judgment in favor of [a social security] 11 claimant who was represented by an attorney ‘may determine and allow as part of its 12 judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total 13 of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.’” 14 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 15 § 406(b)(1)(A)). “Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful 16 claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht 17 v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 18 When determining a reasonable fee, district courts “must respect ‘the primacy of 19 lawful attorney-client fee agreements,’ . . . ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, 20 then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 21 U.S. at 793, 808). Courts must consider “whether the amount need be reduced, not whether 22 the [lodestar] amount should be enhanced.” Id. at 1149. While there is not a definitive list 23 of factors, courts should consider “the character of the representation and the results the 24 representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. “The court may properly reduce the 25 fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time 26 spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. “[A]n EAJA award offsets an award under 27 Section 406(b).” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 28 1 HI. DISCUSSION 2 Prior to filing this case, Plaintiff entered into a contingency fee agreement (“Fee 3 || Agreement”) with the Rohlfing Law Firm. Dkt. No. 20-1. Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel a 4 || contingency fee of up to 25% of past-due benefits awarded by the Commissioner. □□□ 5 Plaintiff's counsel now seeks an award of $16,000.00, less $1,700.00 that he would 6 || reimburse to Plaintiff for the EAJA fee award previously paid. Dkt. No. 20 at 6. The Court 7 || finds the fee request is reasonable. Plaintiff's counsel expended 9.7 hours before the district 8 |{court. Dkt. No. 20 at 17-18. His efficient manner in handling the case saved time and led 9 || to a prompt resolution in his client’s favor. “Neither the character of the representation nor 10 |/the results the representative achieved suggest the unreasonableness of the fee sought.” 11 Chapa vy. Astrue, 814 F. Supp. 2d 957, 962 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citations and quotations 12 |}omitted); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 (finding the fee reasonable because 13 || counsels’ performance was “excellent .. . [with] no evidence of fraud or overreaching in 14 making of the 25% contingent-fee agreement[]”). Similarly, no reduction in the 15 ||requested fee award is appropriate because there 1s no evidence of substandard 16 || performance or delay. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 (“[N]o reduction in fees for dilatory 17 ||conduct was warranted, as the attorneys in these cases caused no excessive delay which 18 resulted in an undue accumulation of past-due benefits.”). 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and awards the Rohlfing 21 ||Law Firm $16,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel must 22 ||reimburse Plaintiff $1,700.00 for EAJA fees awarded by this Court. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 14, 2023 95 ated: July 14, an a8 26 Dilebo—__ 7 United States Magistrate Judge 28