Martinez v. Zavala

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ENRIQUE MARTINEZ, Case No. 22-cv-04707-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; STAYING 9 v. AND REFERRING CASE TO PRISONER MEDIATION PROGRAM 10 L. ZAVALA, Re: Dkt. No. 29 Defendant. 11

12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding without attorney representation, filed this civil 14 rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Plaintiff claims Defendant L. Zavala, a correctional 15 officer at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), injured Plaintiff’s hand by closing a door as 16 Plaintiff was passing through the doorway. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF 17 No. 29), Plaintiff filed an opposition (ECF No. 32), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 32). Plaintiff 18 amended his opposition, and Defendant filed a supplemental reply, both of which the Court 19 permitted. (ECF Nos. 35, 36, 40.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary 20 judgment is DENIED, and this case is referred to the Prisoner Mediation Program and stayed until the mediation proceedings are complete. 21 BACKGROUND 22 The following facts are not in dispute, unless otherwise noted.1 23 24 1 Plaintiff presents his evidence in his verified complaint and his declaration attached to his motion 25 to amend his opposition. (ECF Nos. 1, 34.) Defendant submits his declaration and that of another SVSP staff member, a transcript of Plaintiff’s video deposition, and a number of photographs of 26 the area where the incident took place. (ECF Nos. 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 30.) Defendant objects generally to Plaintiff’s declaration on the grounds it “contains argument and unsupported 27 conclusory speculation that is not based on Plaintiff’s personal knowledge.” (ECF No. 40 at 3:3- 1 On or about July 15, 2020,2 Plaintiff was housed in the “B pod” of Building 5, Facility D, 2 at SVSP. (ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 6; 29-1 at ¶ 9.) At approximately 3:30 p.m. that day, Defendant was 3 the control booth operator for B pod, and he called out inmates who needed to retrieve medication. 4 (ECF No. 29-1 at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff went in his wheelchair from the B pod dayroom to the pharmacy 5 window, which was in a rotunda just outside of the pod, to get an insulin shot for his diabetes. 6 (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6; 29-1 at ¶ ¶ 7-9, Ex. D; 29-5 at 29:25-30:4.) To do so, he had to go through the 7 main doorway for B pod. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Defendant controlled the opening and closing of this 8 door from the control booth situated directly above the doorway. (Id.; ECF No. 29-1 at ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 9 Ex. C.) 10 According to Plaintiff, while he was still in the doorway on the way back to B pod after 11 receiving his shot, Defendant shut the door, “slamming” Plaintiff’s hand between the door and the 12 metal bar wrapped around the wheels of his wheelchair. (ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 6; 30 at 30:5-16.) He 13 “screamed” to Defendant to open the door “repeatedly,” but Defendant “laughed at him” and “kept 14 the door shut[] with the plaintiff’s hand stuck in it[], while directing obscene jokes with [sic] the 15 floor officer.” ( Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7, 12, 13.) Plaintiff states the floor officer, Officer A. Martinez,3 16 witnessed the incident and “yelled up to” Defendant to open the door, which Defendant did. (Id. 17 at ¶ 7.) Another inmate, Morales, also witnessed the incident (id.), but no declaration or other 18 sworn statement by him has been submitted. Plaintiff’s hand was in “severe pain, swollen, and 19 numb,” and he was seen by medical staff who noted the “redness, swelling, and bruising” on his 20 hand. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.) Plaintiff states Defendant had a “history” prior to this incident of making 21 “negative remarks each time he and I would ever cross paths.” (ECF No. 34 at ¶¶ 2-3.) 22 Defendant presents a conflicting account. According to Defendant, he saw4 Plaintiff 23 objections by Defendant (see ECF No. 40 at 3-4) are to statements in the declaration not relied 24 upon for the Court’s analysis. 2 There is some uncertainty over whether the incident took place on July 15 or 18, 2020. (ECF 25 No. 30 at 23:23; see ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 6; 29-1 at 4:7; 29-2 at 2:4; 32 at ¶ 5). This dispute is immaterial as there are no timeliness issues, there are not multiple incidents between the parties, 26 and there is no dispute the incident took place. The Court accepts Defendant’s representation his identifying the year as “2023” in his motion was a typo. (ECF No. 33 at 3:24.) 27 3 Martinez is not a defendant and has no apparent relationship to Plaintiff. 1 “clear” the door before pushing the button to close it. (ECF No. 29-1 ¶ 20.) “Within seconds” 2 Defendant heard “some officer yell something,” including the word “door,” and he pushed the 3 open button. (Id.) He “simultaneously” looked in the convex mirror but did not see Plaintiff stuck 4 in the doorway. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 24) He did not intentionally close the door on Plaintiff, laugh about 5 the incident, or exchange any words with Plaintiff until after Plaintiff had been seen by medical 6 staff, at which time he told Plaintiff he did not intentionally shut the door on him. (Id. at ¶ 23, 24.) 7 According to Officer Martinez, the door was not “fully open,” which caused Plaintiff 8 “difficulty” getting through it. (ECF No. 29-2 at ¶¶ 7, 8.) Officer Martinez states, “The B pod 9 door closed slightly catching Plaintiff Martinez in the doorway. The door then immediately 10 opened. As I recall, Plaintiff Martinez did say something along the lines of ‘ouch’ or ‘ow’ when 11 this happened.” (ECF No. 29-2 at 2:15-17.) Martinez states neither he nor Plaintiff said anything 12 to Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 13.) He and Defendant did not see any injuries on Plaintiff’s hand. (Id. at 13 ¶ 12; ECF No. 29-1 at ¶ 25.) 14 DISCUSSION 15 I. Standard of Review 16 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is 17 “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 18 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of 19 the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 20 fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 21 nonmoving party. Id. 22 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 23 portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 24 issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving 25 party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, 26 by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 27 1 Id. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to show a genuine issue of material 2 fact, the moving party wins. Id. 3 At summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 4 nonmoving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 570 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014). If more than one reasonable 5 inference can be drawn from undisputed facts, the trial court must credit the inference in favor of 6 the nonmoving party. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999). 7 II. Analysis 8 Plaintiff claims Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by shutting the door to 9 the B pod dayroom while he was passing through the doorway, injuring his hand and causing him 10 pain. “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel 11 and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 12 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and citation omitted). What is required to 13 establish an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain varies according to the nature of the alleged 14 constitutional violation. Id. at 320. The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from 15 dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are 16 met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, 17 subjectively, deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. 18 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the first prong, a deprivation is sufficiently serious 19 when the prison official's act or omission resulted in “an infliction of pain or a deprivation of the 20 basic human needs.” Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 21 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Under the second prong, a prison official cannot be held liable under 22 the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the 23 standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive 24 risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 25 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn a 26 substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. However, an 27 Eighth Amendment claimant need not show a prison official acted or failed to act believing harm 1 knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 842. This is a question of fact. Id. 2 Defendant does not dispute (see ECF No. 29 at 9-10) there is a triable issue regarding 3 whether Plaintiff suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation under the objective prong of the 4 Eighth Amendment claim. In deciding Defendant’s summary judgment motion, the Court must 5 accept as true Plaintiff’s sworn statements that his hand was caught between the door and metal 6 bar on his wheelchair, injuring his hand and causing him pain. This testimony is also corroborated 7 by Officer Martinez stating he saw the door close on Plaintiff and heard Plaintiff cry out in pain. 8 If true, this was an “infliction of pain,” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319, that amounted to a deprivation 9 sufficiently serious to meet the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment claim. 10 A reasonable fact-finder could also find, based upon the evidence presented, Defendant 11 acted with deliberate indifference such that the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment test is 12 also met. Defendant argues Plaintiff has not created a triable issue that Defendant knew there was 13 a substantial risk of harm because he did not know Plaintiff was in the doorway when he closed 14 the door. Defendant states in his declaration when he closed the door, he “was able to see Plaintiff 15 clear the B pod door[way].” (ECF No. 29-1 at 20:2 (emphasis added).) However, Plaintiff and 16 Officer Martinez make sworn statements Plaintiff was in fact in the doorway when Defendant 17 closed it. (ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 6; 29-2 at 2:15-17; 30 at 30:5-16.) A reasonable fact-finder could 18 credit Plaintiff and Officer Martinez on this issue and find Plaintiff was in the doorway when 19 Defendant closed it. A reasonable fact-finder could further determine Defendant knew Plaintiff 20 was in the doorway when he closed it. First, there is undisputed evidence Defendant could see the 21 doorway via the convex mirror. Second, Plaintiff submits sworn statements after the door struck 22 him, Defendant laughed, kept the door shut and made obscene remarks. And third, Plaintiff also 23 submits sworn testimony Defendant had a history of making negative remarks to Plaintiff prior to 24 this incident. This evidence support a reasonable inference Defendant either intentionally closed 25 the door on Plaintiff or knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff when he did 26 so. Therefore, there is a triable issue as to whether Defendant was deliberately indifferent to an 27 excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. 1 away.” (ECF No. 29 at 9:16-17.) This evidence is not undisputed; Plaintiff states in his verified 2 complaint after Defendant shut the door on his hand, Defendant “kept it shut.” (ECF No. 1 at 3 3:25.) Moreover, even if Defendant immediately reopened the door, a reasonable fact-finder could 4 nonetheless determine that when he closed the door, he did so deliberately, even if he quickly 5 reversed course. 6 Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s statements in his deposition Defendant “thought” 7 Plaintiff was not in the doorway, Defendant made a “mistake,” and Defendant committed an 8 “accident,” establishes there is no triable issue as to whether Defendant acted deliberately. (ECF 9 No. 29 at 7-8 (citing ECF No. 30).) Defendant makes a similar argument based upon Plaintiff’s 10 assertions in his opposition Defendant acted with “negligence” and “callous disregard.” (ECF No. 11 33 at 5 (citing ECF No. 32 at ¶ 4).) Plaintiff’s statements about Defendant’s state of mind are not 12 within his personal knowledge and therefore not admissible under Rule 602 of the Federal Rules 13 of Evidence, as Defendant elsewhere acknowledges in his objections to Plaintiff’s other statements 14 about Defendant’s state of mind. (See ECF No. 40 at 3:11-12.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s statements 15 that Defendant’s actions were accidental or negligent are legal conclusions that can no more be 16 considered evidence than Plaintiff’s other assertions that Defendant’s actions were “intentional,” 17 “willful,” and “wanton.” (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 24; 34 at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff indicates, moreover, 18 his misstatements in his deposition that Defendant’s actions were an accident were caused by his 19 limited command of English and being a first-time and unrepresented deponent. (ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 20 4, 8.) The Court is aware of no authority, and Defendant cites none, providing the Court’s 21 summary judgment analysis is controlled by an party’s inadvertent or conclusory legal statements, 22 especially where the party is unrepresented and the statements are against his own interests. 23 * * * 24 The evidence presented creates triable factual questions as to whether Defendant was 25 deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety by closing the door on him, which 26 inflicted unnecessary pain and injured Plaintiff’s hand. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to 27 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 1 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 2 As summary judgment has been denied, the Court finds good cause to REFER this case to 3 Magistrate Judge Illman pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. All further 4 || proceedings in this case are STAYED until further order, with the exception of any proceedings 5 related to the mediation. The mediation proceedings shall take place within 120 days of the date 6 || this order is entered. Magistrate Judge IlIman shall coordinate a time and date for a mediation 7 || proceeding with all interested parties or their representatives and, within five days after the 8 conclusion of the mediation proceedings, file a report. All mediation proceedings shall be 9 confidential, and no statement made therein will be admissible in any proceedings in this case, 10 || unless the parties otherwise agree. No part of the mediation proceeding shall be reported, or 11 otherwise recorded, without the consent of the parties, except for any memorialization of a 12 settlement. 5 13 The Clerk shall send a copy of this order to Magistrate Judge II]man. 14 This Order disposes of Docket No. 29. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: March 7, 2024 be Sell □ ne CQWELINE SCOTT CORLEY 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28