Martinez v. State ex rel. Okalahoma State Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision

1993 OK CIV APP 68, 852 P.2d 173, 64 O.B.A.J. 1572, 1993 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 40, 1993 WL 160482
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedApril 13, 1993
DocketNo. 79764
StatusPublished

This text of 1993 OK CIV APP 68 (Martinez v. State ex rel. Okalahoma State Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martinez v. State ex rel. Okalahoma State Board of Medical Licensure & Supervision, 1993 OK CIV APP 68, 852 P.2d 173, 64 O.B.A.J. 1572, 1993 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 40, 1993 WL 160482 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BAILEY, Presiding Judge:

Hector Martinez, M.D., (Doctor), seeks review of an order of State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Oklahoma State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision (Board) denying Doctor’s application for medical licensure. In this appeal, Doctor asserts Board’s error in denying his application (1) Doctor having presented evidence of qualification for medical licensure by endorsement in the State of Oklahoma, (2) Board having applied Board rules which impermissibly conflict with statutory requirements for medical licensure, (3) Doctor having passed a national test with a score not in derogation of Board rules, and (4) violating Doctor’s substantive due process rights.

Doctor graduated from an accredited medical school in 1981, subsequently applied for licensure in the State of New York, and Doctor took a nationally recognized medical licensing examination.1 After at least three efforts, Doctor eventually passed all parts of the FLEX test with a satisfactory “factored” score,2 and obtained licensure in New York. Doctor also subsequently obtained licensure in the states of Maryland and New Mexico.

Doctor then applied for licensure by endorsement in the State of Oklahoma,3 setting forth evidence of passage of the FLEX test and his valid licenses in other states. Board’s Director of Licensure denied his application, citing a Board Rule which mandates eligibility for licensure based on a “score of seventy-five percent (75%) or higher.on each part of the [FLEX] examination,” but specifically disallowing “the practice of ‘factoring’ grades, or combining [175]*175the highest scores from parts of the examination taken in different sittings.”4 Doctor requested review before the Board en banc, which after hearing Doctor’s argument and testimony of Doctor’s character witnesses, voted to deny Doctor’s application. Doctor appeals.5

Decisions of the Board stand reviewable under the provisions of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act (OAPA),6 and we therefore apply the standards of review mandated by OAPA directly to the Board decision.7 Under those standards we review the administrative decision for violation of constitutional rights, excess of authority, unlawful procedures, other pure errors of law, or arbitrary administrative action.8 On fact questions, “we [look] at the entire record to determine whether the result was supported by substantial evidence.” 9

In his first proposition, Doctor asserts Oklahoma statute permits medical licen-sure by three alternate avenues; passage of the medical licensure test administered in Oklahoma, passage of a nationally recognized medical licensure test administered elsewhere, or by endorsement, i.e., in recognition of a valid license issued in another state.10 In a related argument under his [176]*176second proposition of error, Doctor argues that the Board Rule prohibiting “factored” scores impermissibly conflicts with the Oklahoma statute on point,11 both the statute and another Board rule clearly recognizing licensure by endorsement as- an alternative to licensure by examination.12 In his third proposition, Doctor asserts presentation of evidence of his passage of the FLEX examination (on subsequent retesting after initially receiving substandard scores on one or more parts) without “factoring.” Thus, says Doctor, because he applied for Oklahoma licensure by endorsement, not by examination, his passing score on the FLEX tests taken in New York, with or without “factoring,” is of no consequence, and the Board not only erred as a matter of law, but also acted arbitrarily and in disregard of the evidence in denying his application for licensure.

We disagree with Doctor in all three particulars. Both Oklahoma statute and Board rules couch eligibility for medical licensure on education and testing of no less rigor than that required by Oklahoma law, notwithstanding an applicant’s admission in another state.13 In the present case, Doctor’s FLEX test scores duly transmitted to the Board clearly reflect a “factored” passing score, contrary to the explicit rules of the Board, and arguably contrary to statute mandating passage of all parts of the FLEX test without “factoring.” 14 We consequently discern no impermissible conflict between the relevant statutes and the Board rules as alleged.

Moreover, the Board is granted broad police power to supervise the practice of medicine in this state, including the power to promulgate rules governing the admission to practice, and requiring the exercise of considerable discretion to which we ordinarily defer.15 Considering our previous recognition of less rigorous scoring of Doctor’s FLEX test(s), we cannot say the Board abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily in denying Doctor’s application for licensure by endorsement.

In his last proposition, Doctor alleges violation of his substantive due process rights by denial of his application for licen-sure by endorsement. On review of such constitutional questions, we must determine:

[W]hether the classification which forms the basis for the differentiation is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and bears a reasonable relation to the object to be accomplished.

Texas Oklahoma Exp. v. Sorenson, 652 P.2d 285, 289-290 (Okl.1982).

[177]*177Thus, considering our Supreme Court’s previous recognition of (1) State’s interest in the regulation of the medical profession “in the interest of the protection of its citizens,” (2) Board’s “constitutionally authorized ... police powers” “to review the qualifications of persons entering the medical profession in Oklahoma,” and (3) the Court’s rejection of equal protection attacks on Board’s powers under the same analysis applied to due process claims,16 we find no violation of Doctor’s due process rights as alleged in the present case.

The order of Board denying Doctor’s application for licensure by endorsement is therefore AFFIRMED.

HANSEN, C.J., and HUNTER, J. concur.

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Related

Texas Oklahoma Express v. Sorenson
1982 OK 113 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1982)
State v. Bridwell
1979 OK 37 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1979)
DiMauro v. Oklahoma State Board of Medical Examiners
1989 OK 31 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1989)
Seely v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission
1987 OK CIV APP 61 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1987)

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1993 OK CIV APP 68, 852 P.2d 173, 64 O.B.A.J. 1572, 1993 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 40, 1993 WL 160482, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martinez-v-state-ex-rel-okalahoma-state-board-of-medical-licensure-oklacivapp-1993.