IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40285 Summary Calendar
VERLA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RODNEY SMITH, Deputy, Anderson County; BRIAN DANIELS, Deputy, Anderson County; ANDERSON COUNTY, TX,
Defendants-Appellees.
-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:98-CV-246 --------------------
November 4, 1999
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Verla Martinez appeals an order granting the defendants’
motion for summary judgment and dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint with prejudice. Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Martinez, the district court held that the individual
defendants, Officers Rodney Smith and Brian Daniels, were entitled
to qualified immunity on her claims that they unlawfully detained
her, using excessive force in doing so. The court also dismissed
a claim against the officers’ employer, Anderson County, because
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 99-40285 -2-
Martinez had shown no constitutional injury at the hands of the
officers.
In an appeal from summary judgment, we review the record
de novo. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 276
(5th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories
Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that
there is no genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to produce evidence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986).
Whether a public official is qualifiedly immune depends
on two inquiries. Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d
216, 223 (5th Cir. 1999). First, a defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity when a plaintiff has failed to allege the
violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Id.
Second, the defense of qualified immunity will succeed if the
defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable at the time in light
of clearly established law. Id.
Martinez’s complaint argued that the officers violated
her right to be free from detention in the absence of “probable
cause, exigent circumstances, or any other good reason.” Although
we have not addressed the matter in a published opinion, other
courts have held that individuals have a Fourth Amendment right to
be free from detention for psychological evaluation unless there is No. 99-40285 -3-
probable cause to believe that the person may harm herself or
others. S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 266 (4th
Cir. 1998); Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing cases); Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 987 (7th Cir.
1989). In addressing qualified-immunity arguments in this context,
these courts have cautioned that the asserted right must be clearly
established in more than a general sense. See, e.g., Maag, 960
F.2d at 775. We agree that the relevant test is whether a
reasonable officer would, under all of the circumstances, have had
probable cause to believe the plaintiff was dangerous. Id. at 775-
76; Chathas, 884 F.2d at 987. See also S.P., 134 F.3d at 266
(holding that “to establish liability, [the plaintiff] had to
allege facts demonstrating that the established contours of
probable cause were sufficiently clear at the time of the seizure
such that the unlawfulness of the officers’ actions would have been
apparent to reasonable officers”). The nature of the “danger”
posed, however, has not been clearly articulated in the caselaw and
necessarily yields latitute to the reasonably-founded judgment of
the officers at the scene. See e.g., S.P., at 266-67.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Martinez, we hold that a reasonable officer could have believed
that she posed a danger to herself. Someone familiar with Martinez
who stated recent contact reported that she was suicidal. See
S.P., 134 F.3d at 268 (finding a detention reasonable when based on
a call from a “concerned third-party”); Maag, 960 F.2d at 775-76
(involving reports of family members). Although she insisted she
was fine, Martinez confirmed to the officers that she and her ex- No. 99-40285 -4-
husband had just had a disagreement. Martinez attempted to close
the door on the officers before they could talk in any detail.
Furthermore, although Martinez contends that her actions were
always rational, some of the conduct she admits could well have
seemed odd to reasonable officers. After Officer Smith prevented
her from closing the door, Martinez abruptly sat on the floor.
Later, Martinez ran from the officers into the house--where, the
officers had been told, a gun was somewhere located. As the
district court noted, the presence of a firearm in the house and
Martinez’s uncooperativeness “certainly provide[d] grounds for
alarm.”
In addition, the district court cited to a Texas statute
that authorizes a peace officer to take a person into custody
without a warrant if the officer reasonably believes that (i) a
“person is mentally ill,” (ii) there is a “substantial risk of
serious harm to the person . . . unless the person is immediately
restrained,” and (iii) there is insufficient time to obtain a
warrant. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 573.001(a). In holding that
officers were shielded by qualified immunity in similar
circumstances, other courts have noted that the officers adhered to
the relevant involuntary-commitment statute. S.P., 134 F.3d at
268; Maag, 960 F.2d at 776. We agree that the Texas statute
buttresses the officers’ argument that they acted within their
clear authority.
Based on the Texas statute, the information from a third
party, and their own observations, the deputies had probable cause No. 99-40285 -5-
to take Martinez into protective custody. The district court did
not err in dismissing this claim.
Martinez argues that the district court erred in
rejecting her excessive-force claim. The Fourth Amendment, with
its standard of reasonableness, governs claims of excessive force
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40285 Summary Calendar
VERLA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RODNEY SMITH, Deputy, Anderson County; BRIAN DANIELS, Deputy, Anderson County; ANDERSON COUNTY, TX,
Defendants-Appellees.
-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:98-CV-246 --------------------
November 4, 1999
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Verla Martinez appeals an order granting the defendants’
motion for summary judgment and dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint with prejudice. Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Martinez, the district court held that the individual
defendants, Officers Rodney Smith and Brian Daniels, were entitled
to qualified immunity on her claims that they unlawfully detained
her, using excessive force in doing so. The court also dismissed
a claim against the officers’ employer, Anderson County, because
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 99-40285 -2-
Martinez had shown no constitutional injury at the hands of the
officers.
In an appeal from summary judgment, we review the record
de novo. Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 276
(5th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories
Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing that
there is no genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to produce evidence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986).
Whether a public official is qualifiedly immune depends
on two inquiries. Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d
216, 223 (5th Cir. 1999). First, a defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity when a plaintiff has failed to allege the
violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Id.
Second, the defense of qualified immunity will succeed if the
defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable at the time in light
of clearly established law. Id.
Martinez’s complaint argued that the officers violated
her right to be free from detention in the absence of “probable
cause, exigent circumstances, or any other good reason.” Although
we have not addressed the matter in a published opinion, other
courts have held that individuals have a Fourth Amendment right to
be free from detention for psychological evaluation unless there is No. 99-40285 -3-
probable cause to believe that the person may harm herself or
others. S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 266 (4th
Cir. 1998); Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing cases); Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 987 (7th Cir.
1989). In addressing qualified-immunity arguments in this context,
these courts have cautioned that the asserted right must be clearly
established in more than a general sense. See, e.g., Maag, 960
F.2d at 775. We agree that the relevant test is whether a
reasonable officer would, under all of the circumstances, have had
probable cause to believe the plaintiff was dangerous. Id. at 775-
76; Chathas, 884 F.2d at 987. See also S.P., 134 F.3d at 266
(holding that “to establish liability, [the plaintiff] had to
allege facts demonstrating that the established contours of
probable cause were sufficiently clear at the time of the seizure
such that the unlawfulness of the officers’ actions would have been
apparent to reasonable officers”). The nature of the “danger”
posed, however, has not been clearly articulated in the caselaw and
necessarily yields latitute to the reasonably-founded judgment of
the officers at the scene. See e.g., S.P., at 266-67.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Martinez, we hold that a reasonable officer could have believed
that she posed a danger to herself. Someone familiar with Martinez
who stated recent contact reported that she was suicidal. See
S.P., 134 F.3d at 268 (finding a detention reasonable when based on
a call from a “concerned third-party”); Maag, 960 F.2d at 775-76
(involving reports of family members). Although she insisted she
was fine, Martinez confirmed to the officers that she and her ex- No. 99-40285 -4-
husband had just had a disagreement. Martinez attempted to close
the door on the officers before they could talk in any detail.
Furthermore, although Martinez contends that her actions were
always rational, some of the conduct she admits could well have
seemed odd to reasonable officers. After Officer Smith prevented
her from closing the door, Martinez abruptly sat on the floor.
Later, Martinez ran from the officers into the house--where, the
officers had been told, a gun was somewhere located. As the
district court noted, the presence of a firearm in the house and
Martinez’s uncooperativeness “certainly provide[d] grounds for
alarm.”
In addition, the district court cited to a Texas statute
that authorizes a peace officer to take a person into custody
without a warrant if the officer reasonably believes that (i) a
“person is mentally ill,” (ii) there is a “substantial risk of
serious harm to the person . . . unless the person is immediately
restrained,” and (iii) there is insufficient time to obtain a
warrant. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 573.001(a). In holding that
officers were shielded by qualified immunity in similar
circumstances, other courts have noted that the officers adhered to
the relevant involuntary-commitment statute. S.P., 134 F.3d at
268; Maag, 960 F.2d at 776. We agree that the Texas statute
buttresses the officers’ argument that they acted within their
clear authority.
Based on the Texas statute, the information from a third
party, and their own observations, the deputies had probable cause No. 99-40285 -5-
to take Martinez into protective custody. The district court did
not err in dismissing this claim.
Martinez argues that the district court erred in
rejecting her excessive-force claim. The Fourth Amendment, with
its standard of reasonableness, governs claims of excessive force
during arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In
order to state a claim for excessive force in violation of the
Constitution, Martinez needed to allege (i) an injury, (ii) which
resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly
excessive to the need, and (iii) that the excessiveness was clearly
unreasonable. Dunn v. Denk, 79 F.3d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). In gauging the reasonableness of force used, a court must
balance the amount of force used against the need for the force.
Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1993).
The district court held that Martinez could show neither
a use of force that was clearly excessive to the need nor that any
excessiveness was objectively unreasonable. We agree. Accepting
Martinez’s version of events, Officer Smith grabbed Martinez’s
wrist through a closing door as she attempted to shut the door on
the officers; later, when Martinez attempted to run from the
deputies, Smith caught her, bent her over a freezer, and handcuffed
her. Grabbing Martinez’s wrist through the door was not “clearly
excessive” to Smith’s need to maintain contact with Martinez, so
that he could have a sufficient time to evaluate her to determine
whether she might be suicidal. In addition, Officer Smith’s
limited use of force in handcuffing Martinez was not objectively
unreasonable. Martinez does not dispute that the deputies were No. 99-40285 -6-
told she had a gun in the house, and she admits that she ran from
the deputies into the house immediately before she was handcuffed.
Thus, the officers were confronted with an uncooperative, possibly
suicidal person who might have access to a firearm. Under the
circumstances, the deputies’ decision to secure Martinez and
handcuff her was objectively reasonable. See Graham, 490 U.S. at
596-97 (noting that the “calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation”). Accordingly, the district
court did not err in dismissing Martinez’s excessive-force claim.
dismissing her claim against Anderson County. Blue brief, 27-29.
Because she cannot show any constitutional violation by the
individual defendants, however, she cannot show any constitutional
injury that is attributable to the county. See City of Los Angeles
v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (noting that if no
constitutional injury is shown, any infirmities in the city’s
policies are “quite beside the point”).
AFFIRMED.