Martinez v. Lucero CA2/3

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 2, 2015
DocketB250875
StatusUnpublished

This text of Martinez v. Lucero CA2/3 (Martinez v. Lucero CA2/3) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martinez v. Lucero CA2/3, (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

Filed 4/2/15 Martinez v. Lucero CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NOLVIA K. MARTINEZ, B250875

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC491928) v.

PETER LUCERO et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Teresa Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed. Law Offices of Charles O. Agege and Charles O. Agege for Plaintiff and Appellant. Berman Berman Berman Schneider & Lowary, Evan A. Berman and Howard Smith for Defendants and Respondents Peter A. Lucero and Walt Jay Medical Corporation. Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, Katherine Perkins Ross; Law Offices of Jamie Skebba and Roy D. Goldstein for Defendant and Respondent Victor Navarro. _________________________ INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Nolvia Martinez appeals from the dismissal of her complaint against defendants Victor Navarro, Peter A. Lucero, M.D., and Walt Jay Medical Corporation, doing business as Integrative Industrial & Family Practice Medical Clinics because she failed to amend when given leave. The record shows that plaintiff presented an amended complaint 85 days after the time to amend had expired and a month after defendants had served their motions to dismiss, without requesting permission to file (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1))1 and without an explanation for her delay. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action (§ 581, subd. (f)(2)). Accordingly, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On September 10, 2012, plaintiff in propria persona, filed her judicial council form complaint. Plaintiff checked the box entitled “other,” to identify her cause of action, and typed in the word, “Malpractice.” Under “Other allegations,” plaintiff wrote, “Severe pain from Severe Pressure Applied to Torn Rotator Cuff, Cry spells, Sleep Disruption, Psyche, Falsifying Documents for Monetary gain, Pain and Suffering.” She prayed for $100,000 in damages. On the attached civil action cover sheets, plaintiff identified her action as medical and legal malpractice. Defendants demurred to the complaint for failure to allege any facts supporting a claim for medical malpractice. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on December 17, 2012. While the form complaint remained unchanged, plaintiff attached a two and a half page, double-spaced narrative that described the events on which she based her cause of action. The court scheduled a case management hearing with a notation that it was reserving a date for a hearing of all challenges to the first amended complaint. Defendants again demurred for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for medical malpractice. Plaintiff filed no opposition.

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 On February 27, 2013, the trial court sustained the demurrers and granted plaintiff 20 days’ leave to amend, giving plaintiff until March 19, 2013 to file a second amended complaint. Defendants served the notice of ruling on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file a new complaint by March 19, 2013. At the April 17, 2013 hearing, the trial court declined to entertain an oral motion to dismiss the action by defendants Lucero and the Walt Jay Medical Corporation. Instead, the court set a hearing for June 13, 2013. On May 9, 2013, defendant Navarro filed his motion to dismiss, followed on May 14, 2013, by that of defendants Lucero and the Walt Jay Medical Corporation. As grounds, defendants argued that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because she not only failed to file an amended complaint within the 20 days’ leave granted by the trial court, but she failed to file any new complaint. (§ 581, subd. (f)(2).) Defendants served their motions on plaintiff. On June 12, 2013, one day before the hearing on the motions to dismiss, and 85 days after the date set by the court for an amendment to the complaint, plaintiff filed and served a second amended complaint on Lucero and the Walt Jay Medical Corporation. The record contains no indication this pleading was served on Navarro. Plaintiff neither sought leave of court before filing the second amended complaint (§§ 472 & 473), nor opposed the dismissal motions. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing on the motions to dismiss. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s action for failure to timely file a second amended complaint. (§ 581, subd. (f)(2).) The court entered judgment dismissing the action. Plaintiff obtained counsel and filed her timely appeal. CONTENTIONS Plaintiff contends that by filing her second amended complaint, she deprived the trial court of the power to entertain defendants’ motions to dismiss, with the result the dismissal of her action was an abuse of discretion.

3 DISCUSSION Plaintiff contends that Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824 (Gitmed) governs this case. She argues pursuant to Gitmed in essence that the trial court had no authority to dismiss her action for failure to file a second amended complaint because she did present her second amended complaint, which version, she insists, states a cause of action. In Gitmed, the trial court sustained the defendant’s demurrer and gave the plaintiff 20 days’ leave to file an amended complaint. The plaintiff filed his first amended complaint one day after leave to amend had expired. Thereafter, the defendant filed an ex parte motion to dismiss and admitted having received the amended complaint. (Gitmed, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 826.) In reversing the dismissal of the action, the Gitmed court held that once an amended pleading is filed, the trial court must first grant a motion to strike that pleading before it may dismiss the action under section 581, subdivision (f)(2). Thus, the filing of the amended complaint in Gitmed prevented the trial court from entertaining the motion to dismiss the action until, in the exercise of its discretion, it granted a motion to strike the amended pleading. (Gitmed, at p. 828.) The court also looked disfavorably on the defendant’s failure to give the plaintiff notice of the motion to dismiss. (Id. at p. 829.) Gitmed does not help plaintiff here. Gitmed establishes only that when an amended complaint is filed and served before a motion to dismiss is brought, the defendant must first move to strike the complaint and then move under section 581, subdivision (f)(2) to dismiss the action. (Gitmed, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 825-826; Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 614 (Leader).) Under those circumstances, the trial court may choose to exercise its discretion to strike the amendment as untimely and thereafter consider the motion to dismiss. (Leader, supra, at p. 614.) Significantly unlike Gitmed, defendants’ motions to dismiss here had been pending for a month before plaintiff filed her second amended complaint. Also unlike Gitmed, plaintiff here was properly served with defendants’ motions to dismiss.

4 Plaintiff waited until the eve of the hearing on the dismissal motions to present her new complaint. This case is distinguished from Gitmed in another important respect. Plaintiff never properly filed her second amended complaint. As leave to amend had expired, plaintiff “no longer had an unfettered right to file an amended complaint. ‘[A] litigant does not have a positive right to amend [her] pleading after a demurrer thereto has been sustained. “[Her] leave to amend afterward is always of grace, not of right. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ . . . .

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Related

Contreras v. Blue Cross of California
199 Cal. App. 3d 945 (California Court of Appeal, 1988)
Gitmed v. General Motors Corp.
26 Cal. App. 4th 824 (California Court of Appeal, 1994)
Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc.
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489 (California Court of Appeal, 2001)
Kobayashi v. Superior Court
175 Cal. App. 4th 536 (California Court of Appeal, 2009)

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Martinez v. Lucero CA2/3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martinez-v-lucero-ca23-calctapp-2015.