JAMIE MARTINEZ, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-00795-DJC-CKD Plaintiff, v. ORDER
FOODS, LLC, Delaware limited liability company, and DOES 1-100, inclusive Defendants.
This case concerns alleged civil rights violations committed by employer and Defendant Conagra Foods against employee and Plaintiff Jamie Martinez. Conagra brings a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 16), which argues that Martinez cannot properly advance his claims because he has not complied the California Fair Employment and Housing Act's requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a complaint. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion in full. Martinez began working for Conagra in November 2018 and was last employed as a Materials Warehouse Supervisor. (ECF No. 1, Notice of Removal containing Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 9.) Martinez suffers from anxiety and stress, which leaves him disabled. (Id. ¶ 10.) In July 2023, Martinez went on personal leave from work and sought treatment for stress and anxiety. (Id. ¶ 11.) Around this time, Martinez's medical providers ordered him on medical leave for his disability. (Id.) Martinez provided the necessary documentation to Conagra, and his leave was approved. (Id.) Over the next few months, Martinez continued to provide updates and documentation to Conagra about the status of his leave and whether he had been cleared to return to work. (Id. ¶ 12.) In June 2024, Martinez submitted documentation regarding his disability from his medical providers to Conagra's human resources department; his leave had been extended to July 23, 2024. (Id. ¶ 13.) A representative of Conagra's human resources department acknowledged receipt of the documentation and did not raise any issues with the status of Martinez's leave at that time. (Id.) Conagra terminated Martinez's employment on July 19, 2024, which Conagra indicated was due to a "violation of the attendance policy." (Id. ¶ 15, 16.) Martinez believes he was terminated because of his disability and use of medical leave. (Id. ¶ 17.) In January 2025, Martinez filed an administrative complaint with the California Civil Rights Department ("CRD"). (ECF No. 16-3, Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Ex. A.)1 The document attached by Conagra — a Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint and a copy of the complaint itself — indicates that the Department gave Martinez a "Right to Sue" letter, although the actual right-to-sue letter is not attached. (See id. ("The complainant has requested an authorization to file a lawsuit. A copy of the Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue is enclosed for your records.).) It appears that the right-to-sue authorization was given automatically, or immediately, after Martinez submitted a form. (See id. (referencing an employee "requesting an immediate right to sue").) 1 The Court grants Defendants' request for judicial notice. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) ("A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment."). Martinez brings six claims against Defendants. First, he alleges that Conagra violated the California Family Rights Act ("CFRA") by retaliating against him for taking leave covered by the statute. (Id. ¶¶ 21–33.) Second, he alleges that Conagra committed disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing and Employment Act ("FEHA"). (Id. ¶¶ 34–46.) Third, he asserts that Conagra failed to accommodate his disability. (Id. ¶¶ 47–58.) Fourth, he alleges that Conagra failed to engage in a good faith interactive process. (Id. ¶¶ 59–63.) Fifth, he alleges that Conagra retaliated against him in violation of FEHA. (Id. ¶¶ 64–75.) Sixth, he alleges that Conagra wrongfully terminated him in violation of public policy. (Id. ¶¶ 76–82.) This case was originally filed in the Stanislaus Superior Court on February 3, 2025. (Id. at 12.) On March 10, Defendants removed the case to federal court under to the court's diversity jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 1.) The matter is fully briefed and was submitted on August 7, 2025. (See ECF Nos. 20, 23.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) provides that, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). In analyzing a 12(c) motion, the district court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non- moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). However, "[w]hile the court generally must assume factual allegations to be true, it need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non- moving party's pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). Conagra argues that Martinez has not exhausted his administrative remedies and therefore is barred from bringing five of his six claims. His last claim, Conagra argues, must fail because there has been no violation of public policy. I. Exhaustion of Amdministrative Remedies and Plaintiff's First Through Fifth Causes of Action Conagra's position is that Martinez has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because, even though he obtained a right-to-sue notice, the underlying administrative complaint does not comprehensively describe the alleged FEHA violations. (ECF No. 16 at 6.) Martinez views his administrative complaint and subsequent right-to-sue notice as sufficient to satisfy the requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing litigation. A plaintiff bringing a claim under FEHA must first exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a complaint with CRD. Vizcaino v. Areas USA, Inc., No. CV 15-417- JFW (PJWx), 2015 WL 13573816, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015); see Cal. Gov. Code § 12960. To satisfy this jurisdictional requirement, an administrative complaint must provide general details of the alleged FEHA violation. See Cal. Gov. Code §
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JAMIE MARTINEZ, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-00795-DJC-CKD Plaintiff, v. ORDER
FOODS, LLC, Delaware limited liability company, and DOES 1-100, inclusive Defendants.
This case concerns alleged civil rights violations committed by employer and Defendant Conagra Foods against employee and Plaintiff Jamie Martinez. Conagra brings a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 16), which argues that Martinez cannot properly advance his claims because he has not complied the California Fair Employment and Housing Act's requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a complaint. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion in full. Martinez began working for Conagra in November 2018 and was last employed as a Materials Warehouse Supervisor. (ECF No. 1, Notice of Removal containing Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 9.) Martinez suffers from anxiety and stress, which leaves him disabled. (Id. ¶ 10.) In July 2023, Martinez went on personal leave from work and sought treatment for stress and anxiety. (Id. ¶ 11.) Around this time, Martinez's medical providers ordered him on medical leave for his disability. (Id.) Martinez provided the necessary documentation to Conagra, and his leave was approved. (Id.) Over the next few months, Martinez continued to provide updates and documentation to Conagra about the status of his leave and whether he had been cleared to return to work. (Id. ¶ 12.) In June 2024, Martinez submitted documentation regarding his disability from his medical providers to Conagra's human resources department; his leave had been extended to July 23, 2024. (Id. ¶ 13.) A representative of Conagra's human resources department acknowledged receipt of the documentation and did not raise any issues with the status of Martinez's leave at that time. (Id.) Conagra terminated Martinez's employment on July 19, 2024, which Conagra indicated was due to a "violation of the attendance policy." (Id. ¶ 15, 16.) Martinez believes he was terminated because of his disability and use of medical leave. (Id. ¶ 17.) In January 2025, Martinez filed an administrative complaint with the California Civil Rights Department ("CRD"). (ECF No. 16-3, Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Ex. A.)1 The document attached by Conagra — a Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint and a copy of the complaint itself — indicates that the Department gave Martinez a "Right to Sue" letter, although the actual right-to-sue letter is not attached. (See id. ("The complainant has requested an authorization to file a lawsuit. A copy of the Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue is enclosed for your records.).) It appears that the right-to-sue authorization was given automatically, or immediately, after Martinez submitted a form. (See id. (referencing an employee "requesting an immediate right to sue").) 1 The Court grants Defendants' request for judicial notice. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) ("A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment."). Martinez brings six claims against Defendants. First, he alleges that Conagra violated the California Family Rights Act ("CFRA") by retaliating against him for taking leave covered by the statute. (Id. ¶¶ 21–33.) Second, he alleges that Conagra committed disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing and Employment Act ("FEHA"). (Id. ¶¶ 34–46.) Third, he asserts that Conagra failed to accommodate his disability. (Id. ¶¶ 47–58.) Fourth, he alleges that Conagra failed to engage in a good faith interactive process. (Id. ¶¶ 59–63.) Fifth, he alleges that Conagra retaliated against him in violation of FEHA. (Id. ¶¶ 64–75.) Sixth, he alleges that Conagra wrongfully terminated him in violation of public policy. (Id. ¶¶ 76–82.) This case was originally filed in the Stanislaus Superior Court on February 3, 2025. (Id. at 12.) On March 10, Defendants removed the case to federal court under to the court's diversity jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 1.) The matter is fully briefed and was submitted on August 7, 2025. (See ECF Nos. 20, 23.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) provides that, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). In analyzing a 12(c) motion, the district court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non- moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). However, "[w]hile the court generally must assume factual allegations to be true, it need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non- moving party's pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). Conagra argues that Martinez has not exhausted his administrative remedies and therefore is barred from bringing five of his six claims. His last claim, Conagra argues, must fail because there has been no violation of public policy. I. Exhaustion of Amdministrative Remedies and Plaintiff's First Through Fifth Causes of Action Conagra's position is that Martinez has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because, even though he obtained a right-to-sue notice, the underlying administrative complaint does not comprehensively describe the alleged FEHA violations. (ECF No. 16 at 6.) Martinez views his administrative complaint and subsequent right-to-sue notice as sufficient to satisfy the requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing litigation. A plaintiff bringing a claim under FEHA must first exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a complaint with CRD. Vizcaino v. Areas USA, Inc., No. CV 15-417- JFW (PJWx), 2015 WL 13573816, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015); see Cal. Gov. Code § 12960. To satisfy this jurisdictional requirement, an administrative complaint must provide general details of the alleged FEHA violation. See Cal. Gov. Code § 12960(c). The California Code of Regulations requires that in order "[t]o obtain an immediate right-to-sue notice via the [CRD's] automated right-to-sue system or by submitting a completed right-to-sue notice packet to the department, an aggrieved person shall file a right-to-sue-complaint with the department containing the following: . . . (3) a description of the alleged acts or actions of discrimination, harassment or retaliation; (4) the date or dates each alleged act of discrimination, harassment or retaliation occurred, including the data of the last or most recent alleged act . . . [and] (6) for retaliation complaint, the dates and type of protected activity in which the complainant engaged. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 10005(d). While Martinez has obtained a right-to-sue notice, the underlying administrative complaint appears noncompliant with the requirement that he specify the facts of the alleged FEHA claim. District courts have dismissed claims similar to Martinez's for failure to properly document the context and facts in an administrative complaint. For example, in Tonoyan v. Western Refining Retail, LLC, a similar FEHA case, the court found that the plaintiff's FEHA claims were deficient because the underlying administrative complaint "fails to set forth any facts supporting Plaintiff's FEHA claims." No. 219CV08728ABASX, 2020 WL 13132899, *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2020); see also Rankins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 3:23-CV-05785-JSC, 2024 WL 1707245, *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2024) ("Plaintiff's 2022 complaint does not satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement under California law because it fails to provide any relevant factual details that would allow [CRD] to investigate the claims alleged in her complaint."). The underlying complaint in Tonoyan is strikingly similar to the one before the court now. For example, Tonoyan's administrative complaint levied the following allegations: • "Complainant was harassed because of complainant's sexual orientation, sexual harassment-hostile environment." • "Complainant was discriminated against because of complainant's sexual orientation, sexual harassment-hostile environment and as a result of the discrimination was terminated, asked impermissible non-job-related questions, denied a work environment free of discrimination and/or retaliation." • "Complainant experienced retaliation because complainant reported or resisted any form of discrimination or harassment and as a result was terminated, asked impermissible non-job-related questions, denied a work environment free of discrimination and/or retaliation." (219CV08728ABASX, ECF No. 14-3, Ex. A.) Martinez's administrative complaint is similar. He alleges: • "Complainant was discriminated against because of complainant's disability (physical, intellectual/developmental, mental health/psychiatric), family care and medical leave (cfra) related to serious health condition of employee or family member, child bonding, or military exigencies and as a result of the discrimination was terminated, denied any employment benefit or privilege, denied accommodation for a disability, denied family care and medical leave (cfra) related to serious health condition of employee or family member, child bonding, or military exigencies." • Complainant experienced retaliation because complainant requested or used a disability-related accommodation, requested or used family care and medical leave (cfra) related to serious health condition of employee or family member, child bonding, or military exigencies and as a result was terminated, denied any employment benefit or privilege, denied accommodation for a disability, denied family care and medical leave (cfra) related to serious health condition of employee or family member, child bonding, or military exigencies." (RJN Ex. A.) Neither administrative complaint sets forth any facts substantiating the complainant's claims. From reading Martinez's complaint filed with CRD, the Court is unclear as to what constitutes the alleged discrimination or retaliation. However, while the Court generally agrees with Conagra's framing of the complaint, the Court disagrees with Conagra's view that the complaint does not list a date or describe the kind of protected activity being conducted by Martinez. (See ECF No. 16 at 8.) The complaint lists a date of when the alleged incident(s) occurred ("on or about July 19, 2024") and describes the protected action he took ("because of complainant's disability . . . [and use of] family care and medical leave . . ."). (RJN Ex. A.) But ultimately, Martinez's complaint relies on conclusory allegations that leave the agency and Defendants in the dark about whether the claim is viable or supported by evidence. Martinez's complaint — like the complaint in Tonoyan — does not satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement and therefore cannot be a basis for Martinez's FEHA claims in federal court. Martinez argues that this Court should construe his requirements "liberally to accomplish the statutory purpose of assisting employees to pursue compensation for deprivation of their civil rights." (ECF No. 22 at 3.) While the Court is sympathetic to the need to provide remedies to those who have suffered civil rights violations, the issue of exhausting administrative remedies is jurisdictional and precludes any action by the Court. Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 70 (2000) ("Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.") (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Martinez's FEHA claims (causes of actions one through five) must be dismissed. II. Public Policy and Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action Plaintiff levies a sixth cause of action that his wrongful termination is in violation of common law public policy. “The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 4th 144, 154 (2014). Here, it is not contested that there was an employer-employee relationship between the parties, and that the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment. But, Martinez has not established that his termination was motived by a violation of public policy. His related FEHA claims are not properly before this Court and therefore cannot serve as the basis for his public policy violation claim. Accordingly, this claim must fail. lll. Leave to Amend Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and thus leave to amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a Court does not need to grant leave to amend in cases where the Court determines that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile.”). Here, the Court will not allow leave to amend. Further amendment would be futile. That is because a properly articulated administrative complaint must be filed before any litigation. Any amendment of Martinez's administrative complaint would not relate back and therefore would not salvage his lawsuit in federal court. See Tonoyan, 2020 WL 13132899 at *1 ("Plaintiff's amended [CRD] complaint filed after Plaintiff initiated this suit does not relate back to his May 13, 2019 complaint because ‘'[t]he relation back doctrine cannot be used to frustrate the intent of the Legislature to require compliance with administrative procedures as a condition to filing an action.'") (quoting Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 60 (2019), as modified on denial of reh'g (June 28, 2019)). Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED in full. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _August 21, 2025 Donel J Cob tto— Hon. Daniel alabretta UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE