Martinez v. Clark

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 14, 2020
• Docket: 2:20-cv-00780
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 6 7 JAVIER MARTINEZ, 8 Petitioner, C20-780 TSZ 9 v. ORDER 10 LOWELL CLARK, et al., Respondents. 11 12 Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Michelle L. 13 Peterson, United States Magistrate Judge (docket no. 8), Petitioner Javier Martinez’s 14 objections thereto (docket no. 9), Respondents’ response in opposition to those objections 15 (docket no. 10), Petitioner’s reply (docket no. 11), and the remaining record, the Court 16 enters the following Order to address Petitioner’s objections and to clarify why the 17 doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in this case. 18 Background 19 Petitioner does not object to the statement of facts and procedural history as 20 summarized in the Report and Recommendation. See Objections (docket no. 9 at 2). The 21 Court does not recount that background information here. 22 1 Discussion 1. Standard of Review 2 This Court reviews de novo the challenged portions of the Report and 3 Recommendation. See Calderon-Rodriguez v. Wilcox, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1026 (W.D. 4 Wash. 2019). 5 2. Collateral Estoppel 6 Petitioner argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “agency”) was 7 collaterally estopped from finding that Petitioner was a “danger to the community” at the 8 bond hearing before an immigration judge in 2019, based on the district courts’ earlier 9 rulings that Petitioner did not pose such a danger in 2013. Objections (docket no. 9 at 3). 10 The BIA concluded that it was not bound by the courts’ earlier rulings, reasoning that 11 “[c]ollateral estoppel applies only when both the issues and the parties to the proceedings 12 are the same” and that Petitioner’s “criminal proceedings did not involve the same parties 13 as his removal proceedings.” BIA Decision, Ex. 3 to Reply (docket no. 6-3 at 4). The 14 Magistrate Judge likewise concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply because the 15 proceedings, which involved different due-process requirements and different 16 circumstances, did not decide an “identical” issue. Report and Recommendation (docket 17 no. 8 at 9–10). 18 Petitioner now argues that the Magistrate Judge “misunderstood” his argument, 19 and he assigns “legal error” to the conclusion that the doctrine is inapplicable on the 20 ground that the Magistrate Judge cited evidence relevant to his flight risk, as opposed to 21 his dangerousness. Objections (docket no. 9 at 2, 4). Both arguments fail for the simple 22 1 this case. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008) (concluding that the party asserting preclusion carries the burden of establishing all necessary elements). 2 Petitioner is correct that collateral estoppel applies to the agency’s own 3 “determination[s] of certain issues of law or fact involving the same alien,” Oyeniran v. 4 Holder, 672 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012), and to issues that were “already litigated in 5 Article III courts” in a “final judgment on the merits,” Paulo v. Holder, 669 F.3d 911, 6 917 (9th Cir. 2011); but he fails to cite authority indicating that findings underlying a 7 decision to release a criminal defendant before trial or at sentencing are necessary to 8 decide a “final judgment on the merits.” See Report and Recommendation (docket no. 8 9 at 9 & n.1); Reply (docket no. 11 at 1–2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that the issue 10 decided by the district courts was “identical” to the one decided by the agency. As the 11 Magistrate Judge explained, the government could more easily satisfy its burden to show 12 Petitioner’s dangerousness at the agency bond hearing because it was not required to 13 show that “no conditions of release would mitigate any dangerousness,” as required at the 14 criminal proceedings. See Report and Recommendation (docket no. 8 at 9–10); see 18 15 U.S.C. § 3142. The BIA was not collaterally estopped from finding that Petitioner was a 16 danger to the community. 17 3. Evidentiary or Due Process Challenge 18 Petitioner also contends that the BIA’s and the Magistrate Judge’s “conclusion 19 that there is clear and convincing evidence of [his] danger to the community is not based 20 on a fair reading of the record,” purportedly violating his due process rights. Objections 21 22 1 (docket no. 9 at 8); see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017).1 Petitioner, however, fails to point to any evidence that was overlooked or 2 mischaracterized. See Objections (docket no. 9 at 8); see also Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 3 762, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2011); Singh, 638 F.3d at 1206. Nor does Petitioner persuasively 4 challenge the conclusion that his cited authority is factually distinguishable, based on the 5 serious nature of his convictions. See Report and Recommendation (docket no. 8 at 13– 6 16). The BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioner was a danger to the community. 7 Conclusion 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS: 9 (1) The Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation, docket no. 8; 10 (2) Petitioner’s habeas petition, docket no. 1, is DENIED, and this action is 11 DISMISSED with prejudice; and 12 (3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment consistent with this Order and to 13 send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record and to Judge Peterson. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated this 14th day of December, 2020. 16 A 17 THOMAS S. ZILLY 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 1 In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 846–48 (2018), the