Martinez v. City of Los Angeles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-4419
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EVALYN MARTINEZ, No. 24-4419 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-09491-SVW-SK v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF LOS ANGELES; K. PINA, Officer; S. BEUMER, Officer,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 14, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, MENDOZA, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Evalyn Martinez appeals from the district court’s (1) grant of

summary judgment to Defendants Steven Beumer and Karen Pina-Ruiz on her

Fourth Amendment claims for excessive force and failure to intervene under 42

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1983; (2) denial of leave to amend her complaint to add claims for

unlawful entry and warrantless detention; and (3) denial of her motion for

reconsideration. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, Cortez v.

Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015), and the denial of leave to amend and

reconsideration for abuse of discretion, Palm v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 889

F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2018). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm.

1. The district court did not err in its treatment of the testimony from

Martinez’s expert, Charles Stephenson. Martinez identifies no specific instance in

which the district court failed to consider Stephenson’s conclusion that Beumer

“took tactical command of the scene and created a volatile situation.” And the

district court properly excluded Stephenson’s conclusion that Martinez posed no

threat to Defendants as “irreconcilable with the clear-cut video evidence.” See

Elosu v. Middlefork Ranch Inc., 26 F.4th 1017, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[A]

court may reject wholly speculative or unfounded testimony” under Federal Rule

of Evidence 702).

2. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants

on Martinez’s excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims because Defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity. Martinez contends that the excessiveness of

Defendants’ use of force was clearly established by cases concerning the use of

2 24-4419 significant force against individuals who posed no threat, did not resist arrest, or

were already restrained by handcuffs. See, e.g., Young v. County of Los Angeles,

655 F.3d 1156, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011); Garlick v. County of Kern, 167 F. Supp. 3d

1117, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2016). But the video evidence and uncontroverted record

clearly shows that Defendants’ use of force occurred before Martinez was

handcuffed and was in response to her kicking Pina-Ruiz, biting Beumer, and

physically resisting arrest. Because it was not clearly established that Beumer used

excessive force, Pina-Ruiz had no clearly established duty to intercede. See

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000).

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend

Martinez’s complaint for a second time to add claims for unlawful entry and

warrantless detention. Martinez delayed seeking leave to amend until eleven days

before trial and after briefing on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was

complete. And allowing amendment would prejudice Defendants, either by

requiring them to prepare legal defenses against two new claims shortly before trial

or by delaying trial while they undertook such preparation. Therefore, by denying

leave for “undue delay,” “undue prejudice to the opposing party,” and the “failure

3 24-4419 to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,” the district court did not

abuse its discretion. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).1

AFFIRMED.

1 Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of leave to amend were proper, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s motion for reconsideration of those decisions. See Palm, 889 F.3d at 1088.

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