Martinez v. Bay Area Rescue Mission

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 28, 2025
• Docket: 3:22-cv-06092
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 JOANN MARTINEZ, Case No. 22-cv-06092-CRB

9 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 10 v. LEAVE TO AMEND

11 BAY AREA RESCUE MISSION, 12 Defendant.

13 Plaintiff Joann Martinez moves for leave to amend her complaint to add a new 14 count (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and related facts arising out of her 15 employment termination by Defendant Bay Area Rescue Mission, or BARM. Martinez 16 brought her motion after the close of discovery and fails to adequately explain why she did 17 not amend earlier, when any prejudice to BARM could have been avoided or minimized. 18 Accordingly, finding the matter suitable for resolution without argument pursuant to Civil 19 Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court DENIES Martinez’s motion for leave to amend. 20 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 21 In Martinez’s operative complaint, filed in October 2022, she alleges that BARM 22 violated two federal statutes when it fired her: Title VII and the Americans with 23 Disabilities Act. Compl. (dkt. 1) ¶¶ 20, 27, 32, 37. BARM filed its answer in March 2023. 24 Ans. (dkt. 18). After some adjustments, the Court set a discovery schedule with a fact 25 discovery cutoff on January 31, 2025 and an expert discovery cutoff on March 20, 2025. 26 See Disc. Order (dkt. 45) at 11–12. 27 In discovery, Martinez identified a psychiatrist and psychologist as witnesses on her 1 She never identified any potential witnesses who would testify about, or produced 2 documents or other discoverable material relating to, her mental condition after her 3 termination until January 24, 2025—one week before the discovery cutoff. Farbstein Decl. 4 (dkt. 54) ¶ 9. During Martinez’s deposition on January 30, 2025, her counsel requested to 5 examine her and asked for the first time about her mental condition following her 6 termination. Id. ¶ 14; Martinez Dep. (dkt. 54-5) at 509:10–19. 7 Then, a week after the fact discovery cutoff, Martinez stated that she would seek 8 leave to amend her complaint to assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 9 distress. Feb. 7, 2025 Case Mgmt. Stmt. (dkt. 48) at 8. This came in spite of Martinez’s 10 earlier assertions that she would not seek to amend her complaint. See, e.g., Oct. 11, 2024 11 Case Mgmt. Stmt. (dkt. 44) at 8. Martinez contended that her new claim was supported by 12 documents produced late in discovery—including some documents that she herself 13 produced—as well as her deposition testimony. See Feb. 7, 2025 Case Mgmt. Stmt. at 8; 14 see also Mot. (dkt. 51) at 8. Ultimately, Martinez filed her motion seeking leave to amend 15 on March 17, 2025. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Because BARM has filed an answer in this case and has not consented to 18 amendment, Martinez may amend her complaint only with leave of the Court. Fed. R. Civ. 19 P. 15(a)(2). Though courts “freely give leave when justice so requires,” id., factors such as 20 “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 21 cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 22 party by virtue of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment” justify denial of leave to 23 amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Of these factors, “the resulting 24 prejudice to the opposing party” is the “crucial factor.” Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 25 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). On the other hand, “delay alone does not provide sufficient 26 grounds for denying leave to amend.” United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 27 926 F.2d 1502, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 BARM contends that four factors weigh against granting leave to amend: prejudice, 3 undue delay, bad faith, and futility. Opp. (dkt. 53) at 15–23. The Court finds that the first 4 two of these factors, prejudice and delay, are sufficient to deny leave to amend, and 5 therefore does not address whether Martinez’s proposed amendment is in bad faith or 6 whether it would be futile.1 7 Prejudice. BARM argues that it has been prejudiced by Martinez’s late disclosure 8 of her IIED claim because BARM has already pursued its litigation strategy, including its 9 discovery efforts, under the impression that Martinez’s only claims were her federal 10 statutory ones. Id. at 15–17. And now, of course, discovery is closed, so an amendment 11 would require the parties to reopen discovery and expend additional time and money 12 addressing new claims and new facts. This is the kind of prejudice to the opposing party 13 that warrants denial of leave to amend. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 14 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the 15 proceedings supports a district court’s finding of prejudice.”); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. 16 Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of leave to 17 amend where eight months of discovery remained but new claims “would have unfairly 18 imposed potentially high, additional litigation costs”); Morongo Band of Mission Indians 19 v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of leave to amend where 20 “new claims set forth in the amended complaint would have greatly altered the nature of 21 the litigation and would have required defendants to have undertaken, at a late hour, an 22 entirely new course of defense”). 23 Martinez’s response that the “underlying alleged facts” of her new claim were 24 known to BARM as early as September 2024, Mot. at 8, makes little sense. A key element 25 of an IIED claim is the effect on the plaintiff, information that BARM only learned within 26 1 BARM argues that Martinez’s proposed IIED claim would be futile because workers’ 27 compensation is the exclusive remedy for such claims. Opp. at 18–22. Martinez did not 1 a week of the close of fact discovery. Wilson v. Hynek, 207 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1009 2 (2012). And in any event, as discussed next, this concession cuts both ways, because it 3 shows that Martinez could and should have sought leave to amend sooner, when any 4 prejudice resulting from the need to reopen discovery could have been avoided or 5 minimized. 6 Undue Delay. To determine whether delay in seeking amendment is “undue,” the 7 Ninth Circuit instructs courts to consider “whether the moving party knew or should have 8 known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.” 9 AmerisourceBergen, 465 F.3d at 953 (citation omitted). There can be no doubt that 10 Martinez was aware at the time she filed her initial complaint (or at least soon after) that 11 she suffered severe enough emotional distress to bring her IIED claim. See Prop. Am. 12 Compl. (dkt. 51-2) ¶¶ 14–15 (describing Martinez’s emotional distress). Even if she 13 waited to amend until she learned of specific extreme or outrageous conduct by BARM 14 and its employees (as she obliquely suggests), that information appears to have come from 15 their deposition testimony in September 2024. See Mot. at 6; Prop. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11– 16 12; Kariuki Decl. (dkt. 51-1) ¶ 9. The fact that Martinez nevertheless waited over four 17 months after these depositions to indicate an intent to amend her complaint and over six 18 months to actually seek leave to amend her complaint—and in the meantime represented to 19 BARM and the Court that she did not intend to amend her complaint, Oct. 11, 2024 Case 20 Mgmt. Stmt. at 8—is strong evidence of undue delay, and perhaps bad faith or dilatory 21 motive. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Martinez’s motion to amend her 24 complaint. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: April 28, 2025 CHARLES R. BREYER 27 United States District Judge