Martinez Santoyo v. Boyden

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 11 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE TRINIDAD MARTINEZ No. 24-1967 SANTOYO, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00447-DJC-JDP Petitioner - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

LASHA BOYDEN, U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of CA; MINDY MCQUIVEY, Chief, U.S. Probation Office for the Eastern District of CA; MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General; ANTONY J. BLINKEN,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Daniel J. Calabretta, District Court, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 10, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo appeals from the district court’s denial of

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the extradition court’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. order certifying his extradition to Mexico. He argues that the district court erred in

upholding the extradition court’s 1) finding of probable cause as to the alleged

offense underlying Mexico’s request for extradition—intentional aggravated

homicide with advantage; 2) exclusion of a forensic report showing the decedent

had gunshot residue on one of his hands; and 3) denial of his motion to compel

information the United States may have from a prior, unrelated criminal

proceeding against the decedent.1 As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do

not recount them here. We review the district court’s denial of the habeas petition

de novo. Rana v. Jenkins, 113 F.4th 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2024). We affirm.

1. “We must affirm the [extradition court’s] probable cause finding so

long as ‘there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable

ground to believe the accused guilty.’” Id. at 1070 (citation omitted). Three

eyewitnesses saw Santoyo shoot the decedent twice in the head with a pistol.

Officers found two wounds and two bullet casings consistent with their statements.

The witnesses did not mention seeing the decedent carry a weapon of any kind, and

details about the decedent’s personal belongings and the crime scene do not

mention a weapon. The autopsy report is also consistent with the witnesses’

1 Santoyo also argues that the district court erred in holding that the “lapse of time” provision in the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. We address this argument in a concurrently filed opinion, in which we affirm.

2 24-1967 statements and investigation. Thus, there is competent evidence supporting the

extradition court’s finding of probable cause as to the charged crime, i.e., that

Santoyo shot and killed an unarmed individual. See Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson,

858 F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[Petitioner’s] appeal . . . must fail if there is

‘any evidence of probable cause.’” (citation omitted)).

2. The extradition court “has broad discretion to determine the

admissibility of the evidence before it.” Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 1007

(9th Cir. 2016). While explanatory evidence that “explains away or completely

obliterates probable cause” may be admitted, contradictory evidence, which

“merely controverts the existence of probable cause, or raises a defense,” is

inadmissible. Id. at 992 (citation omitted). Here, the forensic report does not

obliterate probable cause. Rather, it is contradictory evidence which, at most,

allows Santoyo to raise a defense. Thus, the extradition court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to admit the forensic report.

3. “[D]iscovery in an international extradition hearing is limited and lies

within the discretion of the magistrate.” Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1014

(9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “[T]he principles set forth in [Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] are not applicable . . . in an international

extradition case.” Merino v. U.S. Marshal, 326 F.2d 5, 13 (9th Cir. 1963). And an

3 24-1967 extradition hearing is “not the occasion for an adjudication of guilt or innocence.”

Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1406 (citation omitted).

Here, unlike in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), on

which Santoyo relies, the government did not conduct its own investigation of the

offense underlying the request for extradition. See In re Extradition of Drayer, 190

F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 1999) (narrowing Demjanjuk and distinguishing it on

similar grounds). Moreover, Santoyo does not explain how the information he

seeks from an unrelated criminal proceeding against the decedent is relevant. And

any such information would attack the credibility of the witnesses and be

contradictory to Mexico’s evidence, which would render the evidence

inadmissible. See Santos, 830 F.3d at 993 (an accused may not introduce “facts

contradicting the government’s proof[] or evidence of defenses”); see also

Prasoprat, 421 F.3d at 1015 (distinguishing Demjanjuk by noting the evidence

sought by Demjanjuk “related to whether he was in fact the individual who had

committed the extraditable offense and thus concerned the probable cause

determination”). Therefore, the extradition court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion.

For all these reasons we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-1967