Martinez Mondragon v. Lamar

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedOctober 19, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00913
StatusUnknown

This text of Martinez Mondragon v. Lamar (Martinez Mondragon v. Lamar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martinez Mondragon v. Lamar, (D.N.M. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO PAMELA MARTINEZ MONDRAGON, Plaintiff, v. No. 1:23-cv-00913-LF

SYLVIA F. LAMAR, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS THIS MATTER comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff’s Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Doc. 1, filed October 18, 2023 (“Complaint”) and Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Doc. 2, filed October 18, 2023. The Complaint Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, a state district court judge who presided over Plaintiff’s divorce case, violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to acknowledge Plaintiff’s disability (traumatic brain injury) and making Plaintiff sign an “agreement not knowing what she was signing.” Complaint at 2. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant violated [HIPAA] by “allow[ing] medical information/background to be discussed in presence of people not involved w/case [Plaintiff] signed document not allowing medical information to be disclosed.” Complaint at 3.

Plaintiff seeks: (i) monetary damages; and (ii) to have Defendant “reprimanded and removed from bench.” Complaint at 5. The Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant for monetary damages. “[S]tate court judges are absolutely immune from monetary damages claims for actions taken in their judicial capacity, unless the actions are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sawyer v. Gorman, 317 Fed.Appx. 725, 727 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (articulating broad immunity rule that a “judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority”). Plaintiff’s allegations show that Defendant’s

actions were taken in her judicial capacity. There are no allegations showing that Defendant’s actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant violated “HIPPA” by allowing the disclosure of medical information without Plaintiff’s Consent. See Complaint at 3. It appears Plaintiff is referring to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). The Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to HIPAA because “HIPAA does not create a private right of action for alleged disclosures of confidential medical information.” Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1257 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff also asks the Court to reprimand Defendant. See Complaint at 5. To the extent

Plaintiff is seeking a declaratory judgment, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to entertain Plaintiff’s request because the Complaint does not set forth allegations which would allow the Court to determine whether to exercise its discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (Declaratory Judgment Act states district courts "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration") (emphasis added); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994) (listing factors courts should consider when determining whether to exercise its discretion to entertain a request for a declaratory judgment). Plaintiff also asks the Court to remove Defendant from the bench. See Complaint at 5. "Section 1983 expressly disallows injunctive relief against a judicial officer 'for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.'” Catanach v. Thomson, 718 Fed.Appx. 595, 599 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011)); see also Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) ("To the extent that he is seeking relief in the nature of mandamus, ordering Defendants to take action in their capacities as state judges, '[w]e have no authority to issue such

a writ to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties'”). Plaintiff has not alleged Defendant violated a declaratory judgment or that declaratory relief was unavailable. The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s Social Security Number and date of birth remain legible on pages 8 and 12, respectively, of her complaint. To protect her identity, Plaintiff should ensure that this information is fully obscured in her amended complaint. Application to Proceed in forma pauperis The statute for proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), provides that the Court may authorize the commencement of any suit without prepayment of fees by a person who submits

an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets the person possesses and that the person is unable to pay such fees. When a district court receives an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it should examine the papers and determine if the requirements of [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(a) are satisfied. If they are, leave should be granted. Thereafter, if the court finds that the allegations of poverty are untrue or that the action is frivolous or malicious, it may dismiss the case[.]

Menefee v. Werholtz, 368 Fed.Appx. 879, 884 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962). “The statute [allowing a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis] was intended for the benefit of those too poor to pay or give security for costs....” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 344 (1948). While a litigant need not be “absolutely destitute,” “an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. The Court grants Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. Plaintiff signed an affidavit stating she is unable to pay the costs of these

proceedings and provided the following information: (i) Plaintiff's average monthly income amount during the past 12 months is $1,325.00; and (ii) Plaintiff’s monthly expenses total $1,370.00. The Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of this proceeding because she signed an affidavit stating she is unable to pay the costs of this proceeding and because her monthly expenses exceed her monthly income. Proceeding in forma pauperis Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. The statute governing proceedings in forma pauperis states "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that … the action … fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also

Webb v. Caldwell, 640 Fed.Appx. 800, 802 (10th Cir.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Stump v. Sparkman
435 U.S. 349 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Wilkerson v. Shinseki
606 F.3d 1256 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents
492 F.3d 1158 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Yang v. Archuleta
525 F.3d 925 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Sawyer v. Gorman
317 F. App'x 725 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Menefee v. Werholtz
368 F. App'x 879 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Knox v. Bland
632 F.3d 1290 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
Webb v. Caldwell
640 F. App'x 800 (Tenth Circuit, 2016)

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Martinez Mondragon v. Lamar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martinez-mondragon-v-lamar-nmd-2023.