Martinez Leon v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-1254
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 19 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS REYNALDO MARTINEZ No. 24-1254 LEON, Agency Nos. A206-711-720 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, TALLMAN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Carlos Reynaldo Martinez Leon, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions

for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the

denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for

substantial evidence, Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir.

2017) (en banc), and we deny the petition.

1. Petitioner asserts that he is eligible for asylum and withholding of

removal because he faces persecution in El Salvador on account of his membership

in a proposed particular social group of “persons believed to be witnesses in gang

crime investigations.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining “refugee”).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that this proposed social

group is not legally cognizable because it lacks immutability, particularity, and

social distinction. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016)

(explaining the requirements for a particular social group). Because Petitioner’s

brief does not contest the agency’s adverse immutability and particularity findings,

he has waived or forfeited any opposition to the agency’s dispositive determination.

See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069,

1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (issues not “specifically and distinctly argued and raised” are

waived (citation omitted)). We therefore need not reach Petitioner’s arguments

regarding social distinction. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per

curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on

issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

2 24-1254 2. To succeed on his CAT claim, Petitioner must demonstrate that he is at

risk of torture “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Substantial evidence

supports the agency’s determination that Petitioner did not establish that it is more

likely than not that he would be tortured in El Salvador by, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official. Petitioner asserts that he is likely to be tortured

in El Salvador because “evidence of state corruption prevalent in the country . . .

[shows] the government would effectively acquiesce in [torture].” But “a general

ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not

suffice to show acquiescence.” Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th

Cir. 2016). Because the record contains no evidence compelling a contrary

conclusion, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection.

See Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating standards for

the denial of CAT relief), overruled on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder,

707 F.3d 1081, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

PETITION DENIED.

3 24-1254