Martinez Hernandez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 25-1168
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IMELDA MARTINEZ HERNANDEZ, No. 25-1168 Agency No. Petitioner, A200-199-109 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 6, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, KOH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Imelda Martinez Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of

a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal of

the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for cancellation of removal.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Dkt. 27; Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). To qualify for a discretionary grant of cancellation of removal, an applicant

must establish that “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship to the [applicant’s] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United

States or [a non-citizen] lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). When the agency concludes that an applicant has failed to meet

this standard, we review the agency’s decision for “substantial evidence.” Gonzalez-

Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). Under this standard, we must

uphold the BIA’s determination that the facts do not establish the requisite hardship

needed for cancellation of removal “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” See id. at 1002 (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). In doing so, though, we may not review the facts as found

by the agency. Id. at 1000 n.2 (citing Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225

(2024)); see also id. at 1000 (explaining the “jurisdiction-stripping” function of 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)). “For example, we may not review an IJ’s factfinding on

credibility, the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition, or the level of

financial support a noncitizen currently provides.” Id. at 1000 n.2 (internal citation

and quotation marks omitted). “Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision

while adding some of its own reasoning, we review both decisions.” Lopez-Cardona

v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Martinez

2 25-1168 Hernandez failed to establish that her removal to Mexico would result in exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship to her two U.S. citizen children. Martinez

Hernandez stated that if she were removed, her husband and sons would endure

financial difficulty living in the United States because they would lose the benefit of

the salary she currently earns. She stated that the family would also incur additional

expenses because her husband would need to get a babysitter for the periods of time

her sons are not in school and her husband is at work. Finally, she stated that her

sons would be “surrounded by stress” and would endure emotional hardship on

account of the family’s separation.

These are unfortunate but “common hardships that can result when [a non-

citizen] parent is removed” and do not compel a finding of exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship. See Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir.

2005). The exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard is a “very

demanding one,” Garcia v. Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2010), and requires

a showing of hardship that is “out of the ordinary and exceedingly uncommon,”

Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006. “With regard to hardship to a child, petitioners

generally must demonstrate that they have a ‘qualifying child with very serious

health issues, or compelling special needs in school.’” Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520

F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56,

3 25-1168 63 (B.I.A. 2001)). As the IJ noted here, Martinez Hernandez’s teenage1 sons “seem

to be good kids” who are doing “very well” in school and have no health issues.

Accordingly, the evidence does not compel a finding of exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship.

2. Second, we find no merit to Martinez Hernandez’s argument that the

agency erred by failing to consider the hardship her two sons would endure if they

were to accompany her to Mexico. Martinez Hernandez argues that the agency erred

by failing to consider this alternative because the record indicates that, if she were

removed, her husband and children “would not be able to financially survive in the

United States without [her] salary.” But when asked, “[I]f you had to go back to

Mexico, would you take [your sons] with you?” Martinez Hernandez unequivocally

answered “No.”

3. Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Martinez Hernandez’s challenge to

factual findings of the IJ. See Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1000 n.2. For this

reason, we decline to review Martinez Hernandez’s argument that the IJ erred in

finding that family, including Martinez Hernandez’s sister, “may be able to lend a

helping hand” in caring for Martinez Hernandez’s sons despite Martinez Hernandez

testifying that her sister would not be able to help on account of a health condition

1 At the time of the BIA’s January 2025 decision, Martinez Hernandez’s children were 15 and 19 years old. At the time of the IJ’s October 2020 decision, they were 11 and 15 years old.

4 25-1168 and work as a baker. We also decline to review Martinez Hernandez’s argument

that the IJ erred in finding that “if” she moves to Tijuana, Mexico, her children “may”

be able to visit her on a regular basis despite Martinez Hernandez’s testimony, which

indicates that she would not be able to afford to live in Tijuana.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. 3, is otherwise DENIED.

5 25-1168