Martinez Avalos v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 16, 2025
• Docket: 23-4060
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSCAR MARTINEZ No. 23-4060 AVALOS; CONSTANTINA DEL Agency Nos. CARMEN RAMIREZ LIMO; JEAN A095-660-308 PIERRE MARTINEZ RAMIREZ; OSCAR A220-147-898 JEAN MARTINEZ RAMIREZ; KYA A220-147-899 MARIA MARTINEZ RAMIREZ, A220-147-900 A220-147-901 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 12, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Oscar Martinez Avalos, his wife Constantina Del Carmen Ramirez Limo,

and their three children are natives and citizens of Peru.1 They petition for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration

Judge’s (IJ) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the BIA summarily adopts the IJ’s decision without opinion

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), we review the IJ’s decision as if it were the

BIA’s decision.” Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We review factual findings for substantial evidence.

Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). Under

substantial evidence review, the petitioner “must show that the evidence not only

supports, but compels the conclusion that these findings and decisions are

erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s no-nexus finding, which is dispositive

of Petitioners’ asylum and withholding-of-removal claims. Both claims require a

causal relationship, or nexus, between a persecutory harm and a protected ground.

See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–58 (9th Cir. 2017). As the IJ

1 Although all five petitioners submitted their own applications, they are all based on the claims of Martinez Avalos. We therefore consider Martinez Avalos’s claims dispositive of his family’s.

2 23-4060 found, Martinez Avalos offers no evidence that his status as a “Peruvian business

owner”—his proposed particular social group—was a reason for his cousin’s death

or the subsequent death threats. The lack of any nexus defeats Martinez Avalos’s

asylum and withholding-of-removal claims. See id. at 360 (explaining that

although withholding claims have a lower nexus standard than asylum claims, both

are properly denied where there is “no nexus at all”).

Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT protection. To qualify

for relief under CAT, Martinez Avalos must show that, if removed, he would more

likely than not be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the Peruvian

government. Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). The risk of

torture must be “particularized and non-speculative.” Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th

965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023). Martinez Avalos, however, does not allege that he has

experienced torture. Although Martinez Avalos points to country conditions

reports, “these reports do not demonstrate that [Martinez Avalos] personally will

face torture if he returns.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir.

2020). Moreover, as the IJ found, Martinez Avalos offers no specific reason that he

could not relocate elsewhere in Peru to avoid any potential future harm. See

Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that internal

relocation, while not dispositive, is relevant).

PETITION DENIED.

3 23-4060