2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Martina Lynn Jaccarino, an individual, Case No. 2:25-cv-00343-GMN-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 Nevada CVS Pharmacy, LLC, a Nevada 9 limited liability company; Warm Springs Road CVS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 10 company; et al.,
11 Defendants.
12 13 Before the Court is Defendants Nevada CVS Pharmacy, LLC and Warm Springs Road 14 CVS, LLC’s motion for a blanket protective order governing the parties’ exchange of 15 information. (ECF No. 21). While the parties agree on nearly all provisions of the protective 16 order, they reached an impasse regarding whether to require third parties who receive confidential 17 information to sign a document agreeing to be bound by the protective order. Because 18 requirements that third parties sign agreements to follow the terms of a protective order are 19 common, and because Plaintiff has not advanced persuasive reasons for the protective order to not 20 include this language, the Court grants Defendants’ motion in part regarding their request that the 21 Court enter a protective order including that language. The Court denies Defendants’ motion in 22 part because the Court declines to enter the protective order attached to Defendants’ motion. 23 Instead, it will require the parties to submit a stipulated protective order including the third-party- 24 agreement-to-be-bound language and attachment and certain additional language that the Court 25 outlines below. 26 I. Legal standard. 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) governs protective orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). It 1 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 2 There are three types of protective orders in federal practice. Federal Deposit Insurance 3 Corporation v. Lewis, No. 2:10-cv-439-JCM-VCF, 2015 WL 13667215, at *1 (D. Nev. July 29, 4 2015). The first—protective orders—protect a person from producing information in response to 5 a discovery request. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C)-(E). The second— 6 sealing orders—protect a person’s privacy interests by preventing the public from accessing court 7 records. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(F)-(H). The third—blanket protective orders—are 8 (typically) stipulated agreements between the parties that generally require discovery to be 9 conducted in a certain manner or be kept confidential. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B). 10 II. Discussion. 11 Defendants assert that the only provision on which the parties cannot agree is the 12 requirement that third parties who receive confidential information sign an agreement to follow 13 the terms of the protective order. (ECF No. 21). In response, Plaintiff argues that requiring third 14 parties like experts and mock jurors to sign an agreement to be bound to the protective order will 15 reduce the number of individuals who are willing to fill those roles and will have a chilling effect 16 on those individuals.1 (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff also raises the issue that, if she were required to 17 keep a list of individuals to whom she disclosed confidential information, and potentially disclose 18 that list, doing so would invade the work product privilege. However, Plaintiff asserts that, if the 19 Court were to require third parties to sign an agreement to follow the terms of the protective 20 order, she would request that the Court include the following sentence: 21 1 Plaintiff raises additional arguments that the Court does not address: 22 First Plaintiff argues that the documents that Defendants seek to mark confidential are not 23 actually confidential. However, because there is no operative protective order in this case under which Defendants have marked documents confidential and because Plaintiff has not challenged 24 the designations over any specific documents, the Court finds that this issue is premature. So, the 25 Court declines to opine on the propriety of Defendants’ confidentiality designations at this stage. Second, Plaintiff argues that the third-party-agreement-to-be-bound would mean that “Defendant 26 can consult with anyone it wants to, but [Plaintiff] cannot.” Having reviewed the language of the 27 proposed protective order, the requirement that third parties agree to be bound to the terms of the protective order applies to any witnesses and third parties, not just those employed by Plaintiff or If any party objects to disclosing their record of people to whom 1 they have given or shown Confidential Material, the party objecting 2 to the disclosure may file the appropriate motion with the Court. 3 In reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s concern about the “chilling” effect of the third- 4 party-agreement-to-be-bound is vague and is outweighed by Defendants’ concern that anyone 5 receiving confidential information understand that they are bound to the terms of the protective 6 order and be subject to consequences of violating it. 7 The Court finds that Defendants have the better argument. Requirements in protective 8 orders that third parties who receive confidential information sign an agreement to follow the 9 terms of the protective order governing discovery in the case are common. See Tomahawk 10 Manufacturing, Inc. v. Spherical Industries, Inc., 344 F.R.D. 468, 471 (D. Nev. 2023) (explaining 11 that “blanket protective orders often include carveouts to enable experts or consultants to access 12 sensitive information upon agreeing to be bound by the terms of that blanket protective order”) 13 (emphasis added); see Satmodo, LLC v. Whenever Communications, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00192- 14 AJB-NLS, 2018 WL 1071707, at *7-10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (entering a blanket protective 15 order including an agreement to be bound to individuals, including professional vendors and 16 experts, to whom the parties disclose confidential information). So, the Court will require the 17 parties to stipulate to a protective order that includes language requiring third parties who receive 18 confidential information to agree to be bound to the terms of the protective order. However, to 19 assuage Plaintiff’s concerns regarding disclosing a list of individuals to whom she has disclosed 20 confidential information, the Court will require the parties’ protective order to include a version 21 of the sentence which she references. 22 Finally, the Court notes that the proposed protective order attached to Defendants’ motion 23 fails to state the governing standards for filing documents under seal with the Court. There is a 24 presumption of public access to judicial files and records. So, a party seeking to file a 25 confidential document under seal must file a motion to seal and must comply with the Ninth 26 Circuit’s directives in Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) 27 and Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). The 1 The Court has adopted electronic filing procedures. Attorneys must 2 file documents under seal using the Court’s electronic filing 3 procedures. See Local Rule IA 10-5.
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2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Martina Lynn Jaccarino, an individual, Case No. 2:25-cv-00343-GMN-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 Nevada CVS Pharmacy, LLC, a Nevada 9 limited liability company; Warm Springs Road CVS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 10 company; et al.,
11 Defendants.
12 13 Before the Court is Defendants Nevada CVS Pharmacy, LLC and Warm Springs Road 14 CVS, LLC’s motion for a blanket protective order governing the parties’ exchange of 15 information. (ECF No. 21). While the parties agree on nearly all provisions of the protective 16 order, they reached an impasse regarding whether to require third parties who receive confidential 17 information to sign a document agreeing to be bound by the protective order. Because 18 requirements that third parties sign agreements to follow the terms of a protective order are 19 common, and because Plaintiff has not advanced persuasive reasons for the protective order to not 20 include this language, the Court grants Defendants’ motion in part regarding their request that the 21 Court enter a protective order including that language. The Court denies Defendants’ motion in 22 part because the Court declines to enter the protective order attached to Defendants’ motion. 23 Instead, it will require the parties to submit a stipulated protective order including the third-party- 24 agreement-to-be-bound language and attachment and certain additional language that the Court 25 outlines below. 26 I. Legal standard. 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) governs protective orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). It 1 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 2 There are three types of protective orders in federal practice. Federal Deposit Insurance 3 Corporation v. Lewis, No. 2:10-cv-439-JCM-VCF, 2015 WL 13667215, at *1 (D. Nev. July 29, 4 2015). The first—protective orders—protect a person from producing information in response to 5 a discovery request. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C)-(E). The second— 6 sealing orders—protect a person’s privacy interests by preventing the public from accessing court 7 records. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(F)-(H). The third—blanket protective orders—are 8 (typically) stipulated agreements between the parties that generally require discovery to be 9 conducted in a certain manner or be kept confidential. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B). 10 II. Discussion. 11 Defendants assert that the only provision on which the parties cannot agree is the 12 requirement that third parties who receive confidential information sign an agreement to follow 13 the terms of the protective order. (ECF No. 21). In response, Plaintiff argues that requiring third 14 parties like experts and mock jurors to sign an agreement to be bound to the protective order will 15 reduce the number of individuals who are willing to fill those roles and will have a chilling effect 16 on those individuals.1 (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff also raises the issue that, if she were required to 17 keep a list of individuals to whom she disclosed confidential information, and potentially disclose 18 that list, doing so would invade the work product privilege. However, Plaintiff asserts that, if the 19 Court were to require third parties to sign an agreement to follow the terms of the protective 20 order, she would request that the Court include the following sentence: 21 1 Plaintiff raises additional arguments that the Court does not address: 22 First Plaintiff argues that the documents that Defendants seek to mark confidential are not 23 actually confidential. However, because there is no operative protective order in this case under which Defendants have marked documents confidential and because Plaintiff has not challenged 24 the designations over any specific documents, the Court finds that this issue is premature. So, the 25 Court declines to opine on the propriety of Defendants’ confidentiality designations at this stage. Second, Plaintiff argues that the third-party-agreement-to-be-bound would mean that “Defendant 26 can consult with anyone it wants to, but [Plaintiff] cannot.” Having reviewed the language of the 27 proposed protective order, the requirement that third parties agree to be bound to the terms of the protective order applies to any witnesses and third parties, not just those employed by Plaintiff or If any party objects to disclosing their record of people to whom 1 they have given or shown Confidential Material, the party objecting 2 to the disclosure may file the appropriate motion with the Court. 3 In reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s concern about the “chilling” effect of the third- 4 party-agreement-to-be-bound is vague and is outweighed by Defendants’ concern that anyone 5 receiving confidential information understand that they are bound to the terms of the protective 6 order and be subject to consequences of violating it. 7 The Court finds that Defendants have the better argument. Requirements in protective 8 orders that third parties who receive confidential information sign an agreement to follow the 9 terms of the protective order governing discovery in the case are common. See Tomahawk 10 Manufacturing, Inc. v. Spherical Industries, Inc., 344 F.R.D. 468, 471 (D. Nev. 2023) (explaining 11 that “blanket protective orders often include carveouts to enable experts or consultants to access 12 sensitive information upon agreeing to be bound by the terms of that blanket protective order”) 13 (emphasis added); see Satmodo, LLC v. Whenever Communications, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00192- 14 AJB-NLS, 2018 WL 1071707, at *7-10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (entering a blanket protective 15 order including an agreement to be bound to individuals, including professional vendors and 16 experts, to whom the parties disclose confidential information). So, the Court will require the 17 parties to stipulate to a protective order that includes language requiring third parties who receive 18 confidential information to agree to be bound to the terms of the protective order. However, to 19 assuage Plaintiff’s concerns regarding disclosing a list of individuals to whom she has disclosed 20 confidential information, the Court will require the parties’ protective order to include a version 21 of the sentence which she references. 22 Finally, the Court notes that the proposed protective order attached to Defendants’ motion 23 fails to state the governing standards for filing documents under seal with the Court. There is a 24 presumption of public access to judicial files and records. So, a party seeking to file a 25 confidential document under seal must file a motion to seal and must comply with the Ninth 26 Circuit’s directives in Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) 27 and Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). The 1 The Court has adopted electronic filing procedures. Attorneys must 2 file documents under seal using the Court’s electronic filing 3 procedures. See Local Rule IA 10-5. Papers filed with the Court under seal must be accompanied with a concurrently-filed motion 4 for leave to file those documents under seal. See Local Rule IA 10- 5(a). 5 All motions to seal shall address the standard articulated in Ctr. for 6 Auto Safety and explain why that standard has been met. 809 F.3d 7 at 1097. Specifically, a party seeking to seal judicial records bears the burden of meeting the “compelling reasons” standard, as 8 previously articulated in Kamakana. 447 F.3d 1172. Under the compelling reasons standard, “a court may seal records only when 9 it finds ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Ctr. for 10 Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 11 1179). “The court must then ‘conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep 12 certain judicial records secret.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097. 13 There is an exception to the compelling reasons standard where a 14 party may satisfy the less exacting “good cause” standard for sealed 15 materials attached to a discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case. Id. “The good cause language comes from Rule 26(c)(1), 16 which governs the issuance of protective orders in the discovery process: ‘The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a 17 party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)). “For 18 good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of 19 showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips v. General Motors, 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 20 (9th Cir. 2002). The labels of “dispositive” and “nondispositive” will not be the determinative factor for deciding which test to apply 21 because the focal consideration is “whether the motion is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 22 809 F.3d at 1101. 23 The fact that the Court has entered the instant stipulated protective 24 order and that a party has designated a document as confidential pursuant to that protective order does not, standing alone, establish 25 sufficient grounds to seal a filed document. See Foltz v. State Farm 26 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 27 1992). If the sole ground for a motion to seal is that the opposing party (or non-party) has designated a document as confidential, the seal) either (1) a declaration establishing sufficient justification for 1 sealing each document at issue or (2) a notice of withdrawal of the 2 designation(s) and consent to unsealing. If neither filing is made, the Court may order the document(s) unsealed without further 3 notice. 4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for a protective order (ECF 5 No. 21) is granted in part and denied in part. The Court grants Defendants’ request that the 6 Court find a protective order appropriate. The Court denies Defendants’ request that it enter 7 Defendants’ proposed terms. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties must meet and confer and attempt to 9 stipulate to a protective order governing the exchange of discovery that includes the language 10 addressed in this order. The parties must file their stipulated protective order on or before 11 November 10, 2025. 12 13 DATED: October 10, 2025 14 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27