Martina Dominguez and Savannah Reyes, as Next Friend of Jeremiah Ramirez, a Minor v. Bexar County Medical Examiner's Office

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 28, 2007
• Docket: 10-06-00109-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-06-00109-CV

Martina Dominguez and

Savannah Reyes, As Next Friend

of Jeremiah Ramirez, A Minor,

                                                                      Appellants

 v.

Bexar County Medical Examiner's Office,

                                                                      Appellee

From the 166th District Court

Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-CI-01136

(Severance from Trial Court No. 2005-CI-10694)

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

      Dominguez sued the Bexar County Medical Examiner’s Office (“the County”) for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence, and other defendants on those and other claims.  Dominguez alleged that the County “[f]ail[ed] to properly identify the body/remains of JERMAINE RAMIREZ.”  ([sic] II C.R. at 201, 202 (bracketed alterations added); see id. at 202-204.)  The trial court granted the County’s plea to the jurisdiction and severed the claims against the County.  Dominguez appeals.  We affirm.

      In Dominguez’s two issues, she contends that the trial court erred in granting the County’s plea to the jurisdiction.  In Dominguez’s first issue, she contends that her claims were not barred by governmental immunity.  In Dominguez’s second issue, she contends that she did not release the County from her claims.

      “When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.  We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders’ intent.”  Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-27 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)).  “However, if a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do.”  Miranda at 227. 

If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial courts [sic] jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend.  If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27 (citing County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002)).  “If a plaintiff has been provided a reasonable opportunity to amend after a governmental entity files its plea to the jurisdiction, and the plaintiff’s amended pleading still does not allege facts that would constitute a waiver of immunity, then the trial court should dismiss the plaintiff’s action.  Such a dismissal is with prejudice . . . .”  Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004).

      “Governmental immunity . . . protects political subdivisions of the State, including counties” from suit.  Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003); see Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003).   The Texas Tort Claims Act provides, however, that “[a] governmental unit in the state is liable for . . . personal injury . . . so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal . . . property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (Vernon 2005); see id. §§ 101.001-101.109 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006); see Torres v. City of Waco, 51 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds, Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 651 n.11 (Tex. 2004).  “‘[U]se’ . . . mean[s] ‘to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose.’”  San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244, 246 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Beggs v. Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d)); accord Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1989); see Tex. A & M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580, 583 (Tex. 2005).  “[T]angible personal property refers to something that has a corporeal, concrete, and palpable existence.”   Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. 1994).

      The trial court did not hear evidence on the County’s plea.

      In the County’s plea, the County argued:

. . . Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor identified any set of facts or circumstances that would waive Defendant, BEXAR COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER’S OFFICE, governmental liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act.  . . . .  Specifically, no act or omission by Defendant constituted a “use” of tangible personal property as required by the Act.

([sic] I C.R. at 15-16 (ellipses added).)  Dominguez argues that the County used the decedents’ driver’s licenses and corpses as tangible personal property.  (Br. at 20-24.)

      Driver’s Licenses.  Dominguez argues that “Appellant’s trial courts erred in determining that the Texas Driver’s License of JERMAINE RAMIREZ, Appellant’s deceased loved one, was not property for the purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act.”  ([sic] Br. at 22; see Reply Br. at 7-10.)  The petition alleged that the County “misuse[d] the charred and burned Texas Driver’s License of JERMAINE RAMIREZ (which is an item of tangible personal property).”  ([sic] II C.R. at 208 (bracketed alteration added) (emphasis in orig.).)  The County argues that its actions constituted the use of the information on the driver’s licenses, not the use of the driver’s-license certificates as tangible personal property.^[1] 

      “[T]he Legislature has not waived immunity for negligence involving the use, misuse, or non-use of the information” that property “contain[s].”  Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tex. 2001); accord York, 871 S.W.2d at 179.  “[I]nformation is not tangible personal property, since it is an abstract concept that lacks corporeal, physical, or palpable qualities.”  Petta at 580; accord York at 179.  “[S]imply reducing information to writing on paper does not make the information ‘tangible personal property.’”  Petta at 580 (quoting Dallas County v. Harper, 913 S.W.2d 207, 207-208 (Tex. 1995)).

      Dominguez relies primarily upon Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District.  See Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983), limited by Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998).  Dominguez argues that

the Texas Supreme Court has held when the information is reduced to writing by a machine correctly and that writing/information is misinterpreted (misused) in such a way that it brings about the very injury the writing was designed to prevent, liability has been found to exist based on the misuse of the machine and/or the written results of that machine.

([sic] Br. at 21 (citing Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d 30; Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. Estate of Blackmon, 169 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005)[, vacated, 195 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)]); see Br. at 21-22; Reply Br. at 5-6.) 

      Salcedo, however, “does not permit claims against the State for misuse of information.”  York, 871 S.W.2d at 179.  “The decision in Salcedo is limited to its facts.”  Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 342 (citing York at 178); accord Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 591 (Tex. 2001).  “[T]he waiver of immunity in Salcedo arose from the governmental unit’s misuse of an electrocardiograph” device, not merely information.  Bossley at 342 (citing York at 178); see York at 178-79. 

      Construing Dominguez’s pleadings liberally in her favor and looking to her intent, she has not alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate that the County used tangible personal property in the form of Ramirez’s driver’s license. 

      Corpses.  Dominguez argues, “The remains of JERMAIN RAMIREZ were plead in Appellant’s petition and specifically referred to as property which was misused by this Appellee for the purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act.”  ([sic] Br. at 22; see Reply Br. at 7-10; see also id. at 10-13.)  The petition similarly alleged that the County “misuse[d] the charred and burned body of JERMAINE RAMIREZ, (which is an item of tangible personal property).”  ([sic] II C.R. at 208 (bracketed alteration added) (emphasis in orig.).)  In this connection, Dominguez argues, “the law . . . specifically state[s] that human remains [a]re property.”  (Br. at 23 (citing Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex. 1993); Terrill v. H[a]rbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1964, writ dism’d [w.o.j.])); see Reply Br. at 11-12.)  Those cases do not state that proposition.  Cf. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d 593; Terrill, 376 S.W.2d 945.  Dominguez argues, further, “the heirs/survivors do have ownership in these remains such that they can bring suit in order to enforce their selection on how those remains are to be disposed so long as their elected method is consistent with the laws and customs of their civil society.”  ([sic] Br. at 23 (citing e.g. Lancaster v. Mebane, 247 S.W. 926 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1923, writ ref’d)); see Reply Br. at 12-13.)  Assuming that those cases so hold, they do not stand for the proposition that the corpse constitutes personal property concerning which a party may sue the State for money damages.^[2]  Cf. e.g. Lancaster, 247 S.W. 926.

      Construing Dominguez’s pleadings liberally in her favor and looking to her intent, she has not alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate that the County used tangible personal property in the form of Ramirez’s corpse. 

      Because the trial court would not have erred in concluding that Dominguez did not allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate that court’s jurisdiction in the County’s use of tangible personal property in either manner alleged by Dominguez, we need not reach her arguments concerning the other grounds in the County’s plea.

      Dominguez does not contend that she did not have an opportunity to amend her petition in response to the County’s plea.   

      We overrule Dominguez’s first issue.  We need not reach Dominguez’s second issue.

      Having overruled Dominguez’s first issue, we affirm.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Reyna

      (Justice Vance dissents from the judgment without a separate opinion)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 28, 2007

[CV06]

---

                [1]  We note, moreover, that it is a “settled principle that a license or permit to drive an automobile on the public highways and streets is . . . not property or a property right.”  Gillaspie v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 466, 259 S.W.2d 177, 182 (1953); see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.001(a)(3), (6) (Vernon Supp. 2006).

                [2]  In the only such case, for instance, that Dominguez cites decided under the Tort Claims Act, the appellant alleged the misuse of a corpse, but the appellate court held for the appellant instead only on the theory of the operation or use of motor-driven equipment.  See Freeman v. Harris County, 183 S.W.3d 885, 888 n.3, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. filed); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(1)(A).

hief Justice Davis,

      Justice Gray

Opinion delivered and filed July 11, 2001

Publish