Martin v. State of Nevada

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided November 19, 2024·No. 3:21-cv-00365·Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 WESLIE MARTIN, Case No. 3:21-cv-00365-ART-CSD 4 Plaintiff, ORDER TO REOPEN CASE 5 v.

6 STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

7 Defendants.

8 I. SUMMARY 9 In August 2021 Plaintiff Weslie Martin (“Plaintiff”), then an inmate in the 10 custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), initiated this lawsuit 11 by submitting a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filing an application to 12 proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.) After the Court dismissed the 13 original complaint (ECF No. 5) and the first amended complaint (ECF No. 8), it 14 screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”) (ECF No. 10), allowing his 15 First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed against Defendant Reubart. (ECF 16 No. 13 at 11.) The Court then stayed the case and referred it to the Inmate Early 17 Mediation Program. (Id. at 11–12.) 18 During the stay, the NDOC filed a suggestion of death on the docket, 19 informing the Court that Plaintiff passed away on September 11, 2023. (ECF No. 20 15.) The Court ordered that any motion for substitution be filed within 90 days 21 and warned that the failure to do so could result in dismissal of this case. (ECF 22 No. 18.) Following the 90-day period, on January 9, 2024, the Court had not 23 received a motion to substitute, so it dismissed this action and closed it. (ECF 24 No. 21.) 25 On October 18, 2024, Denzel Hosea Martin (“Denzel”), through counsel, 26 filed a Motion to Set Aside Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b) and a Motion for 27 1 Substitution Pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1).1 (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) Denzel states that he 2 is Plaintiff’s brother and the special administrator of Plaintiff’s estate. (ECF No. 3 26 at 2.) He learned about Plaintiff’s death on February 15, 2024, when the Ninth 4 Circuit served him a notice of death from another of Plaintiff’s cases before this 5 Court. (Id. at 3.) After learning about Plaintiff’s death, it took Denzel two months 6 to secure counsel. (Id.) A few months later, Denzel filed the petition in state court 7 requesting that he be named the special administrator of Plaintiff’s estate. (Id.) 8 On August 1, 2024, the state court granted the petition and named Denzel as 9 the special administrator of his brother’s estate. (Id.) Once the appointment was 10 finalized, Denzel started to make substitution motions in the active cases 11 Plaintiff had before he died. (Id.) 12 In his motions, Denzel requests that the Court: (1) reopen the case, (2) 13 amend the caption of the case to name him as the plaintiff, and (3) allow him to 14 pursue the claim(s) pending in this matter. (Id. at 2, 7.) 15 II. DISCUSSION 16 Denzel is asking this Court to set aside its judgment dismissing this action 17 without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). This rule 18 provides that a court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final 19 judgment, order, or proceeding for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 20 neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 21 In Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 22 (1993), the Supreme Court interpreted “neglect” to encompass “both simple, 23 faultless omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions caused by 24 carelessness.” Id. at 388. In assessing whether a set-side is justified by a party’s 25 excusable neglect, courts apply a four-part test: (1) the danger of prejudice to the 26

27 1 These motions are identical. (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) Therefore, the Court will cite to the first motion in this order when referencing them. 1 opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 2 proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 3 reasonable control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 4 Id. at 395. 5 A. Prejudice to the Opposing Party 6 To be prejudicial, the “standard is whether [Defendants’] ability to pursue 7 [their defenses] will be hindered.” Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984). 8 The delay must result in tangible harm such as loss of evidence, increased 9 difficulties of discovery, or greater opportunity for fraud or collusion. See TCI 10 Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on 11 other grounds by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). The 12 loss of a quick victory does not constitute prejudice. Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 13 231 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of setting aside its prior 15 judgment. The case was in the preservice screening stage and was going to the 16 Inmate Early Mediation Conference. Therefore, the danger of prejudice to the 17 opposing party is low because the opposing party had not yet been served. 18 B. Length of Delay 19 Next, the Court considers whether Denzel’s neglect caused significant 20 delay and its impact on the proceedings. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. The Court 21 finds that this factor weighs against setting aside the judgment. The Court closed 22 the case in January 2024. Denzel filed his motions ten months later. 23 C. Reason of the Delay 24 Next, the Court considers whether Denzel’s neglect caused significant 25 delay and its impact on the proceedings. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. When 26 assessing the reason for the delay, the Supreme Court interprets Congress’s 27 intent as permitting courts “to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, 1 mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the 2 party’s control.” Id. at 388. Delays in filing resulting from “negligence and 3 carelessness,” not “deviousness or willfulness,” may be considered excusable 4 neglect. Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1225. 5 While there was a ten-month gap between the closing of this case and 6 Denzel’s motions, he states that he acted with the utmost speed under the 7 circumstances. He was unaware of the dismissal of this action and did not 8 receive notice of Plaintiff's death until February 15, 2024. (ECF No. 26 at 2, 6.) 9 It took him two more months to find counsel. (Id. at 3.) And it was not until 10 August 1, 2024, that the state court named him as the special administrator of 11 Plaintiff’s estate. (Id.) Therefore, even though there was a significant gap in time 12 between the closing of this case and the present motions, the delay is 13 understandable, and Denzel shows that he acted as quickly as possible under 14 the circumstances. This factor weighs in favor of setting aside the prior 15 judgment. 16 D. Bad Faith 17 For the last factor, the Court examines whether Denzel acted in bad faith 18 when he failed to respond to the Court’s orders and meet its deadlines. There is 19 no evidence that Denzel purposely acted in bad faith. On the contrary, he was 20 unaware of the deadlines and appears to have acted as quickly as possible to 21 reopen this case. 22 After considering all the Pioneer factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 23 favor of reopening this case.

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