Martin v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Martin v. State

587 S.E.2d 650, 277 Ga. 227, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 3126, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 896

Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided October 20, 2003·No. S03A0691·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

Fletcher, Chief Justice.

James Martin appeals from his convictions for felony murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime.¹ Martin claims that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to police and other evidence obtained before he was read his Miranda rights.² Because this evidence was properly admitted under the “public safety” exception to Miranda, we affirm.

1. The evidence at trial showed that at around 1:00 a.m. on December 9, 2000, Martin was at the house of his neighbor, Deneen Johnson, drinking brandy and smoking crack cocaine. The victim, Christopher Allen, showed up about two hours later and got into an argument and fist-fight with Martin over a debt. After Johnson and her brother broke up the fight, Johnson told Martin to leave. Martin went to his house, got a knife, returned to Johnson’s house, and attacked Allen. Allen died of stab wounds.

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination of guilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Martin was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted.³

2. Martin contends that statements he made concerning the location of the knife and the knife itself should have been excluded from evidence because he had not received his Miranda warnings at the time the statements were made. The evidence at the Jackson-Denno⁴ hearing showed that, shortly after the crime occurred, a police officer received a broadcast describing the crime, naming Martin as the suspect, and giving his address. The officer arrived at the address as Martin was walking out of the door. The officer asked Martin where the knife was. Martin led him inside the house to his bedroom and said that the knife was under the pillow on his bed. The officer recovered the knife, placed Martin in his patrol car, and read him his Miranda rights.

As a general rule, Miranda prohibits the interrogation of sus[228] pects in police custody until they are informed of their rights.⁵ In New York v. Quarles,⁶ however, the United States Supreme Court created a “public safety’ exception to Miranda. This exception allows an officer to ascertain whether a suspect is armed prior to advising him of his rights.⁷ Because the officer was entitled to determine the location of the knife prior to reading Martin his Miranda rights, the trial court did not err in admitting Martin’s statements and the ¡knife into evidence.

Decided October 20, 2003. Edwin L. Albright, William J. Mason, for appellant. J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, Michele C. Ivey, Stacey S. Jackson, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jennifer S. Gill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

3. Martin claims that his indictment for felony murder was defective because it did not allege the underlying felony with sufficient particularity. Because Martin did not file a special demurrer before pleading not guilty to the indictment, he waived this objection.⁸

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Footnotes

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Fletcher, Chief Justice.

James Martin appeals from his convictions for felony murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime.¹ Martin claims that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to police and other evidence obtained before he was read his Miranda rights.² Because this evidence was properly admitted under the “public safety” exception to Miranda, we affirm.

1. The evidence at trial showed that at around 1:00 a.m. on December 9, 2000, Martin was at the house of his neighbor, Deneen Johnson, drinking brandy and smoking crack cocaine. The victim, Christopher Allen, showed up about two hours later and got into an argument and fist-fight with Martin over a debt. After Johnson and her brother broke up the fight, Johnson told Martin to leave. Martin went to his house, got a knife, returned to Johnson’s house, and attacked Allen. Allen died of stab wounds.

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination of guilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Martin was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted.³

2. Martin contends that statements he made concerning the location of the knife and the knife itself should have been excluded from evidence because he had not received his Miranda warnings at the time the statements were made. The evidence at the Jackson-Denno⁴ hearing showed that, shortly after the crime occurred, a police officer received a broadcast describing the crime, naming Martin as the suspect, and giving his address. The officer arrived at the address as Martin was walking out of the door. The officer asked Martin where the knife was. Martin led him inside the house to his bedroom and said that the knife was under the pillow on his bed. The officer recovered the knife, placed Martin in his patrol car, and read him his Miranda rights.

As a general rule, Miranda prohibits the interrogation of sus[228] pects in police custody until they are informed of their rights.⁵ In New York v. Quarles,⁶ however, the United States Supreme Court created a “public safety’ exception to Miranda. This exception allows an officer to ascertain whether a suspect is armed prior to advising him of his rights.⁷ Because the officer was entitled to determine the location of the knife prior to reading Martin his Miranda rights, the trial court did not err in admitting Martin’s statements and the ¡knife into evidence.

Decided October 20, 2003. Edwin L. Albright, William J. Mason, for appellant. J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, Michele C. Ivey, Stacey S. Jackson, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jennifer S. Gill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

3. Martin claims that his indictment for felony murder was defective because it did not allege the underlying felony with sufficient particularity. Because Martin did not file a special demurrer before pleading not guilty to the indictment, he waived this objection.⁸

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Footnotes

Martin v. State, 587 S.E.2d 650, 277 Ga. 227, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 3126, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 896 (Ga. 2003).

Pincite

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Opinion

Footnotes

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