Martin v. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedFebruary 16, 2021
Docket0:20-cv-00311
StatusUnknown

This text of Martin v. Saul (Martin v. Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martin v. Saul, (mnd 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA CIVIL NO. 20-311(DSD/BRT) Odis W. M., Plaintiff, v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

This matter is before the court upon the objection by plaintiff Odis W.M.1 to the November 30, 2020, report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson (R&R). The magistrate judge recommends that the court (1) deny Odis’s motion for summary judgment, and (2) grant the motion for summary judgment by defendant Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). After a de novo review, and for the following reasons, the court overrules Odis’s objection and adopts the R&R in its entirety.

BACKGROUND This action arises out of Odis’s application for social security income (SSI). The complete background of this action is

1 The court’s policy is to use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in social security cases. As such, the court will refer to plaintiff by his first name. fully set forth in the R&R and will not be repeated here. The court will only briefly summarize the history of the present action.

On or about October 25, 2016, Odis filed for SSI based on various mental and physical disabilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on December 11, 2018, in which she denied Odis’s request to admit additional records because the request was untimely under the five-day rule. The five-day rule requires that the parties provide the ALJ with all evidence “no later than five business days before the date of the scheduled hearing.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935(a), 416.1435(a). If claimants do not comply, the ALJ “may decline to consider or obtain the evidence, unless [an exception] appl[ies].” Id. At the beginning of the hearing, Odis’s counsel notified the ALJ that he was still waiting for certain records from North

Memorial Clinic. The ALJ asked why they were not included in the record, and Odis’s counsel responded that he only recently discovered that certain records were missing. Odis’s counsel received medical records from North Memorial on November 28, 2018, and submitted them to the ALJ the same day. But he failed to realize that he had not received all of the records. The ALJ declined to leave the record open for the additional records, finding that (1) Odis had not timely submitted the records at issue, (2) the records did not fall under any exception to the five-day rule, and (3) the records would not change her decision in any event. ECF No. 17, at 5-6. On January 23, 2019, the ALJ concluded that Odis was not

disabled with the meaning of the Social Security Act and denied his application. Odis appealed, arguing that that the ALJ erred in precluding him from submitting the additional records. Both parties moved for summary judgment. On November 30, 2020, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment in Saul’s favor. Odis now timely objects.

DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review The court reviews de novo any portion of the R&R to which ' specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(c). As noted in the R&R, the court reviews ALJ’s determination with deference to the ALJ. See Kelley v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ’s findings “as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....“ 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). On review, the court considers “both evidence that detracts from and evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision.” Hartfield v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The court, however, may not “reverse the Commissioner’s

decision simply because there is evidence supporting a different result.” Hall v. Chater, 109 F.3d 1255, 1258 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “If the evidence supports two inconsistent = conclusions, one of which is that reached by the Commissioners conclusion, [the court] must affirm the decision.” Id. Moreover, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Fastner v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2003). The court may remand if an ALJ fails to adequately support their determination. II. Analysis Odis argues that the R&R incorrectly concluded that the missing clinical records do not fall under one of the exceptions to the five-day rule. Specifically, Odis argues that the ALJ should have allowed the records to be a part of the proceedings because “unusual, unexpected, or unavoidable circumstances beyond his control” caused the omission. He argues that the R&R erred in relying on Shari Lee Z. v. Saul, No. 5:19-CV-0268 (GTS), 2019 WL 6840134, (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2019), in deciding otherwise. He also maintains that the ALJ would have decided the case differently if she had included the records at issue. The court disagrees on all counts. As set forth in the R&R, the ALJ properly determined that the records were correctly excluded under the five-day rule. As noted, the five-day rule requires parties to “make every effort” to submit

all evidence “no later than five business days before the date of the scheduled hearing.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935(a), 416.1435(a). The ALJ may decline to admit evidence not complying with the rule unless an exception applies. Id. Relevant here, one exception allows claimants to submit late evidence if “[s]ome other unusual, unexpected, or unavoidable circumstance beyond [the claimant’s] control prevented [the claimant] from informing [the ALJ] or submitting the evidence earlier.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935(b)(3), 416.1435(b)(3). Examples include serious illness, death, or serious illness in the claimant’s immediate family, records were destroyed by accident, or the claimant “actively and diligently sought evidence from a source and the evidence was not received or

was received less than 5 business days prior to the hearing.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935(b)(3)(i)-(iv), 416.1435(b)(3)(i)-(iv). “A claimant must ... show due diligence and that the delay was outside of her control.” Wasen A. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-03242 (SRN/LIB), 2020 WL 823095, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 2020) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-3242 (SRN/LIB), 2020 WL 818908 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2020). If a plaintiff tries to submit late evidence, it is plaintiff’s burden to prove that one of the exceptions to the five day rule applies. See Nino v. Berryhill, No. 3-18-cv-82-CRW-SBJ, 2019 WL 3491929, at *1-2 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 11, 2019). Odis has not met this high burden. Odis’s counsel did not

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