Martin v. Pullman Standard, Division of Wheelabrator Frye

Third Circuit

Martin v. Pullman Standard, Division of Wheelabrator Frye

726 F.2d 101, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2932, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 26059

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedJanuary 26, 1984

DocketNo. 82-5470

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 726 F.2d 101 (Martin v. Pullman Standard, Division of Wheelabrator Frye) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Martin v. Pullman Standard, Division of Wheelabrator Frye, 726 F.2d 101, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2932, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 26059 (3d Cir. 1984).

Pincite

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge:

Terry G. Martin appeals from a judgment on the pleadings, on statute of limitations grounds, in his suit against his employer and the labor union representing him, alleging that his discharge violated a collective bargaining agreement and the union’s duty of fair representation. The trial court, relying on United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), held that the action was barred by the thirty-day statute of limitations in 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 7314(b) (Purdon 1982). Martin v. Pullman Standard, 538 F.Supp. 1174, 1176 (W.D.Pa.1982). While Martin’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court overruled United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, holding that the six-month period for filing unfair labor practice [102]*102charges in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976), was the appropriate limitations period for suits such as his. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2285-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983).

Martin’s grievance was withdrawn by the union on April 13, 1981, and the present action commenced on October 15, 1981, or 185 days thereafter.

Martin contends, however, that the statute of limitations should have been tolled until the Union informed him, sometime in May of 1981, that the grievance was withdrawn. The trial court did not decide the tolling question because even if the action had been tolled until May, the thirty-day Pennsylvania time bar still would govern. 538 F.Supp. at 1176. In DelCostello, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings in identical circumstances. - U.S. at-, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. We conclude that that course is appropriate here as well.

The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

OPINION OF THE COURT

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge:

Terry G. Martin appeals from a judgment on the pleadings, on statute of limitations grounds, in his suit against his employer and the labor union representing him, alleging that his discharge violated a collective bargaining agreement and the union’s duty of fair representation. The trial court, relying on United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), held that the action was barred by the thirty-day statute of limitations in 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 7314(b) (Purdon 1982). Martin v. Pullman Standard, 538 F.Supp. 1174, 1176 (W.D.Pa.1982). While Martin’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court overruled United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, holding that the six-month period for filing unfair labor practice [102]*102charges in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976), was the appropriate limitations period for suits such as his. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2285-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983).

Martin’s grievance was withdrawn by the union on April 13, 1981, and the present action commenced on October 15, 1981, or 185 days thereafter.

Martin contends, however, that the statute of limitations should have been tolled until the Union informed him, sometime in May of 1981, that the grievance was withdrawn. The trial court did not decide the tolling question because even if the action had been tolled until May, the thirty-day Pennsylvania time bar still would govern. 538 F.Supp. at 1176. In DelCostello, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings in identical circumstances. - U.S. at-, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. We conclude that that course is appropriate here as well.

The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Robert Gavalik, Frank Grelo, Joseph Urban, Anthony Ulyan, Donald A. Berger, Ronald Clarke, Henry Foster, George Patterson, Joseph Kellerman, Robert Pavlik, Phillip Farley, Thomas Riley, Thomas Warren and Francis Humenik v. Continental Can Company. Albert J. Jakub, Fred Cipriana, Jr., Anthony J. Bernardo, Thomas A. Mulligan, William T. Tarr, Donald W. Roberts, Ernest Wirbecki and George W. Stepanic on Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly Situated Alfred Borrelli, Jr., Michael Di Iorio, Anthony Folino, Thomas E. Johston, Robert Kapolka, John C. Kincel, Peter A. Rumain, Harry H. Smith, Melvin J. Smith, Jack A. Stull and Ernest B. Taddeo, on Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly Situated v. Continental Can Company, a Member of Continental Group, Inc. Appeal of Robert Gavalik and Albert J. Jakub Appeal of Continental Can Company, U.S.A., a Member of the Continental Group, Inc

812 F.2d 834 (Third Circuit, 1987)

McCoy v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ralway Co.

762 F.2d 1009 (Sixth Circuit, 1985)

No. 82-5470

726 F.2d 101 (Third Circuit, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

726 F.2d 101, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2932, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 26059, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-v-pullman-standard-division-of-wheelabrator-frye-ca3-1984.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack