MARTIN v. ORTIZ

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJanuary 4, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-02175
StatusUnknown

This text of MARTIN v. ORTIZ (MARTIN v. ORTIZ) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MARTIN v. ORTIZ, (D.N.J. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ____________________________________ GEORGE MARTIN, : : Petitioner, : Civ. No. 21-2175 (RBK) : v. : : DAVID E. ORTIZ, : OPINION : Respondent. : ____________________________________:

ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.

Petitioner is a former federal prisoner previously incarcerated at F.C.I. Fort Dix in Fort Dix, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (See ECF 1). Petitioner seeks additional credits of up to one year purportedly owed to him by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) under provisions of the First Step Act (“FSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). Respondent initially filed a response in opposition to the habeas petition. (See ECF 5). Petitioner then filed a reply in support of his habeas petition. (See ECF 6). On December 6, 2022, Respondent submitted a letter indicating that the BOP had recalculated Petitioner’s sentence in accordance with interim procedures associated with the FSA on January 20, 2022. (See ECF 7). Respondent indicated that Petitioner received 367 days of FSA credits which made his new release date September 2, 2022. (See id.). Respondent further stated in the letter that Petitioner was released from BOP custody on September 2, 2022, and is now serving his term of supervised release. (See id.). Indeed, the BOP’s online inmate locator confirms September 2, 2022 as Petitioner’s release date. See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on January 4, 2023). Respondent argues that either because Petitioner has received the relief he is seeking or because he has been released from BOP custody, his habeas petition is now moot. Petitioner’s release from custody implicates this case in two ways.1 First, Petitioner has failed to update his address of record which remains F.C.I. Fort Dix. Thus, he has failed to

comply with Local Rule 10.1. See L. Civ. R. 10.1(a) (“Counsel and/or unrepresented parties must advise the Court of any change in their or their client’s address within seven days of being apprised of such change by filing a notice of said change with the Clerk.”). Normally, this failure would result in this Court administratively terminating this case. However, for the reasons discussed infra, Petitioner’s habeas petition will be dismissed rather than simply administratively terminating this matter. Petitioner’s habeas petition is now moot. Article III of the United States Constitution permits a federal court to adjudicate “‘only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.’” Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). The case or controversy requirement requires the parties to have a personal

stake in the outcome throughout the judicial proceedings. See id. (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477–478). “This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Id. (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477)). “Incarceration satisfies the case or controversy requirement[;] [o]nce a sentence has expired, however, some continuing injury, also referred to as a collateral consequence, must exist for the action to continue.” Id.

1 Because this Court finds that Petitioner’s release from custody clearly moots his habeas petition, this Court need not consider Respondent’s alternative argument that Petitioner’s habeas petition is now moot because he has received the requested relief he is seeking. In this case, Petitioner’s request for credits under the FSA became moot upon his release from BOP custody. See Allen v. Ortiz, No. 20-21027, 2021 WL 1947300, at *1 (D.N.J. May 14, 2021) (dismissing habeas petition seeking credits under FSA as moot as petitioner was released from BOP custody); see also Fitzpatrick v. Knight, No. 22-5847, 2022 WL 17177851, at *1

(D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2022) (citations omitted) (finding petitioner’s habeas petition seeking additional FSA credits is moot upon release from prison). Indeed, this “Court can no longer grant Petitioner's request for FSA time credits, as such ‘credits affect the timing of an inmate's conditional release from prison, but they do not alter the sentence itself.’” Puccio v. Ortiz, No. 22-5138, 2022 WL 4468599, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2022) (quoting Scott v. Schuylkill FCI, 298 F. App'x 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000)) (“The Supreme Court has held that the length of a term of supervised release cannot be reduced ‘by reason of excess time served in prison.’”). Accordingly, this Court will enter an order dismissing Petitioner’s habeas petition as

moot.

DATED: January 4, 2023 s/ Robert B. Kugler ROBERT B. KUGLER United States District Judge

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Related

Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.
494 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Spencer v. Kemna
523 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1998)
United States v. Johnson
529 U.S. 53 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Burkey v. Marberry
556 F.3d 142 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Scott v. Schuylkill FCI
298 F. App'x 202 (Third Circuit, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
MARTIN v. ORTIZ, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-v-ortiz-njd-2023.