Martin v. Muniz

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 25, 2021
• Docket: 5:17-cv-01690
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 GEORGE MARTIN, 11 Case No. 17-01690 BLF (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DENYING

MOTION FOR 13 v. RECONSIDERATION; 14 ADDRESSING OTHER REQUESTS 15 W. MUNIZ, et al.,

16 Defendants. (Docket Nos. 173, 174, 175)

18 Plaintiff, a California inmate, filed the instant pro se civil 19 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against prison 20 officials at the Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). The Court 21 granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Eighth 22 Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 23 claim against them. Dkt. No. 169. Plaintiff has filed a motion 24 for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 25 and 60(b)(1-6), Dkt. No. 175, along with exhibits in support, Dkt. 26 No. 175-1. 27 order (e.g., after dismissal or summary judgment motion), a 1 motion for reconsideration may be based either on Rule 59(e) 2 (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Rule 60(b) (motion for 3 relief from judgment) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 See Am. Ironworks & Erectors v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 5 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). The denial of a motion for 6 reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is construed as a denial of relief 7 under Rule 60(b). Id. at 1255 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation 8 omitted) (en banc). 9 Motions for reconsideration should not be frequently made 10 or freely granted; they are not a substitute for appeal or a means 11 of attacking some perceived error of the court. See Twentieth 12 Century - Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th 13 Cir. 1981). “‘[T]he major grounds that justify reconsideration 14 involve an intervening change of controlling law, the availability 15 of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent 16 manifest injustice.’” Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. 17 Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United 18 States v. Desert Gold Mining Co., 433 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 19 1970)). 20 This action was based on Defendants’ treatment of 21 Plaintiff’s chronic pain related to certain longstanding injuries to 22 his neck and back, and the alleged failure to provide corrective 23 surgeries to address that pain. Dkt. No. 137 at 6. With regards to 24 this treatment, Plaintiff claimed the following; (1) in February 25 2007, he was given the wrong blood pressure medicine and that 26 Defendant Tran was deliberately indifferent to him from 2007 1 through 2015, and that he has been falsely labeled as a “non- 2 compliant” patient; (3) at some point in 2013, he was given 3 Tylenol with codeine but was later given a different drug which 4 tasted strange; (4) his extended release morphine was cancelled 5 in 2016 and replaced with “crush-float morphine” which is 6 inadequate; and (5) he was denied pain medication, a CAT scan, 7 and surgeries during 2016 and 2017. Dkt. No. 169 at 16. In 8 granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court 9 concluded that there was an absence of a genuine dispute of 10 material fact with respect to any of these Eighth Amendment 11 claims. Id. at 27. 12 The Court first considers Plaintiff’s motion for 13 reconisderation under Rule 59(e). A motion for reconsideration 14 under Rule 59(e) “‘should not be granted, absent highly unusual 15 circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly 16 discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 17 intervening change in the law.’” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 18 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (en banc). 19 Evidence is not newly discovered for purposes of a Rule 59(e) 20 motion if it was available prior to the district court's ruling. See 21 Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) 22 (affirming district court’s denial of habeas petitioner's motion for 23 reconsideration where petitioner's evidence of exhaustion was not 24 “newly discovered” because petitioner was aware of such 25 evidence almost one year prior to the district court's denial of the 26 reconsideration when the question before it is a debatable one. 1 See McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1256 (district court did not abuse its 2 discretion in denying reconsideration where question whether it 3 could enter protective order in habeas action limiting Attorney 4 General’s use of documents from trial counsel’s file was 5 debatable). 6 Plaintiff’s major arguments are that the Court has failed to 7 be impartial in its ruling and that Defendant Bright’s declaration 8 is “perjured testimony.” Dkt. No. 175 at 4, 5. Plaintiff repeats 9 his assertions from his prior briefs that his pain issues stem from 10 a “wrongful surgery” from 2006. Id. at 9-11. He also contends 11 that there is evidence of his inability to consume crush-float 12 medication. Id. at 15-16. However, none of these assertions or 13 evidence establish grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). 14 Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d at 369 15 n.5. First of all, Plaintiff does not allege any intervening change 16 of controlling law. Secondly, the documents Plaintiff submits in 17 support do not constitute “new evidence,” as they are largely 18 from his medical records which were available prior to the 19 district court's ruling, see Ybarra, 656 F.3d at 998, and any “new” 20 information he provides is not relevant to the issues that have 21 been resolved. Dkt. No. 175-1. For example, Plaintiff insists that 22 Defendants were aware of his need for surgery, and that a letter 23 in a “Plata Class action inquiry” shows that he would be “cleared 24 for surgery.” Dkt. No. 175 at 2; Dkt. No. 175-1 at 12. However, 25 this Plata letter is dated October 19, 2011, which is 26 that Defendants denied him surgery during 2016 and 2017. As 1 the Court found, the only mention of surgery was in the medical 2 records submitted by Plaintiff from January 2017, when Dr. 3 Ramberg concluded that surgery was not a viable option to 4 alleviate Plaintiff’s chronic pain. Dkt. No. 169 at 22-23. 5 Plaintiff asserts in his motion that the Court improperly relied on 6 Dr. Ramberg’s report and that two other doctors had different 7 opinions. Dkt. No. 175 at 27. However, Dr. Ramberg’s report 8 was submitted by Plaintiff in support of his opposition, and the 9 other doctors’ reports he provides now are from 2007 and 2008, 10 which is 9-10 years before Plaintiff was allegedly denied surgery 11 in 2016 and 2017. Dkt. No. 175-1 at 22-23, 26-27. Furthermore, 12 Plaintiff’s assertions that Dr. Bright’s declaration is “perjured 13 testimony” and that the Court has failed to be impartial are 14 simply conclusory and is not supported by any evidence. A 15 review of Dr. Bright’s declaration shows that he simply 16 summarized the underlying medical records of Plaintiff, which 17 were attached to the declaration. Dkt. No. 167-1. Plaintiff does 18 not claim that Dr. Bright mischaracterized any of the records, but 19 rather he disagrees with the observations contained in the chart 20 notes.1 Plaintiff further offers only references to other chart notes 21 regarding recommendations for treatment that predate Dr. 22 Bright’s review by five to ten years. Lastly, Plaintiff’s lay 23 opinions that he should be provided with other pain medications 24 25 26 1 The Court will address Plaintiff’s specific objections in the or surgery are not sufficient to attack the credibility of Dr. 1 Bright’s testimony or to create a triable issue of material fact. 2 Absent highly unusual circumstances, and Plaintiff pleads none, 3 the Court finds no other basis for granting the motion for 4 reconsideration where the Court’s decision was correct. See 5 McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1255. Accordingly, the amended motion 6 for reconsideration based on Rule 59(e) is DENIED. 7 The Court next considers the motion under Rule 60(b). Rule 8 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the 9 following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 10 excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 11 diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 12 new trial; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; 13 (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) any other reason 14 justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J v. ACandS 15 Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993). Rule 60(b)(6) is a 16 “catchall provision” that applies only when the reason for 17 granting relief is not covered by any of the other reasons set forth 18 in Rule 60. United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 19 (9th Cir. 2005). “It has been used sparingly as an equitable 20 remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only 21 where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking 22 timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Id. 23 (internal quotations omitted). 24 Plaintiff has failed to establish any basis for reconsideration 25 under Rule 60(b). At most, his argument that Dr. Bright offered 26 by the adverse party.” The relevant inquiry is not whether 1 fraudulent conduct prejudiced the opposing party, but whether it 2 harmed the integrity of the judicial process. See United States v. 3 Sierra Pacific Indus., 862 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). 4 There must be an intentional, material misrepresentation that 5 goes to the central issue in the case and that affects the outcome 6 of the case. Id. Relief is available only where the fraud was not 7 known at the time of settlement or entry of judgment. Id. A 8 “mere discovery violation or non-disclosure does not rise to the 9 level of fraud on the court.” Id. at 1171. “[A] long trail of small 10 misrepresentations--none of which constitutes fraud on the court 11 in isolation--could theoretically paint a picture of intentional, 12 material deception when viewed together” even if each individual 13 misrepresentations did not rise to the level of fraud on the court. 14 Id. at 1173. 15 Here, Plaintiff points to parts of Dr. Bright’s declaration 16 which he asserts includes “perjured” statements. First, Plaintiff 17 asserts that Dr. Bright’s account of an incident where Plaintiff 18 was alleged to have run 10 feet is incorrect. Dkt. No. 175 at 12. 19 However, the Court did not merely rely on Dr. Bright’s 20 declaration but reviewed the supporting documentation by 21 medical staff reporting on the incident. Dkt. No. 169 at 5-6. 22 Accordingly, any alleged inconsistency by Dr. Bright in this 23 regard did not affect the outcome of the case. Plaintiff also 24 points to Dr. Bright’s statement that Plaintiff was belligerent 25 toward staff without identifying the specific staff member. Dkt. 26 outcome of the case because there was other evidence of 1 Plaintiff’s belligerence: Defendant Birdsong reported Plaintiff 2 was belligerent in March 2015, Dkt. No. 169 at 8; and Plaintiff 3 was belligerent while interacting with Dr. Carl Bourne, a 4 nonparty, whom Plaintiff called a “liar,” id. at 9. Plaintiff also 5 asserts that Dr. Bright offered “perjured testimony” when he 6 stated that there were no physical findings in Plaintiff’s medical 7 exams or imaging to support Plaintiff’s request for surgery. Dkt. 8 No. 175 at 18-19. Plaintiff asserts that the consultation notes 9 from Dr. Rahimifar from 2006 states otherwise. Id. at 19. 10 However, Plaintiff’s claim in this instant action was that 11 Defendants wrongly denied him surgery in 2016 and 2017: the 12 fact that Plaintiff needed surgery in 2006, which he did in fact 13 receive, does not establish that Dr. Bright’s statement over a 14 decade later was false. Based on the foregoing, the Court is not 15 persuaded that Dr. Bright’s declaration constates “fraud” such 16 that it harmed the integrity of the judicial process. See Sierra 17 Pacific Indus., 862 F.3d at 1168. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 18 failed to establish that he is entitled to this equitable remedy 19 under Rule 60(b) to prevent manifest injustice. See Washington, 20 394 F.3d at 1157. 21 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for 22 reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) is DENIED. 23 Dkt. No. 175. 24 Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to respond to the 25 court’s order is DENIED as moot. Dkt. No. 173. He also 26 1 || motion is DENIED to filing it in the Ninth Circuit, if he chooses 2 || to appeal this matter. 3 Plaintiff's request that his motion for reconsideration be 4 || served on Defendants’ counsel is also DENIED as moot. Dkt. 5 No. 174. 6 This order terminates Docket Nos. 173, 174, and 175. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. || Dated: _ May 25,2021 __ hota Lun jrornuenl, 9 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 10 United States District Judge 1 12

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 || PRO-SEWLACRI701690Martin deny.recon 26 27