Martin v. Montgomery County Department of Police

Fourth Circuit

Martin v. Montgomery County Department of Police

624 F. App'x 115

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedDecember 17, 2015

Docket15-2139

StatusUnpublished

This text of 624 F. App'x 115 (Martin v. Montgomery County Department of Police) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Martin v. Montgomery County Department of Police, 624 F. App'x 115 (4th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*116 PER CURIAM:

Richard Martin appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil action pursuant to 28'U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On appeal, Martin challenges the district court’s conclusion that his claims were untimely. Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations. See Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (2013) (general civil statute of limitations); Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105 (2013) (actions for assault and defamation); Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir.2014) (§ 1983 claims), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1893, 191 L.Ed.2d 762 (2015). While Martin’s malicious prosecution claim has not yet accrued, this claim is barred by his inability to meet the favorable termination requirement. See Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (2000). Contrary to Martin’s assertions, the facts alleged in the complaint demonstrate that his remaining claims accrued, at the latest, by the time he was released from prison, and the limitations period was not subject to tolling. See A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2011) (accrual under § 1983); Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 43 A.3d 1029, 1034-34, 1039-41 (2012) (discussing accrual and tolling under state law); see also Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166-67 (4th Cir.1991) (describing continuing violations doctrine). Finally, because Martin’s claims were properly dismissed, the district court committed no error in denying as moot Martin’s request to file electronically.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Martin’s motions to seal and to compel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*116 PER CURIAM:

Richard Martin appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil action pursuant to 28'U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On appeal, Martin challenges the district court’s conclusion that his claims were untimely. Martin’s claims, whether brought under state law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), were subject to, at longest, a three-year statute of limitations. See Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (2013) (general civil statute of limitations); Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105 (2013) (actions for assault and defamation); Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir.2014) (§ 1983 claims), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1893, 191 L.Ed.2d 762 (2015). While Martin’s malicious prosecution claim has not yet accrued, this claim is barred by his inability to meet the favorable termination requirement. See Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (2000). Contrary to Martin’s assertions, the facts alleged in the complaint demonstrate that his remaining claims accrued, at the latest, by the time he was released from prison, and the limitations period was not subject to tolling. See A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2011) (accrual under § 1983); Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 43 A.3d 1029, 1034-34, 1039-41 (2012) (discussing accrual and tolling under state law); see also Nat’l Advert. Co. v. Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166-67 (4th Cir.1991) (describing continuing violations doctrine). Finally, because Martin’s claims were properly dismissed, the district court committed no error in denying as moot Martin’s request to file electronically.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Martin’s motions to seal and to compel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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624 F. App'x 115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martin-v-montgomery-county-department-of-police-ca4-2015.

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